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FOREWORD

Much of the floodplain development taking place today in the rapidly
growing areas of the United states is at high risk of damage or destruction due
to the velocity, rapidity, duration, or debris content of flood waters.

These

and other complications create a ·protection gap· in current floodplain management guidelines which usually address the depth of flooding but not other
factors.
This symposium focused upon techniques for identifying and managing such
high risk areas.

At all levels of government progress in effectively reducing

flood losses in high risk areas has been slow due to the lack of detailed flood
data and the lack of development guidelines reflecting the full range of risk
factors.

Yet real progress has been made in a few community and state programs

and in federal agency research.
The papers presented in this symposium define high risk area problems and
document problem-solving approaches.

We hope you will find them useful.
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RESOLUTION 1984-1
HIGH RISK AREAS

WHEREAS, the Association of State Floodplain Managers has completed preliminary work to identify high risk areas and analyze the status of floodplain
management for these areas; and
WHEREAS, simplifying assumptions for floodplain management made by Federal
agencies, states, and local governments in the late 1960s have resulted in
serious understatement of hazards in 20-30% of the nation's floodplains; and
WHEREAS, these simplifying assumptions include: 1) flood stage is the only
damage factor; 2) only clear water flooding occurs; and 3) the channel (or
shore line) configuration is stable; and
WHEREAS, these simplifying assumptions, while necessary at the time,
failed to consider: 1) velocity, 2) debris in the water (ice, rocks, trees,
etc.), 3) rapidity and duration of flooding, and 4) erosion and other changes
in the flood channel; and
WHEREAS, as a result of these assumptions, flood mapping, regulatory
standards, and insurance rating are inadequate for a significant portion of the
nation's floodplains; and
WHEREAS, failure to correctly map and regulate high risk areas, without
consideration of additional risk and loss potential, is causing and will cause
an escalation of insurance claims and disaster losses; and
WHEREAS, growth potential is substantial in high risk areas including:
barrier islands (e.g., much of the developed Gulf and Atlantic coastline);
areas subject to subsidence (e.g., New Orleans and Houston-Galveston); alluvial
fans (30% of the arid southwest and Colorado); and areas prone to mudfloods
(California coast and Wasatch front); and
WHEREAS, increased market penetration for flood insurance in high risk
areas will likely lead to massive increases in losses (out of proportion to
premiums) in high growth areas such as Los Angeles County, Clark County, New
Orleans, Houston-Galveston, Denver, and Salt Lake City, unless insurance
premiums and land management standards are adjusted to reflect the special
risk; and
WHEREAS, the state of knowledge with regard to mapping and management of
high risk areas has progressed sufficiently in the last 15 years to permit a

variety of low-cost actions to reduce losses including mapping as part of the
remaining map studies and remapping effort, upgraded land management, and
increased insurance rates; and
WHEREAS, there are continued methodological problems which need research
and field testing,
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED, that this Association recommends:
1)

That FEMA, in cooperation with other Federal agencies and states, develop
a national policy for addressing areas where special risk factors
(velocity, debris, unstable channels) pose significant threats to life and
property.

2)

That such a policy supplement rather than replace existing policies
pertaining to flood stage.

,
3)

That an interagency task force be established to develop this policy with
Association assistance.

4)

That such a policy not only recognize the importance of such areas but set
forth a process to develop improved maps, land management standards,
actuarially sound insurance policies, and postdisaster mitigation plans
and guidelines.

5)

That such a policy be based upon further research and investigation that
will:
a.

Examine, in depth, disaster payments and insurance claims for high
risk areas to determine the magnitude of existing losses.

b.

Determine growth potential in these areas (using the Donnelly Study
and other approaches) and future damage potential, including
potential losses due to increased flood insurance penetration.

c.

Determine the effectiveness of land management techniques in such
areas (e.g., elevation on pilings vs. elevation on fill) and needed
improvement through postdisaster surveys and laboratory modeling.

d.

Through demonstration projects, determine for individual types of
areas cost-effective combined approaches including mapping, land
management standards, insurance, etc. These might best be initiated
in communities and states in need of immediate assistance and willing
to assist in these efforts.

Adopted in draft form this 15th day of June, 1984, at the annual meeting
of Association of State Floodplain Managers in Portland, Maine.

Robert Hendrix, Chair, ASFPM
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IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FLOODPLAIN
MANAGEMENT IN HIGH RISK AREAS

Jon A. Kusler and Pat Bloomgren

Introduction
On the average, 200 lives are lost each year due to flooding.

The u.S.

Water Resources Council has estimated that property losses will exceed $4.3
billion per year by 2000, despite the mapping and regulation of floodplains in
17,000 communities during the last 15 years.
Inadequate maps, regulations, and other management approaches for high
risk flood hazard areas and substantial new development in these areas are one
reason for increased rather than decreased losses.

High risk areas collective-

ly constitute only 20-25% of the nation's floodplains, but account for much of
the loss of life.
destroyed.

When flooding occurs, structures are severely damaged or

Such high risk areas include barrier islands, bluffs and beaches

subject to waves and erosion; alluvial fans; areas behind unsafe levees and
below unsafe dams; and areas subject to mudfloods, inland and coastal subsidence, inland flash floods, ice jams, and fluctuating lake and ground water
levels.
High risk areas occur in a broad range of geologic, topographic and hydrologic conditions:
Coastal Erosion/flooding
At least 2,700 miles of Great Lake, Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf shoreline
are subject to critical erosion with thousands of miles of other shores subject
to lesser beach, dune, and bluff erosion.
thousands of structures are at risk.
and winter storms.

Tens and perhaps hundreds of

Most erosion occurs in major hurricanes

Sea level rise compounds the problem.

mapping and regulation has not considered erosion.

Most flood hazard

However, storm-related

erosion is compensated by flood insurance despite a lack of mitigation standards for this special flood hazard.

4
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Alluvial Fans
It has been estimated that alluvial fans constitute 30% of the arid Southwest land including even a greater percentage of the developable land.

Fans

have usually been mapped, regulated, and insured as shallow flooding areas
despite severe flood hazards due to the velocity of the flooding, debris, and
erosion.

Mudflows and Mudfloods
Mudflows and mudfloods often occur when heavy rains follow forest fires in
the Southwest.

They have accounted for hundreds of millions of dollars in

flood losses in the last decade not only because of the depth of inundation but
also because of the velocity of the water and the debris.

Mudflows also occur

in other areas of the nation.
Areas Below Unsafe Dams
At least 2,900 dams have been listed as "unsafe" by the Corps of
Engineers. It has been estimated that more than 2,000 communities would be
inundated to levels exceeding the 100-year flood by rupture of these dams •. The
failure of a dam can cause major loss of life and property damage due not only
to the depth of the water but also its velocity, debris, and the suddenness of
onset.
Areas Behind Unsafe Levees
There are over 25,000 miles of levees in the nation.

These levees range

widely in terms of protection (e.g., 20-year, 30-year, 50-year, 100-year);
construction materials; and adequacy of design and maintenance.

Severe losses

like the $500 million in flood damage in Jackson, Mississippi, in 1979 occur
when levees are overtopped or fail due to the depth, velocity, and suddenness
of the flood.
Subsidence
Flooding due to subsidence, which gradually lowers the land surface, is a
serious problem in Louisiana, Texas, and California with lesser problems in
other states.

Subsidence is caused by extraction of ground or surface waters,

compaction of organic soils, solution, or tectonic adjustments.

Subsidence not

only increases flood heights but also can cause permanent flooding as in
Baytown, Texas.

5
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Liquefaction
Liquefaction caused by earthquakes or other factors is a major potential
cause of flooding in some areas of California and Alaska and along the
Mississippi River.

When earthquakes occur, unconsolidated sands and silts

temporarily lose their strength and behave as viscous fluids.

Levees fail and

slumping and other ground failures occur.
Ice Jams
Flooding as a result of ice jams is a serious problem along rivers and
streams in 35 of the northern and midwestern states.
flood stage
tion.

~o

The jam can increase

heights far greater than the calculated 100-year flood eleva-

Ice and high velocity also add to the destructive force of the flood

waters.
Fluctuating Lake Levels
Long-term fluctuations in lake levels is a problem for the Great Lakes,
many of the glacially created smaller lakes in the northern tier of states, and
the "playa" or drainage lakes in the West and southwest with no or limited
outlets.

Flood waters may rise for years at a time, rendering structures

elevated on pilings useless.

Common additional special risk factors for lake

flooding include ice (northern lakes) and erosion (the Great Lakes).
Inadequacy of Existing Approaches
Existing maps, regulations, insurance and other management approaches
adopted for flood hazard areas by FEMA, states, and local communities during
the late 1960s and 1970s often underestimate the hazards in high risk flood
hazard areas.

Mapping, regulations, and insurance were designed to address a

"normal" flood hazard situation where clear water flooding and the depth of
inundation was the primary factor causing damage.

Flooding was assumed to be

temporary and the configuration of the flood channel relatively stable.

Such

areas include:
•

Low velocity flow areas along major rivers and streams (e.g., the
Mississippi and Missouri); and

•

Relatively flat-lying and stable coastal areas inundated by the storm
surge where waves and erosion are not major factors. These include large
areas along the Atlantic and Gulf Coast.

_____________________O_V_E_R_V_I_EW AND PERSPECT]
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Such a focus upon the "typical" or "norm" with little attention to speci
situations and high risk areas was needed during early phases of federal,
state, and local floodplain management due to limited budgets and personnel,
the need for consistency in standards, and lack of satisfactory mapping methc
and regulatory standards for high risk areas.

National criteria based upon

such a concept of the "norm" have proven satisfactory for much of the country
(perhaps 70-80% including most urban areas adjacent to major rivers and strea'
and the Great Lakes).1
The lack of attention to and the failure to consider other flood damage
factors in special situations has resulted in serious deficiencies in floodplain management for high risk areas:
•

Guidelines for mapping the "norm" and the resulting maps have often unde,
stated hazards in areas with veloci ty, debris, or other high risk proble:
and failed to provide the basis for realistic planning, regulation, and
flood warning systems. For example, flood maps for alluvial fans designate them as shallow flooding areas, implying low risk. Risks are, in
fact, serious--largely due to high velocities, debris, and erosion. Sue,
maps give a false sense of security and may mislead landowners and local
governments.

•

Regulatory criteria designed for the "norm" underestimate the hazard in
velocity, erosion, debris, and other high risk areas, often resulting in
damage or destruction of structures built in compliance with regulatory
criteria when a major flood occurs (e.g., during Hurricane Frederic,
structures built in compliance with the 100-year storm surge elevation
were destroyed by waves which had not been considered).

•

Flood insurance for high risk areas has not reflected actual risk, resul:
ing in inordinately high losses for such areas and an unjustified incentive for development.
In some instances, state and local opposition has developed to federal

maps and regulations due to these deficiencies and the lack of credibility of
approaches now being applied.

Such approaches have not, without tailoring to local conditions,
been satisfactory for smaller rivers and streams and other drainage
areas, which are typically not mapped or regulated or which, if mappe'
or regulated, do not consider the impacts of urbanization on flood
peaks.

Kusler/Bloomgren~

____________
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Inadequate Attention to Risk and Damage Factors
Depth of inundation is unquestionably the most important cause of flood
damage in many situations, and an important factor even in high risk areas.
But other factors become important or dominant in certain contexts:
velocity
The damage potential of flood waters increases dramatically and in some
instances exponentially with velocity.

Velocity is determined by slope, rough-

ness, waves (coastal), and several other factors.

Unless velocities are con-

sidered in building design, floodproofed structures often collapse from added
pressures and stresses.

water moving at speeds of 10-15 or more feet per

second will undermine pilings and slab foundations.

Water velocity is a major

damage factor for
•

Coastal wave action areas (velocity zones) and coastal inlets and overwash
areas during the rise and fall of the storm surge;

•

Inland high gradient flood areas (usually along smaller rivers and
streams). These are also often "flash flood" areas with additional
damage due to the rapid rise of the water. Such areas include alluvial
fans; some riverine floodways; and areas subject to mudfloods, mudflow,
and high gradient sheet flows.

•

Areas behind levees or dams where the protective structure suddenly fails
or the design capacity is suddenly exceeded.
Rocks,

Sedi~ent,

Ice !...-.2..~er Debris

The "work potential" and damage potential of flood waters may be increased
hundreds of times over clear water flooding where rapidly flowing flood waters
contain substantial amounts of rock, sediment, ice, or other natural or humanmade materials.

Clear water standards for floodproofing and elevation are

inadequate in these

contexts:

•

Alluvial fan flooding (rocks, mud);

•

Mudflow and mudflood (sediment, rocks, trees, etc.);

•

Meandering, unstable streams in the Southwest;

•

Ice jam flooding (ice);

8
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•

High velocity flood areas along rivers and streams (rocks, mud trees,
lumber, bridges, etc.);

•

Areas subject to darn or levee failure (trees, portions of houses, lumber,
etc. );

•

Coastal wave action (rocks, gravel, portions of houses, etc.)
Rapid Rise of Water
Areas subject to rapid inundation by flood waters pose special threats to

property and life because there is insufficient time for evacuation, emergency
floodproofing, or other protection measures.

Rapid inundation is a serious

problem for:
•

High gradient rivers and streams in mountainous or hilly areas subject to
sudden rainfall (e.g., Big Thompson Canyon). Such "flash flood" areas are
most common in the mountainous West but occur in the eastern mountains and
elsewhere;

•

Areas behind dams or levees subject to failure;

•

Barrier islands and certain other coastal areas principally along the Gulf
or Atlantic coasts, which may be subject to relatively rapid (2 to 4
hours) hurricane storm surge;

•

Coastal areas (principally along the west coast) subject to tsunamis.
~ong-term

or Permanent Inundation.

Unlike the "typical" riverine or coastal flood situation where flood
waters rise and fall quickly, certain areas are subject to long-term or essentially permanent flooding.

Structures elevated on pilings or floodproofed in

such areas are often permanently unusable and must be abandoned unless specially designed for long-term inundation with adequate access and services.

Such

areas often include:
•

Barrier islands and beaches inundated by rising sea levels;

•

Areas around lakes subject to long-term fluctuation of ground water
levels; playa lakes and internal drainage lakes such as the Great Salt
Lake; and lakes with inadequate outlets such as the Great Lakes;

•

Erosion areas, such as bluffs, where the land itself is destroyed in a
flood event;

9
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•

Subsidence areas such as Baytown, Texas, caused by ground water or oil
withdrawals, isostatic adjustments, or gradual solution of the underlying
strata (karst topography);

•

Areas subject to high groundwater levels and those behind dikes and levees
where high water levels may persist for months or years (e.g., lands in
Arizona adjacent to dikes along the Colorado River).
Two or more of the special risk factors often occur in combination in high

risk areas, exacerbating the problem.

For example, high velocity, debris, and

rapid rise of water cause severe damage in alluvial fan, mudflood, high velocity mountain stream areas, and areas subject to flooding by the failure of dams
or levees.
Erosion of the folood channel or blockage of the channel by sediment or
debris is also common in alluvial fan, mudflood, high velocity stream, and
coastal velocity areas.
Progress in Addressing High Risk Areas
Progress has been made in identifying high risk areas and formulating or
adopting special management standards for them.
1)

FEMA has identified coastal velocity zones and is adding wave elevations
to coastal flood hazard maps. FEMA now requires special engineering for
structures in velocity zones although erosion is not considered. FEMA has
also undertaken studies to develop mapping methods for areas below unsafe
dams, mudslides, alluvial fans, and ice jams. However, few maps have been
actually prepared.

2)

The u.S. Army Corps of Engineers has identified coastal erosion areas
including those subject to "critical" erosion. The Corps continues to
plan and construct coastal erosion engineering works and to fund some
private protection measures. Michigan, North Carolina, washington,
Massachusetts and several other coastal states have mapped coastal erosion
areas and adopted setback lines and other regulatory standards.

3)

The National Weather Service has identified, on a preliminary basis,
communities with flash flood problems and is assisting such communities to
develop flood warning systems and evacuation plans.

4)

The U.S. Geological Survey has identified mudflood and mudslide areas in
Utah, the San Francisco Bay Area, and some other areas. The survey has
also mapped "sinks,· liquefaction areas and certain other geologic hazards
in a few locations. Colorado has mapped and established regulatory guidelines for a wide range of special hazard areas. Los Angeles County and
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some other local governments have also mapped and regulated alluvial fans
and mudflood and mudflow areas.

5)

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and some states have established darn
inspection programs to identify unsafe structures.

Iowa regulates areas

below unsafe dams.

6)

NOAA, the Corps of Engineers, FEMA, SCS, and the USGS have developed flood
warning systems and evacuation plans for selected high risk coastal and
inland areas.

Despite this progress:
1)

Only a portion of the high risk areas have been mapped at federal, state,
and local levels on even a preliminary basis. Maps for coastal velocity
zones (the one type of area mapped) do not, in most instances, adequately
consider erosion. There is no systematic high risk area mapping program
in progress on a nationwide basis for even a single type of area.

2)

FEMA, other federal agencies, and the states have, with a few exceptions,
not adopted regulatory guidelines for high risk areas adequately reflecting the risk (except certain coastal velocity zones)
or provided guidance
to local governments with regard to high risk area management.

3)

Federal and state programs for high risk areas are, in general, uncoordinated and fragmented.
For example, many states are mapping coastal
erosion areas, but such erosion information is not systematically considered by FEMA in mapping.

4)

Available information concerning mapping methodologies for high risk
areas, building standards and warning systems and other mitigation
measures has not been widely disseminated. There are few reports, model
ordinances or guidebooks. This problem is particularly critical for
alluvial fans, ice jams, and coastal erosion areas where considerable
methodological and technical information relevant to management of such
areas has been developed but has not been supplied to potential users.
Opportunities
Having mapped and regulated most of the nation's low risk areas, is it not

now time to turn federal, state and, local attention to special problems where
the greatest present and future threats occur?

Arguments that mapping and

regulatory methodologies are not yet adequate and that more research is needed
are not entirely honest or accurate.
apRroaches considerably!

Enough is known to improve management

Arguments that mapping and regulation should wait

until methodologies are fully perfected or until a nationwide program is

Kusler/Bloomgren

11

possible (from budget and personnel perspectives) fail to consider the enormous
present growth in high risk areas, many of which will be developed in five to
ten years (e.g., alluvial fans, coastal erosion areas, lakeshores).
Available methods for mapping and managing high risk areas could produce
maps and regulations with accuracies exceeding many of the flood-prone area
maps and flood hazard boundary maps developed by the USGS and FIA study contractors for 17,000 communities during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

These

maps have served as the basis for flood insurance and state and local regulations despite their many limitations.
High risk areas have been dismissed individually as regional or local
problems not deserving national attention.

But they are collectively important

and should be collectively considered in national policy making.
If more research is needed to perfect map methodologies and land management guidelines for such areas, it should be undertaken.

Budgets, manpower,

and expertise are limited at federal, state, and local levels, but much more
could be done with existing budgets.

For example, map contractors could map

those areas as part of ongoing new flood mapping and restudy efforts already
scheduled.
Selective mapping and management of such areas is needed on a priority
basis, beginning with the areas with the largest potential flood losses, and
with communities or states most interested in improving management of the
areas.
If budgets and staff are insufficient to develop detailed maps and management standards for specific areas, a portion of the data gathering and design
burden may be shifted to those seeking to develop such areas.

Such an approach

has been applied with considerable success by states and communities in dealing
with more conventional flood hazards.

Such an approach involves:

1)

preliminary mapping of areas through use of historical data on hazard
events, soils, topographic maps, elementary modeling, etc.;

2)

Adoption of regulations for mapped areas requiring that anyone wishing to
subdivide land or construct buildings within such areas a) carry out a
more detailed examination of hazards consistent with guidelines in the
regulation and b) prepare subdivision and building designs sufficient to
provide protection for intended uses.

OVERVIEW AND PERSPECTIVE
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While not perfect, such an approach would be a major improvement over
existing mapping and regulatory approaches which ignore risk factors.
Given limited budgets, a major opportunity for improved management of higt.
risk areas also lies in better training and education and improved coordinatior.
and utilization of existing federal, state, and local personnel.

High risk

areas are the logical focus of not only floodplain managers but civil defense
and emergency managers in their disaster preparedness and response programs and
coastal zone managers and land use planners in preparation of coastal zone
management and floodplain management plans.

Management of these areas is also

of great interest to natural resource specialists because high risk areas
encompass some of the most ecologically sensitive barrier islands, beaches, and
wetlands in coastal settings and the shore lands of scenic and wild rivers,
riverine wetlands, and riparian habitat areas (in the West) along inland
waters.
Better interagency coordination at federal, state and local levels for
high risk areas concerning predisaster mitigation planning, regulation, flood
warning systems, flood insurance, engineering works, training and education,
and technical assistance efforts might be accomplished through interagency
memoranda of understanding, executive orders, directives from Congress, or
other approaches.
Other recommendations for improved management of high risk areas include:
•

Improved technical assistance and training and education efforts are
needed for communities. These should be undertaken by FEMA, the Corps of
Engineers, SCS, NOAA, other federal agencies, the states, universities,
and interest groups;

•

Lists of communities with particular types of high risk areas should be
prepared by states to help set priorities for mapping, technical assistance, flood warning systems, and other programs on an interagency basis;

•

Predisaster plans, including master plans, should be prepared by states
and localities for priority high risk areas (e.g., barrier islands,
alluvial fans) to mitigate future damage and provide guidance for rebuilding after a disaster.
Although these measures would reduce losses, the most pressing need is

coordinated and upgraded mapping and regulations and revised flood insurance
policies for these areas.

Suggestions for each of these include:

Kusler/Bloomgren
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Mapping
1)

Efforts at the federal, state, or local level to better address high risk
areas must begin with an identification of communities subject to such
risks and the actual areas. Once identified, regulations and other
management measures can be adopted. Maps are essential if high risk areas
are to be zoned (state zoning statutes require maps). Maps are also
needed to inform governmental officials and private landowners of the
locations of high risk areas. In general, the issue is not whether maps
are needed if regulations are to be adopted for high risk areas but which
map scales, degrees of accuracy, and other features are needed.

2)

Generalized high risk maps should be developed even if detailed mapping is
not practical. These might take the form of overlays. If maps are to be
developed for regulatory and management purposes, it is desirable, but
perhaps not essential, to distinguish between moderate hazard areas and
the truly high risk areas, since regulatory procedure can be used in some
circumstances to make this determination during administrative phases of a
program (as suggested above). Such a procedure is incorporated in the
single-district floodplain zoning ordinance proposed in Volumes 1 and 2 of
Regulation of Flood Hazard Areas. with such an approach the map only
serves to establish regulatory jurisdiction. The specific hazard at a
site is determined through a case-by-case hazard analysis procedure as
individual permit applications are submitted.

3)

If maps are to be prepared for regulation of high risk areas, they must be
prepared at relatively large scale (e.g., 1 inch = 1000 feet or larger).
Large scales are particularly needed for urban areas, although smaller
scales may suffice for rural settings. A quantified evaluation of hazard
is desirable (e.g., the lOa-year event) but not essential. Mechanisms
should be available for resolving boundary disputes and carrying out more
specific hazard and project analysis on a case-by-case basis, perhaps in
the manner suggested above.

4)

Historical data and other sources of available information should be used
for identification of high risk areas if other, more detail information is
not available or cannot be developed. Although high risk factors have not
been systematically mapped, such factors often occur within areas designated as subject to flooding on more generalized floodplain maps prepared
by the u.S. Geological Survey, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the U.S. Soil Conservation
Service. Historical data (albeit unquantified)
also exists for many
areas that have suffered high risk flooding such as flash floods, mudflows, and coastal erosion. This data could serve as the basis for preliminary overlay mapping to supplement existing maps showing flood stage.

5)

Any effort to map such areas by FEMA, by another federal agency, states,
or local governments should not necessarily mean that these areas will be
insured under the National Flood Insurance Program. It may be that for
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some high risk areas, denial of all insurance or at least very high rates
would be appropriate.
6)

without a massive new mapping effort, FEMA could begin to upgrade its
ongoing mapping program by adopting clarified high risk area map guidelines for use by study contractors and training these contractors in the
application of such guidelines. Restudy mapping efforts and mapping after
disasters could also reflect high risk factors.

7)

If FEMA does not wish to map high risk areas due to budgetary and administrative limitations, it may nevertheless wish to encourage state and
local mapping and regulation. Such efforts could serve FEMA's loss reduction objectives, reduce disaster assistance, and reduce flood insurance
payments. Such mapping and regulation could be encouraged not only
through cost sharing and technical assistance but favorable community
rating for flood insurance purposes. For example, a community that maps
and regulates high hazard areas might be given lower overall flood insurance rates due to the overall lowered potential for loss.

8)

Mapping of high risk areas could, perhaps, begin on a pilot basis. Such
pilot studies could test mapping methodologies as well as meet management
needs at particular sites.

9)

High risk area mapping should be a multidisciplinary and, in some instances, a multiagency effort. Mapping of high risk areas often requires
more than hydrologic information, complicating the mapping process and
requiring cooperative multidisciplinary mapping. For example, geologic,
as well as hydrologic, data is needed for the mapping of coastal erosion!
flood hazard areas, mud flow, subsidence, and certain high risk dam
failure areas. The separation of hydrologic and geologic study functions
in federal and state agencies has discouraged such mapping.

10) Some combination of maps and technical studies on a site-specific basis i3
needed for project evaluation. Maps in themselves rarely, if ever, provide-all of the data needed for design of protective works, floodproofing,
and other adjustments in high risk areas since it is difficult to cartographically represent velocity, debris load, depth of inundation, and
other relevant factors even if this information is available. There are
also limits to map scale and accuracy (given limited budgets). Such sitespecific data gathering could be undertaken by consultants, local governments, states or federal agencies.
Regulation
1)

perhaps 60% to 70% of the high risk floodplain areas are subject to at
least minimal floodplain regulations consistent with the standards of the
National Flood Insurance Program. However, with the exception of some
coastal velocity and erosion areas subject to state or local setback or
high velocity zone ordinances, regulatory standards substantially underestimate the true hazard and fail to prescribe adequate protection
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measures. In some instances, such as ice jam flooding, protection elevations are inadequate. In others, the management approaches are inappropriate. For example, elevation of structures on pilings does not provide
flood protection from long-term lake level fluctuation unless roads and
utilities are also elevated and the pilings and structures are designed
for permanent or semipermanent inundation.
2)

The lack of local regulatory guidelines specifically addressing high risk
problems has been due to lack of maps; lack of model ordinance approaches,
manuals or other information setting forth management approaches for high
risk areas; lack of expertise at local or state levels; lack of incentives
to encourage special regulation; and failure of state or national regulations to require or encourage special regulations.

3)

Despite the relative lack of local regulations on a nationwide basis,
several hundred communities have, on their own initiative or at the urging
of states, adopted special hazard regulations for alluvial fan, mudflood,
coastal erosion, and other types of areas. Regulations are usually part
of broader zoning, subdivision control, building code, or other regulations. These regulations serve as valuable precedents for other
programs.

4)

Strengthened regulatory approaches needed for high risk areas may
include:

5)

•

Complete prohibition of development in certain areas with substantial
risks to safety, where development will substantially increase flood
heights or erosion on other lands, or where engineering solutions are
impractical (e.g., bluff erosion, mudslide below unsafe dams). Such
prohibitions may be accomplished through setbacks or open space
zoning.

•

Added elevation requirements through freeboard or increased base load
elevations to reflect the special risk (e.g. wave heights, ice
jams).

•

Strengthened performance standards to reflect not only water depth
but velocity, debris, and other risk factors. Such performance standards could require that anyone desiring a building permit or subdivision plot approval first undertake a hydrologic or combined
hydrologic/geologic investigation to more specifically determine
hazard at the site and then design the proposed structure to withstand the identified hazard.

After flood disasters, upgraded regulations should be adopted for high
risk areas to prevent rebuilding without consideration of special risks.
State or local regulations could take the form of interim "freeze"
ordinances and longer-term enhanced setback of elevations and performance
standard guidelines. FEMA could encourage such regulation by requiring
that federal postdisaster teams address special hazards and by incorpora-
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ting special hazard provisions in the section 406 guidelines for state ar.
local postdisaster mitigation planning.
6)

states could strengthen regulations of high risk areas by mapping and
directly regulating or requiring local regulation of such areas pursuant
to existing broader floodplain management legislation now in effect in
many states; or through new legislation authorizing state mapping and
regulation or state-supervised local regulation of such areas.

7)

FEMA and other federal agencies could encourage local and s ta te regula tic'
of high risk areas through manuals, ordinances, technical assistance
grants-in-aid, training and education programs, and community rating systems for flood insurance (described below). Existing FIA regulatory
guidelines for mudslide and erosion areas could be implemented by actual!
mapping such areas. Broader mapping would also encourage state and local
programs even if FEMA did not require regulation of such areas. Strong
fiscal arguments can be made that over time FEMA should require special
state or local regulations of all high risk areas if subsidized insurance
is to be continued for such areas.

Insurance
1)

Solid estimates are lacking of the total number of structures in high risi
areas insured by National Flood Insurance programs, claims to date, losse;
per claim, the adequacy of protection and management standards, and anticipated future trends. FEMA should begin to systematically gather and
analyze insurance data (and perhaps disaster assistance data) to provide
such information which is needed not only for future insurance rating but
also for the establishment of mapping priorities, regulatory guidelines,
and other management approaches.

2)

It is likely that many existing structures in high risk areas are now
insured under the National Flood Insurance Program because the areas are
contained within broader areas subject to preliminary flood maps or flood
insurance rate maps or because the occupants have applied for such insurance, despite their location outside of mapping risk zones.
Although flood insurance rates have been made more nearly actuarial for
coastal velocity areas, no special risk rating has been applied to other
high risk areas, due in part to lack of maps for these areas or the
identification of special risk factors on existing maps and the lack of
special risk-rating procedures related to actual hazard. Such insurance
has the potential for encouraging unsound development since rates in some
instances (e.g., alluvial fans)
grossly underestimate risk.

3)

Any effort to increase flood insurance rates for unidentified high risk
areas would require, as a starting point, the identification of such areas
with a degree of accuracy considered satisfactory for insurance rating.
Relatively poor initial data might be used if techniques are available to
refine hazard data and insurance rates on a site-specific basis as has

!
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been done with coastal velocity zones. Another approach might be to apply
high insurance rates on a uniform basis for identified areas with the
option of the community or developer applying for lower rates if they
could provide information indicating lower risk or satisfactory master
planning or engineering to address risk.
4)

FEMA might encourage local or cooperative state/local mapping of high risk
areas through an "incentive" insurance rating scheme. Lower overall
insurance rates would be made available to a community willing to map and
regulate high hazard areas with more specificity than now is required by
FEMA regulations. Such an approach would encourage community and state
initiatives in reducing losses and would make sound financial sense, since
additional community mapping and regulation of these areas would reduce
federal insurance claims and disaster assistance payments.

5)

Congress could eliminate insurance for certain high risk areas through
amendments to the flood insurance act or special legislation such as the
Coastal Barrier Resources Acts of 1982 (which prohibits flood insurance
and certain other federal subsidies for new development on certain undeveloped barrier resources.)
If present rating procedures are not revised to reflect actual risk, such an approach may be needed to prevent
further encouragement of unsound development.
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SIMPLE TRUTH IN PUBLIC POLICY

James E. Tierney
Attorney General, State of Maine
The first elemental truth with which I would like to leave you this afternbon is that I am far from an expert in managing high risk flood areas.

So the

mtst I can do to keynote this conference is to help you place your tremendously

1

important work in a broader context--a context within which public policy will

1

be made for the rest of our lifetimes.
Your work and responsibilities were an unknown governmental function
during the early days of our country when we moved from an agrarian to an
industrialized society.

When our parents, grandparents, and great grandparents

came as "huddled masses" to these shores, their everyday problems were so
immense that few were concerned either about protecting the natural environment
or protecting themselves from it.
History books are filled with references to the human suffering which
resulted from those early decisions.

The growth of industrialism in the late

19th and early 20th centuries was hard, bloody, and filled with pain.

It was

only as individuals began to claw a ,semisecure niche in our country that they
began to feel comfortable enough to assert that, indeed, they did have a right

to a government that provided basic health facilities, that provided an economic and natural environment in which they could be happy while they raised their
families, and that all had the right to live to a prosperous old age in peace
and dignity.
So it was that when Franklin Delano Roosevelt swept into office, it was
with the belief that government itself could be a positive force in people's
lives.

Surely government could be designed to do more than provide for the

common defense and deliver the mail.
The first task was to correct the gross disregard previously shown for our
Ruman and physical environment as a result of the rapid capital formation;
government had to address the human suffering that prevailed in the land.

The

J

New Deal and all it meant for America, from social security to electricity in

~ral America--which, of course, also marked the beginning of 20th century
!lood control--was clearly only the beginning.

20
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After World War II, as our society grew in strength and wealth, the
American public demanded and received an even higher standard of living.
Essential to that, and relevant to our discussions today, was the rise of
environmentalism.

Many point to Rachel Carson's Silent

~pring,

published in

1962, which showed the destructive side effects of a number of "miracle"
pesticides, as the beginning of contemporary environmentalism.

This nation

began to pay attention to a new grass roots movement called "ecology."

Earth

Day, in 1970, provided a clear indication that environmentalism was strong,
politically powerful, and here to stay.
Americans were demanding strong laws and were willing to put their dollars
behind solving some of our most apparent environmental problems.

Americans

refused to allow their rivers to remain open sewers; Americans refused to al.l.o.
their air to be choked with smog; and Americans refused to see precious wildlife brought to extinction.
Public officials eagerly joined this movement.

They did so because of "he

voices of their constituents, and they did so because immediate action was long
overdue.

They did so also, however, safe in the realization that they would

not have to make very difficult choices in defending the environment because
America during this period was sustaining a long and uninterrupted period of
economic growth.
From 1950 to 1973, the gross national product doubled in real dollars,
national producti vi ty increased on an average of 3% per year, and inflation v,as
virtually nonexistent.
real dollars.

During this period, the price of oil actually fell ir

While the balance of foreign trade was generally positive, it

was not deemed essential to economic health because 93% of the gross national
product went into domestic sales.
American technological ingenuity powered these increases in productivity
and the resulting economic growth.

People allover the world used our steel,

drove our cars, and we stood as the world's economic colossus.
Lest we forget, the outcry for increased environmental protection was only
part of what Americans were demanding from government.

Increased--and I might

say unfunded--social security benefits were passed on an annual basis.
were demanding a safer work place.
rapidly as environmentalism.

Workers

Consumerism raced into vogue at least as

Everyone demanded shorter hours and more pay and

no one seemed to really care about productivity, growth and competition.

!~lO.r~ey
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politicians were happy to accommodate, and the nation's economic growth
sustained these new demands.

Great successes were made in all areas, but

especially in the environment as Maine's own Ed Muskie championed the environmental cause with the result of dramatically improved air and water quality.
Leisure, recreational opportunities and cleaner beaches caused a national
rush in the 1970s towards the construction of second homes and cottages along
our now clean rivers and beckoning oceans.

The wealth of our nation generated

the construction, and clearly good things were waiting for us all.
What does all this mean for us today?

Where are we now?

Why do my

remarks seem to evoke a time which, although we all remember it, seems so far
away?
My friends, those times are indeed far away, and, I would state as a
hypothesis, they will not return.

There is no doubt that the united states

will, for the rest of our lifetimes, have an economy of scarcity within which
every dollar granted by the public sector will be closely scrutinized.
I am sure we all wish it were different.

I am sure we all wish that we

were sustaining greater economic growth when we are not.

I am sure we all wish

that our federal government was not sustaining deficits of almost 200 billion
dollars a year which threaten continually to send us into an inflation/
unemployment spiral.

I am sure we all wish that our nation's goods and

services were more competitive in the international market.

I am sure we all

wish that Adam smith's invisible hand would appear with enough money in it to
provide for a dignified life for the elderly, the abolition of ignorance and
child abuse, full employment, educational opportunities for our youth, and
markets for goods that are made in America--that are worth what we pay for
them, safe to use, and made to last a lifetime; and enough money to create
easily not only a clean environment but also the opportunity to avoid environmental risks that are within our control and to mitigate those which are not.
As mature leaders we must realize this is not to be.

This is not because

of some mysterious evil force or a political malaise; but rather because other
nations in the world--both friends and enemies--have worked hard to ach·ieve the
same goals we have--security, peace, and a clean and safe natural and physical
environment.

These nations, especially since the oil crisis in the early

1970s, have become technologically sophisticated and diplomatically wise so as

to create competition that means our nation will always face difficult
choices.

OVERVIEW AND PERSPECTt.
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What then is my message to you as you step back from your hectic scheduh
to begin this conference?

What is your message and how do you carry it out

into a public that is so concerned and so worried about other things?

Allowt

to make a few suggestions.
1)

Regardless of your political preference, insist on a government that

is clean, active, and strong.

Against those people who do not believe that

government must play an active force in the daily lives of us all, I urge you
to stand up and be heard.

When po Ii ticians and cynics from ei ther the private

or public sector berate the efforts of the millions of dedicated public officials in this country, then it behooves you and me to stand up and tell them
that they are wrong--tell them with our voices, with our feet, with our money,
and with our votes.
2)

Clarify your message.

The efforts that you take and the requests you

make of public officials--elected and appointed--must be done with a basic
understanding that their choices are difficult ones.

You therefore have a

special responsibili ty to make your points clear, concise, and based on a real·
istic listing of priorities.
The facts are clear enough.

Hundreds of lives and four billion dollars a

year are being los t to our nation because of inadequate planning and manageroen:
of high-risk hazardous areas.

Much of this is avoidable if this society, whid

has the capacity to do so much, takes it seriously.
it clear.
3)
mistakes.
now.

Refine your message.

Mak!

Drive it home.
Accept responsibilities for your failures.

Be willing to admit your

If in the past you have recommended too much or too little say so

I know I am joined in this by millions of Americans who are tired of

people who are more willing to point to "the other guy" than they are to say
that answers they thought were appropriate before are not appropriate now.

The

economics have changed, the culture has changed, and the technology has changed
in a remarkably short period of time.
4)

Don't be afraid to stand up and say so.

Don't be afraid to tell the public that they should not be foolish.

Clearly there are areas in this country that are so environmentally sensitive
and dangerous that development should not occur there.

Be it the floodplain of

a river; be it the base of a volcano; or be it atop a sand dune--you must be
willing simply to say that you cannot build in or live in this place, in this
time, in this way and, if you do, then the government will not be there to help
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These are tough words and tough medicine.

If you do not say it, no one

else will.

i

1,

In conclusion, my remarks roll down to a simple message: The times have

changed and changed permanently.
difficult.

Our resources are scarce and our choices

And finally, to borrow from Confucius, while all truthful people

are not in government, all people in government must be truthful.
I truly hope you enjoy your time with us here in Maine.

I hope you learn

from each other and from us, and that you leave more professional and proficient than when you came.

Thank you for asking me to speak and thank you very

much for being with us here this week in Maine.
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A NOTE ON INTEGRATED EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT:
FACT OR FANTASY

William J. Petak
University of Southern California

Albert Einstein stated many years ago that "a perfection of means and a
cJnfusion of aims seems to be our main problem."

•

If the .problems associated

wfth the implementation of an integrated emergency management system (lEKS) are
~

looked at in a broad context, one has to agree with Einstein.

Although techni-

cal, bureaucratic, and procedural methods of dealing with disaster management
problems are being perfected, application of these methods in many cases lacks
clear direction.

However, even if the perception of aims were clear, the wide

choice of means makes accomplishment of the aims a very complex undertaking.
IEMS is seen by many as "old wine in a new bottle," in that Comprehensive
Emergency Management, promoted more than a decade ago, is the same thing.
Others see IEMS as legitimizing preparation for nuclear war by diverting the
focus to major catastrophic events such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods.
Still others see lEKS as the application of a more rational systems approach to
understanding and developing solutions to a complex set of problems.
Whether lEKS is a fact or fantasy is highly dependent upon one's perspective, which is generally based upon past experience (successes and failures);
knowledge, skills and attributes; political support within the responsible
jurisdiction; and the availability of data and information.

There appears to

be little question that, in a time of severely limited resources, economic
growth as evidenced by increased land development is highly valued, and the
governmental focus is on limited regulation and more freedom of choice, much
effort will be required by state and local officials to achieve the aims of

•

I~MS.
j

There are many factors working against developing and implementing policies that will make lEKS a workable system.

~tigating

Included in this list of factors

against developing policy support are 1) the absence of sufficient

j

B Pportive political constituencies;

1
3~ significant problems of

2) absence of effective inside advocates;

complexity and uncertainty; 4) confusion of issues
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of fact and value; 5) administrative inadequacies; and 6) failure to see the
benefits of multihazard approaches and coordination.
Once policies have been adopted, implementation is handicapped by 1) slow
progress in identifying and mapping hazard zones; 2) poor procedures and data
bases supporting cost/loss reduction analysis; 3) significant turf difference
across jurisdictions in building code and development policies; 4) inadequate
codes; 5) limited technical capacity on the part of many jurisdictions' personnel; 6) emphasis largely on demands for financial assistance and area protection works; and 7) past coordination inadequacies on the part of the federal
government.
Necessary critical actions on the part of those involved in the emergency
management system are to 1) develop a positive and creative attitude toward
IEMS; 2) integrate IEMS into the comprehensive (urban/regional) land use planning process and engage in pre-event planning; 3) create a participatory system
designed to help overcome the internal turf issues; 4) apply technical expertise early in the process; 5) develop multijurisdictional relationships and
memorandums of understanding; and 6) develop and implement training and education programs for both jurisdictional staff and the citizenry.
Only when we increase our level of professionalism will we begin to both
see and understand the benefits of IEMS.

It is important that we learn from

our successes, share limited resources, overcome turf problems, and, finally,
emphasize solutions.
purpose.

Agreement on aims and implementation of means is our main

FEDERAL INSURANCE ADMINISTRATION INITIATIVES
TO RESOLVE INCONSISTENCIES IN
FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS

William L. Trakimas
Indiana Department of Natural Resources

TQe main issues that confront us today are the complexities and inconsistencies that exist at the local level for administering an effective floodplain management program.

This issue is magnified when we start addressing

high risk areas.
Problems already exist with the basic terminology and management procedures for dealing with the "normal" floodplain as shown in the Flood Insurance Studies.

The introduction of terms like liquefaction, alluvial fans, and

fluctuating lake levels has the potential of confusing the part-time local
official who is the foundation of a successful floodplain management program.
This does not mean, however, that we should forget these issues in the
name of simplifying the program.

Rather, we should strive harder to work with

each other to incorporate these ideas into implementation strategies that
simplify this program, into a framework that truly shows the federal/state/
local partnership working together instead of in segmented efforts, each trying
to protect its own turf.

This will require sweat and compromise by everyone if

we are serious about reaching our goals.
An

effective partnership is beginning to be realized.

The FIA planning

cycle is an excellent example whereby we now know when policy and program
changes will occur and how we can plug into that cycle.

This cycle allows us

(the ASFPM) as a volunteer group to make wise use of our limited time and
resources to achieve the biggest results.
The producers Services Review Committee is another avenue by which we can
~rovide

~

valuable input on insurance issues to local producers.

This group has

"teen successful in getting the FIA too revise definitions, develop better claims
procedures, and make the insurance program operate more like the private
Industry.

J

The goal or challenge for us is to begin to make better use of these

lvenues that already exist.

Through our past efforts we have seen the NFIP
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become a program better adapted to local administration.
in some areas, but it has occurred.

PERSPECTI~

Change has been slow

Only through a concentrated effort by all

those involved can we begin to resolve the remaining inconsistencies and make
the NFIP a program that truly meets the needs of those who need it most--the
local officials and their citizens who live in high risk areas.

PART TWO
SPECIAL HIGH RISK FLOOD AREAS:
Ice Jams
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THE COLD FACTS OF ICE JAMS:
CHARACTERISTICS AND INCIDENCE

R. Gerard
Department of Civil Engineering
University of Alberta

The Problem
In cold regions, floods are caused either by high discharge (an open water

~flood), or the effects of ice, of which ice jam floods are most common.

~ngland

..... ice jam flooding is a frequent occurrence....

~ommunities

In New

Since 1970, 249

in these states have suffered from ice jam flooding.

Of the 249

'''communities documented, 49 were identified as having frequent ice jam floods
"which caused substantial damage"

(McLoughlin, 1980).

Oil City, pennsylvania,

~

',provides another example.

There, ice j am flood stages far exceed open water

stages in both magnitude and frequency (Deck and Gooch, 1981).
Such ice-related flooding should be anticipated anywhere north of the 0 0
January isotherm, an area that includes some 80% of North America and 50% of
the contiguous united States.

It should be kept in mind that such a limit is

just a guide: there have been ice jams on the Mississippi River at New
Orleans.
A breakup ice jam flood frequently resembles a flash flood, with extremely
rapid water level increases with little or no warning.

A description of events

during the severe ice jam flood from the Delaware River at Port Jervis, New
York, in 1875, illustrates this point.
" ••• The volume of water in the river appeared to increase as if by magic,
and within ten minutes a raise [sicl of eighteen feet occurred" (Port Jervis
paily Union, March 1, 1875).

Later the same month, in a separate but related

ievent:
Just at this moment, the Erie dispatch engine, which had been sent to
Delaware Bridge, four miles west of the village, came thundering down the
track, the shrill whistle announcing the approach of the avalanche of
water and ice •••• Men, women and children were fleeing in every direction
for safety ••• (Port Jervis Daily Union, March 18, 1875).
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Similar events have occurred at this location since, the most recent being in
1981.
In Alaska,
An example of a flash flood from rapidly rising backwater occurred ie.
the 1975 spring breakup, when a major ice jam formed at Holy Cross on the
Yukon River. Record flooding occurred upstream at Anvik and Graylin as
the Yukon River rose suddenly. The ice jam held for six days and the
water dammed upstream from Holy Cross inundated the tributary Innoko,
Bonasila, and Anvik Rivers creating a large lake. The lake was estimated
to have an area of 1,000 square miles. This is comparable in size to Lak,
Iliamna, Alaska's largest lake. The description of this flood through the
personal experiences of residents was "worst in the history of the
villages." Multiple flash flooding by waters suddenly released by an i.ce
jam occurred at Anik on the Kuskokwim River during the 1972 breakup. The
town was flooded four different times as the ice jam, that had formed a
lake extending 30 miles upstream, shifted, releasing sudden surges of the
impounded waters.
The art of river forecasting using the best meteorological and hydrologic scientific technology has not yet mastered the prediction of times
of formation and disintegration of moveable ice jams forming suddenly in
random locations (Bowers, 1978).
Freeze-up jams are considerably more placid and predictable but, once the
situation is ripe, can be as inexorable.
Ice jams are a very site-specific phenomenon.

One location can be plagued

with ice jam flooding while sites a short distance upstream or downstream can
be completely free of the problem.
floods.

This differs significantly from open water

A related feature is that ice jam formation can be very sensitive to

river changes.

After construction of even a small dam, ice jams may begin to

form at the backwater in the channel upstream; after removal of the dam, ice
jam flooding may begin at sites downstream that were previously untroubled.
Gravel removal from the Allegheny River downstream of oil City changed a significant ice jam problem into an extremely severe one, while the simple act of
installing an inexpensive boom a short distance upstream of Oil City will
likely completely remove the problem.
Another ice jam feature that follows from this sensitivity is that it is
very difficult to anticipate ice jam frequency and magnitude, particularly for
breakup.
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Causes of Ice Jams
Ice jam formation is an integral part of the freeze-up and breakup processes and is therefore subject to all the vagaries of these phenomena.

Never-

theless there are some features commonly associated with sites subject to
repeated ice jam formation.
Freeze-up jams are usually associated with steep, shallow streams which
resist formation of a solid ice cover and therefore produce large quantities of
frazil ice that eventually must be stored somewhere in the stream channel for
the winter.

It is this storage that reduces, or even eliminates, the waterway

and hence causes flooding.
(Calkins, 1984).

Harkwick, Vermont, provides an example of this

In other cases, the slope may be steep but the velocities are

low enough that an ice cover forms a thick initial accumulation that increases
the stage sufficiently to cause flooding.

The recent flooding from the Salmon

River at Salmon, Idaho, provides an example of this (Cunningham and Calkins,
1984) •

Most breakup ice jams are caused simply by stalling of the breakup front.
That is, either the front meets a portion of the solid ice cover that is more
resistant than elsewhere--is thicker or more shore- or bottom-fast--or the
channel geometry enlarges downstream so that the breakup surge loses its
impetus.

Freeze-up or winter ice jam accumulations obviously result in much

more resistant ice covers and therefore pose a strong impediment to breakup.
Like>lise, a thick ice cover locked into a sharp bend in the channel may resist
breakup sufficiently to initiate ice jam formation.

On the other hand, a

brer,kup surge is attenuated as i t moves into the headwater of a reservoir, a
lake or even a larger main channel, so that even the normal ice cover may be
sufficient to resist breakup and initiate an ice jam.

A similar circumstance

applies to the sudden reduction in a channel slope, a change usually accompanied in an alluvial stream by enlargement of the channel.
New York, site seems to be an example of this.

The port Jervis,

These various factors have

combined to produce the rule of thumb that the vicinity of a sudden reduction
in ,'ater surface slope is a likely ice jam location.
~n

obvious cause of ice jams would seem to be ice floes jamming in a

~ontraction.

While this is the usual reason for initial lodgement at freeze-

lP, and hence initiation of freeze-up, and possibly even of freeze-up jams, it
ls not often the cause of major ice jams at breakup.

Likewise, bridge piers of

SPECIAL HIGH RISK FLOOD
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modern bridges over streams wide in relation to the ice thickness rarely
seriously hinder passage of ice at breakup.
Characteristics of an Ice Jam
When fully developed, an ice j am profile will appear as shown in Figure 1.
Its components are the jam key, which in this case is the solid ice cover; the
thickened toe region, a result of the steeper water surface slope in this
gradually varied flow portion; the body of the jam which, if the accumulation
is long enough, will contain a uniform "equilibrium" section that gives the
maximum depth that can be caused by such a jam and that plays an important role
in the simple analysis of ice jam levels described below; a thinning of the
accumulation to the head of the jam; and a classic backwater curve as the water
depth decreases to the uniform flow depth some distance upstream.

The increase

in water level caused by an ice jam has two sources: the thickness of the ice
accumulation, and the increased flow resistance of the much rougher accumulation "ice cover."

A fragmented ice mass behaves much like a cohesionless

accumulation (the ice fragments in a jam are simulated in hydraulic model
studies by small plastic pellets).

Thus the accumulation thickness depends on

its "geotechnical" strength, and on the drag exerted on the accumulation by the
flow and the downslope component of its own weight.
The accumulation thickness, the waterway depth and, therefore, the wate.r
level, depend mostly on the discharge per unit width of channel, q, the energy
slope, S (roughly the water surface slope), and the hydraulic roughness, k, of
the waterway under the accumulation.

For example, the maximum depth, h, that

can be caused by a steady, floating ice jam is given very approximately by
1

h

[qkl/6J 3/5

'2
IgS

or
2

[n~ f/5 in

SI

Is
where g is gravitational acceleration and n is the Manning coefficient.
(Indeed, it might be noted that the above relations provide the following
useful rule of thumb: the maximum depth to the water level in a floating jam is
given simply by calculating the flow depth under the accumulation using a
regular uniform flow formula (e.g., Mann's equation) and adding 50%.)

As

mentioned, this depth occurs in the equilibrium, or uniform flow, portion.

Figure l(a) TYPICAL ICE JAM CONFIGURATION
(b) MEASURED WATER LEVEL PROFILE THROUGH AN ICE JAM (Andres, 1980).
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Varia tions from the profile shown in Figure 1 can occur.

If the volume of

ice is limited, the jam may not be long enough to develop an equilibrium
portion, and hence the maximum depth along the jam will be more shallow.

On

small, steep streams the required accumulation thickness in the toe region may
be larger than the depth; the accumulation will then ground, over some length,
across a good portion of the channel width.

The flow resistance over this

length will increase substantially which may cause a maximum depth along the
jam greater than the equilibrium depth for a fully floating jam.

However,

analysis of jams in the field to date suggests that the equilibrium depth is
not often exceeded by much for streams more than about 50 meters wide, even if
there is a grounded portion near the toe.
Ice Jam Failure and Reformation
Probably a greater limitation to using depths calculated assuming a fully
developed floating jam under steady flow conditions is the possibility of a
very unsteady flow as a result of ice jam formation and failure.
particular, is by nature a very unsteady phenomenon.

Breakup, in

When an ice jam forms, it

is literally like a dam in the river and, if i t fails suddenly, a surge of fast
moving water and ice will be released.

Depending on the nature of the jam and

the channel downstream, such surges can travel long distances, carrying with
them, with little attenuation, the increase in water level caused by the jam.
If the surge encounters another jam, or the jam reforms, the water level may
rise even further, creating a surge that moves upstream.

Such happenings

explain the dramatic water level increases often associated with ice jam
floods.

For at least some sites--Port Jervis, New York, being one of them--

there are strong indications that the maximum recorded ice-related water levels
have been caused by such events, rather than by the increase in water level
caused by a jam at or downstream of the site.
Ice Jam Flood Frequency
Before planning ice jam flood mitigation measures, i t is necessary to
define the significance of the problem at a particular site.

This will usually

require estimation of the ice-related flood frequency distribution.
several problems with this, particularly for breakup jams.

There are

As mentioned above,

the location and frequency of breakup jams are difficult to assess without
historical data.

As a result analytical techniques, analogous to rainfall

runoff simulations for open water floods, are much less definitive for icerelated floods with regard to frequency.

On the other hand, because ice jams

~erard
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l
ire site-specific and historical records of ice jam floods cannot be transLosed, historical records must be available for the vicinity of the site at

,

~ssue.

On balance, although analytical estimates of frequency distributions

;.~

may be tenuous, they may be more necessary because of the absence of reliable
historical data, particularly for shallower floods.
One reasonable compromise between the limitations of analytically derived
ice jam flood-frequency distributions, and their necessity, is that outlined by
Gerard and Calkins (1984).

In this approach, analytical techniques are used to

derive upper and lower bound frequency distributions, and what historical data
are available are used to assist in deciding on a compromise frequency curve.
Alternately, if a reasonable amount of historical data is available, such
analytical techniques can assist in the reasonable extrapolation of the
historical frequency curve, as is commonly done for open water floods.
It should be noted that the tenuous nature of analytical frequency estimates, and the general lack of gauge records, make historical ice jam data far
more valuable than for open water floods, and the luxury of discarding all but
data for the most extreme events can rarely be afforded.

This means that

historical data from sources of varying reliability and "record length"
usually must be utilized.
Karpuk (1979).

The analysis of such data is discussed by Gerard and

The general problem of flood frequency estimates for cold

region sites is discussed in more detail by Gerard and Calkins (1984).
Conclusions
~

Ice jam floods are much more common and widespread than generally appreciated, and their often substantial contribution to the flood population
generally has been either overlooked entirely or poorly treated in past
flood studies.

~

The characteristics of ice jams are much better understood now than two
decades ago.

•

Ice jam floods can and should be incorporated quantitatively in future
flood studies.
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COLD FACTS OF ICE JAMS:
CASE STUDIES OF MITIGATION METHODS

Darryl J. Calkins
Research Hydraulic Engineer
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory

Introduction
There are very few "classic" analyses of mitigation methods for ice jam
problems.

Unfortunately, the sole approach often has been to treat the symptom

rather than to identify and remove or prevent the cause.
It is fair to say that half the battle in mitigating ice jam floods is
understanding the cause of the problem.
should be evident.

River provides an excellent example.
at breakup.

Once that has been achieved, solutions

The recent ice control structure placed in the Allegheny
The problem was obvious: ice jam flooding

The cause was not known until winter field investigations revealed

that too much ice in a pool in the mainstream prevented the tributary ice run
from entering.

Once the cause was identified, the solution was simple: reduce

the volume of ice in the pool by initiating the ice accumulation at freeze-up
in the next upstream pool.
Understanding the cause requires some knowledge of river/ice hydraulics,
but equally important is keeping an open mind when reviewing the written
accounts of ice jam floods.

Observations of river and meteorological condi-

tions leading up to and including the event can be very informative.
accounts and diaries can be useful.

Newspaper

Another source of information is the

environmental evidence along the river banks.

Moving ice or ice that has been

pushed against the banks often leaves scars on the trees lining the banks.
These scars can be dated, surveyed for elevation, and used in the frequency

!
.::analysis
;1

of ice jam stages when direct observations are not available.

It

',generally takes a lot of time and investigative work to get information on ice
~
)am flooding.

I

~very

Causes of Ice Jam Flooding
It is often difficult to define the cause(s) of an ice jam.

In almost

case, an ice jam forms as a result of an existing ice cover blocking the
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ice run as i t moves downriver.

The channel geometry plays a role, but an ice

run moving down an ice-free river will not suddenly stop and jam.

A full-width

or nearly full-width barrier is necessary to halt its movement.
Once the ice cover has been set in motion downriver, surges of water and
ice accompany the breakup.
almost feeds itself.

As new ice is broken and set in motion, the ice rUn

In some areas the ice cover breaks up and moves away,

while other sites initiate ice jams that create water level differences of
several feet before the jam breaks and the process is repeated.
One classic location for ice jams is in the upper end of the backwater
behind a dam.

The bed slope and the water surface slopes are changed to a

milder condition than existed in their natural state.

Again, the ice cover in

the pool often retards the movement of the ice jam.
Even though bridge piers are often thought to cause ice jams, a careful
look usually reveals that the ice run actually passed the bridge piers, only to
be stalled by the ice sheet downstream.

That is, the toe of the jam was well

below the bridge piers.
An important cause of increased flood levels associated with ice jams is
floodway encroachment.

When a river channel is packed with ice (when 50% to

70% of its depth is ice), the floodway becomes the major channel for conveying
the water.

Unfortunately the designs of many highways have created much higher

ice j am water levels.

In areas prone to ice jams, problems can be caused by an

approach embankment that constricts or cuts off the floodway or by a highway
that is elevated and runs parallel to the channel bank.
causes higher ice jam stages.

Denial of the

floo~way

I have seen the "500-year" open-channel flood

stages exceeded at three sites as a result of floodway encroachment by an ice
jam stage whose flow might have a frequency of only a 10-year open-channel
event.
Once the ice cover has been broken up, ice jams typically are caused by:
•

Backwaters of reservoirs;

•

Major changes in channel gradient, usually a decrease;

•

Low overbank floodways;

[Calkins
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Building of dams and regulation of the flow, especially in the winter;
Removal of dams from the river;

~

·1.

peaking by hydropower dams;

•

water supply reservoirs altering the winter flow distribution;

•

Major sediment deposition;

•

Tributary junctions; and

•

Excessive freeze-up ice cover thicknesses prohibiting channel storage of
breakup ice.

For any of these typical jams, an ice cover must exist downstream of the ice
jam toe to key it in place.
Potential solutions
Once the cause (s) of the ice jam has been determined, solutions can be
eVQluated.

Unless the cause is known with a reasonable degree of assurance,

attempts to solve the problem can be inappropriate and wasteful.
A modification in the ice conditions at freeze-up can have a significant
effect on the breakup conditions and any resulting ice jams.

A corollary of

this is that one ice control measure for breakup jams might be the alteration
of the ice regime during freeze-up.
A structural solution is defined here as a permanent or temporary modification to the river channel and/or the floodplain, including structures that
are meant to minimize or contain flood levels.

Structural solutions include:

•

Ice booms;

•

High/low head structures; i.e., reservoirs, weirs, etc.;

•

Levees, berms, etc.;

•

Floodplain storage facilities for ice;

\.

·

High level diversion channels;

.:.

In-stream channel improvements; and

•

Thermal suppression.
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Nonstructural solutions use existing structures or temporary measures
control the ice and flood conditions.

~

Nonstructural solutions include:

•

Flow control at existing reservoirs;

•

Ice control at existing reservoirs;

•

Dusting;

•

Mechanical removal;

•

Vessel assistance;

•

Removal of structures within the floodplain;

•

Flood warning system;

•

Blasting; and

•

Thermal suppression.
Case Studies

Allegheny River
Report:

Deck and Good (1981).

Location:

Oil City, Pennsylvania

Problem:

Ice jam flooding at the confluence of oil Creek and the
Allegheny River.

Cause:

A river dredging project on the Allegheny created a long,
deep pool just downstream of the confluence with Oil
Creek, which caused a large accumula tion of ice. The ie,
run from the smaller tributary could not penetrate the
Allegheny River ice cover. The ice j am would remain in
the tributary channel and the floodplain (Oil City
business district) would handle the flow.

Solution:

Winter field investigations revealed an excessive ice
buildup--15 feet at the confluence during freeze-up.
relatively inexpensive ice boom just upstream of the
confluence was designed to start the freeze-up ice cover
at that location and minimize the ice volume at the
confluence area.

Implemented:

1982

Performance:

The volumes of ice have been dramatically reduced.
Although conditions have been favorable for ice jam
formation, no ice jam flooding has occurred, as the
tributary ice run can now move into the main river.

~kins
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sjlmon River
Report:

Walla Walla District (1984).
(1984).

Cunningham and Calkins

Location:

Salmon, Idaho.

Problem:

Ice jam flooding at freeze-up and breakup on both the
main river and a tributary.

Background:

The river is designated as wild and scenic. Hydraulic
mining activities created the problem in the late 1800s
by altering the natural channel characteristics of the
Salmon River 26 miles downstream of Salmon, Idaho.
Winter river observations will be expanded to analyze the
environmental impact and assess the performance of the
possible alternatives with respect to the ice regime.

Causes:

Thick ice cover results in stage increases of 8 to 12
feet; low temperatures must occur in the basin;
Floodplain encroachment; and
Breakup ice conditions occur with a higher flow discharge, which creates even higher stages; mild weather
must occur to create high flows.

solution:

Alternatives are being evaluated under the 205 program.

Israel River
Report:

Frankenstein and Assur (1972).
date).

Location:

Lancaster, New Hampshire.

Problem:

Breakup ice jam flooding in the business district and
some residential areas.

Causes:

Removal of two old mill dams upstream;

Northeast District (no

The flooded area is located at a transition from steep to
mild slope; and
A thick accumulation of ice develops in the mild slope
reach during freeze up, reducing breakup ice storage.
Storage:

Install submarine net one mile above the flooded area
where the river changed slope and floodplain relief for
water and ice was available.

SPECIAL HIGH RISK FLOOD AREAS
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Israel River cont'd
Implemented:

1974.

Performance:

The structure has held back ice each year, primarily
because floodplain relief for the water is available.
This was a good solution for holding back ice at this
location. However, the one mile of ice between the net
and the town was still sufficient to cause ice jams in
flooded area.

Solution:

Construct a low head weir 0.5 mile upstream of the
flooded area near the site of the first old mill dam to
serve as a replacement.

Implemented:

1982.

Performance:

The structure does not hold back ice because the pool
length is too short. Ice jam flooding still exists.
Additional modifications may be necessary.

Delaware River
Report:

Philadelphia District (1984).

Location:

Port Jervis, New York; and Matamorous, pennsylvania.

Problem:

Breakup ice jam flooding in two communities.

Causes:

Not fully understood yet; only three major events have
occurred in the last 100 years, with the jam of record
occurring in 1981, causing $18 million in damage. A
midwinter jam at Port Jervis followed by the spring
breakup appear to cause this flood.

Solution:

Several alternatives are being considered:
hydraulic structure;
Flow control, freeze-up and breakup;
Ice control at freeze-up with ice booms;
High level diversion channels; and
Levee protection.

Peace River
Report:

Neill and Andres (1984).

Location:

Peace River, Alberta, Canada.

Calkins (1984).

Permanent
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Peace River cont'd
Problem:

Freeze-up ice cover flooding.

Causes:

construction of hydropower dam 100 miles upstream;
Release schedule of flow (surges); and
Increased winter flows versus the natural condition
(factor of two to three).

solution:

Modify release schedule during freeze up.

Implemented:

Some modification of the releases.

Performance:

Insufficient data have been collected.

Report:

Deslouriers (1965).

Location:

Quebec, Canada.

Problem:

Ice jam flooding at breakup.

Causes:

Thick ice accumulations at freeze-up; and

Michel (1965).

No river channel storage for the ice at breakup due to
thickness of the ice at freeze-up.
Solution:

Construct a 60-foot-high dam upstream of the flooded
area.

Implemented:

1967.

Performance:

Ice jam flooding occurs now in the pool behind the structure and not in the community. The dam is considered
very successful.

Other case studies have been completed, and several are in the analysis/
design phase.

In each case study listed above, field observations by experi-

enced personnel have played the major role in identifying the cause of the
problem. Such personnel are few.

Unfortunately the engineering and planning

communities at large are unaware of the significance of ice problems, let alone
the details of the ice processes.

This situation should not be perpetuated,

and the burden rests with those who can narrow the gap.
Emergency Operations
Generally, once an ice jam has formed and flooding has occurred, remedial
solutions for the ice in the river are not practical.

There are times when
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mechanical removal, such as blasting, or vessel assistance may be used with
good results.

However, the implications of each method must be fully weighed

before a method is chosen.

One may refer to the Ice Engineering Manual pub-

lished by the Corps of Engineers (EM 1110-2-1612) for more details.
It is obvious that residents of areas subject to ice jam flooding should
be aware of the potential for flooding and the conditions that cause ice jams.
Stage increases caused by ice jams can occur very quickly, depending upon the
river.

Rates of water level rise of one foot per minute downstream of an ice

jam failure are common.

Stage increases of 10 to 20 feet within 10 to 30

minutes due to a jam have been reported.
Conclusions
Ice jams are natural occurrences and the misconception that little can be
done to minimize their impact is disappearing.

The causes of ice jams are now

better understood, and remedial measures are being designed and constructed to
address them.
The analytical techniques for ice jams are improving, but technology
transfer is moving slowly.

Alteration of the existing river ice regime by any

external force will have an impact somewhere; fortunately the tools necessary
to assess the impact are now being developed.
The evidence presented in these case studies demonstrates to those responsible for floodplain management that a change in the winter flow regime or
modification of the existing river hydraulics will,affect the ice regime.

This

impact has to be assessed to be certain that both the negative and positive
effects are identified.
ly negative impacts.

Simple ice management schemes can nullify the initial-

For example, by simply altering the hydropower releases

below a dam, one can reduce the potential for ice jam flooding.
•

The general lack of data, particularly high quality data, inhibits ice jam
analysis and makes the causes more difficult to determine.

•

Ice jam flood levels are just beginning to be incorporated into "stage
frequency" analysis. Several techniques for developing the data base may
be necessary to ensure that what little data might be available are
included.

•

The stage damage curve for ice jam flooding has long been assumed to be
similar to the "open water" damage curve. This may be false. The damage
can be significantly greater because the high water velocities cause
erosion and the moving ice floes can damage the structures on impact and
move objects around like match sticks.
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•

The risk to life in ice jam floods is high because the water levels can
rise quickly and residents can become trapped in their houses.

•

There are many remedies for ice jam problems, and care must be exercised
to ensure that the solution will address the cause. The projects will
take longer to investigate because at least one and probably two years of
winter observations are required to ensure that the problem is fully
understood. These studies cost more than traditional "open water" flood
inves tiga tions.
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MANAGING RISK BELOW UNSAFE DAMS
Robert Roden
Bureau of Water Regulations and Zoning
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources
Introduction
One of the emerging "special hazards" issues of the 1980s is the regula'ltion of areas subj ect to floods resulting from dam failures.

Of course neither

ifloodplain management nor dam safety programs are new ini tiatives.

It is the

Jidea of linking them together in a coordinated approach to hazard management
'.that is a recent development.

Before exploring the specifics of what Wisconsin

Jis now doing to address this problem, some of the basic concepts should be
~outlined

•
Basic Issues

;What is an "Unsafe Dam?"
There are certainly a variety of ways to define an unsafe dam.

For our

:purposes, an unsafe dam is one that poses an unacceptable level of risk to life
:.or property through potential failure of the structure.

No dam is 100% safe.

',lIn fact, in a very real sense, the term "unsafe dam" is redundant.

Also, a dam

'jmi.ght be safe now but unsafe in a few years.
iWhat Can Make a Dam "Unsafe?"
There are three ways in which this can happen.

First, the dam may not be

,;designed to pass a large enough flood without "overtopping" (having water
Jflowing over parts of the dam that are not designed for that purpose).
-ja dam may not be properly maintained.
,Ibelow the design flood.

Second,

This can lead to failure at flows well

And third, the dam may not be operated properly.

An

lexample of this would be failure to open gates or spillways quickly enough.

~This
.i

could undo assumptions made by the designer •

~Can We Predict the Likelihood of a Dam Failing?

The only way to be absolutely sure of a dam's failure is to go out after
~the flood and see if the dam is still there.

We can predict with reasonable

~ertainty that the likelihood that a well-operated, well-maintained dam will

~ail is pretty close to the probability of its design flood being exceeded.

At
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the other extreme, a dam which is obviously ready to collapse at any time can
easily be called ·unsafe."

The problem lies wi th the ones in between that, we
For these, ~

feel, could be a sizeable percentage of the dams in this county.

may not know what condition the structure is in and thus have little idea how
·unsafe" i t is.

Because of all the variables involved, using a frequency

analysis based on the number of dam failures would probably be misleading.

So

each situation is unique, and there is no approach to assess the likelihood of
failure.

This is in sharp contrast to our usual approach (admittedly far from

perfect) of predicting flood frequencies from statistical records.
Do Dams Only Fail During Floods?
Of course not.

While floods and other natural disasters

(e.g~,

earth-

quakes) have certainly caused their share of dam failures, many dams fail under
much more "normal" conditions.

In Wisconsin, out of 30 failures documented

between 1973 and 1983, 19 were of the "sunny day" variety.

presumably many of

these failed because they were improperly maintained.
What Kind of Flooding Results from Dam Failures?
While gradual failures can occur (these obviously attenuate the surge of
water and lessen the amount and severity of flooding), a more sudden failure
can lead to rapid increases in water levels, high velocities, and debris damage
(including the possibility of debris jams).

There may be little or no warning,

and sudden failures can occur under conditions (e.g., at night)

where their

detection is almost impossible until i t is too late.
Can Flooding from Dams be Prevented?
As you might guess, the answer is both "yes" and "no".

Proper operation

and maintenance, along with adequate spillway capacity and storage, can go a
long way towards minimizing the risk, but the plain fact is there are no
guarantees.

At the least, a "bigger and better" flood can always come along,

yet people historically have put a lot of trust in the "protection" offered by
dams.
My sense is that what they really have done is to replace a more likely
but less serious risk with a less likely but potentially much more serious
hazard.

So while the safety of most dams can be improved, we think it is also

important to take steps to minimize loss of life and property damage in the
event the dam fails anyway.
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Extent of the Problem
How large a problem are we dealing with?
~isconsin

Ignoring the small dams (in

these make up about 70% of the total), there are about 67,500 large

dams in the united states.

Based on the potential for loss of life from fail-

ure, the Corps of Engineers identified 8,800 "high hazard" dams and found 2,900
(33%) of them to be unsafe (most of these because of inadequate spillway capacity).

If the same percentage of the other large dams were also found to be

unsafe, there would be over 22,000 unsafe large dams (by Corps' standards)
the country (well over 400 per state on the average).

in

This is probably a high

estimate.
To go one step further, if failure of each unsafe high hazard dam could
affect two downstream communities (Dewberry and Davis, 1982), there would be
around 6,000 communities facing a degree of risk to lite and property from dam
failure that the Corps' standards say is excessive.

It is also estimated that

2,000 communities could experience floods greater than the 100-year event due
to dam failures.

All of these figures are "guesstimates".
Managing The Risk: Now

What are we doing about this potential time bomb?
process of developing our awareness.

We are still in the

Most states have floodplain management

programs, and quite a few have dam safety programs.

Fewer have both, and these

often are not housed together; my impression is that not that many states are
clr,~ely

coordinating the two efforts.

To add another factor, the emergency

mandgement agency should playa role as well, and this probably is not happeninc very often.

In Wisconsin, we are just starting to work on coordination

with our Division of Emergency Government.
On the federal side, some things are starting to happen.
(FEOlA) has been given responsibility for dam safety.

One agency

Since FEMA also houses

floodplain management and emergency preparedness, there is a potential for some
me:i.di.ng of these programs into an integrated approach.
emergency management efforts could help us get there.
much to be done to address the problem fully.

Indeed, integrated
Realistically, there is

One of our biggest difficulties

is identifying and mapping the hazard areas accurately so that regulations and
insurance ratings can be realistic and reasonable.
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Managing The Risk: The Future
Here are some key steps to be taken:
1)

2)

Identify the potentially affected areas below dams.
•

Assume any dam can fail and will eventually be removed.

•

Perform a "dam break" analysis at a specified flood frequency.
(Note: water surface elevations resulting from failure during a floo;
will almost always be higher than those caused by "sunny day"
failures.)

•

Do not neglect upstream areas. These should be regulated on the
assumption of the dam not failing since this causes a higher upstrean
profile.

Take steps to limit the risk in the identified hazard areas.
•

Hold regular inspections to encourage improved dam maintenance.

•

Establish dam design standards to set an appropriate level of risk,
assuming proper operation and maintenance.

•

Develop emergency preparedness plans (required by FERC for licensed
dams) and warning systems where appropriate.

•

Require proper dam operation (set limits and criteria).

•

Require proper design and construction for new dams and for significant repairs or alterations to existing dams.

•

Guide land use and development to reflect the hazard (zoning).
Insurance "disincentives" would be helpful, but it is difficult to
assess the risk to damage unless major simplifying assumptions (e.g.,
all inadequately maintained dams will fail during the 100-year flooo)
are made.
Wisconsin's Current Initiative

While we have not addressed all of the above program elements, the
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources has recently proposed two administrative rules that deal with this issue.
1) NR 116--Floodplain Management: Revisions to existing rule to require
zoning of areas downstream from dams. If the dam can safely pass the 100year flood, zoning will be based on the "no-dam" condition to ensure that
future removal of the dam does not jeopardize downstream development. If
the dam cannot safely pass the lOO-year flood, zoning must be based on
failure of the dam during that event.
2) NR 333--Dam Design and Construction Standards: Requires identification of
area affected by failure of the dam during the lOO-year flood. Establishes a hazard classification based on existing development in this area.
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The higher the hazard classification, the larger the required spillway
capacity. When someone wants to build a new dam or undertake "major
reconstruction" of an existing dam, the rule provides the option of controlling downstream land use to maintain the present hazard classification
or providing the greater hydraulic capacity required for a "high hazard"
dam.
What Might Be Done Under the NFIP?
Given the variability of dams and how well or poorly they are operated and
maintained, having an actuarially-based rate structure for insurance in
affected downstream areas seems out of reach.

Instead, I suggest that FIA

concentrate on:
•

Mapping potential hazard areas during new studies or restudies using both
dam break analysis and the "no dam" condition.

C

providing some kind of rate incentive for proper dam maintenance (e.g.,
failure of a periodic certification by a public agency or qualified consultant that a dam meets acceptable standards might result in no insurance
or increase the rate).

6

Avoiding the creation of an incentive to build below dams by limiting
recognition of the protection they offer. The approach Wisconsin is
proposing may be a model.

G

Alternatively, considering whether insurance for protection of downstream
development might not be considered a responsibility of the dam owner (the
problem here is separation of "natural flooding" damages from the added
ones that may be caused by dam failure).
What Can the States Do?

6

with local input, identify areas (or at least communities) at risk from
dam failure and develop priorities for mapping and corrective/preventive
measures.

"

Ensure an adequate dam safety program that includes regular inspections
plus other inspections as needed; engineering review of plans for construction, alteration, and major repair; the ability to prescribe methods
of operation; and the ability to take necessary action to correct
viola tions.
Establish appropriate standards for land use control in affected areas and
assist locals to adopt and administer zoning based on them.

"

Assist locals and dam owners to develop emergency action plans.
Within capabilities and based on the level of federal assistance, conduct
analyses of dams to delineate the hazard areas.

•

Inform the public of the risks •
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What Can Locals Do?
•

Be aware of the problem.

Help maintain citizen awareness.

•

Plan community growth around (not in) the hazard area.

•

Encourage proper dam operation and maintenance by the owners.

•

Help the state identify hazard areas.

•

Take the lead in hazard mitigation planning and implementation.

•

Adopt and administer adequate zoning ordinances.
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DAM SAFETY AND LAND USE
AN IOWA CASE

Jack D. Riessen
Iowa Department of water, Air and waste Management

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to present the facts of a
case in point about dam safety and downstream land regulations; and second, to

l

discuss the implications of that case on dam safety regulations not only in
Iowa but across the nation.

This situation is somewhat unique in that it

!nvolves dam safety litigation resulting from restrictions placed on land use
downstream of a dam and not from actual damages sustained from the failure of

the dam.
Facts of the Case
The Dam

Yeader Creek is a small creek (10 square mile drainage area)

with its

tipper watershed located in a heavily urbanized part of Des Moines, the capital
dity of Iowa.

From the urbanized portion, Yeader Creek flows out of the city

'iimits into a relatively undeveloped part of polk County, back into the city
~imi ts

briefly and into the Des Moines River a short distance thereafter.

In 1965, the Polk County Conservation Board proposed the construction of a
d,am across the lower portion of Yeader Creek to create a recreational impound-

,

ient as part of a county park.

plans called for the construction of a compact-

er earth fill dam 1850 feet long and 39 feet high;

a concrete chute spillway

~th a 30-foot long sharp-crested weir; and an SAF-type stilling basin.
~

water

storage was estimated as 3,200 acre feet at normal pool and 6,200 acre feet at
~
~e top of the dam.
In essence, the dam proposal was for a well designed

*rncture typical of many dams in the Midwest.
Since 1957, the state of Iowa has had legislation regulating dams and

~ther floodway construction.

Administered by the Iowa Natural Resources

ebuncil, the law required approval of the Council prior to construction.

;~an~

Jt

The

for the proposed dam were submitted to the Council for review in 1965.

v~ew of the low damage potential of downstream lands at the time of review,

e dam was assigned a low hazard potential.
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Design standards then in effect required that low hazard dams be able to
safely pass a design flood resulting from a rainfall of 7.55 inches in six
hours over the upstream watershed.

The review showed the dam could safely pass

a flood resulting from a rainfall of ten inches in six hours, thereby exceedin;
Council standards.

All other design standards were met and the Council

approved the construction of the dam.

The dam was completed in 1967 and has

since been well maintained and is considered structurally sound.

As part of

the County's Easter Lake Park, the dam became known as the Easter Lake Dam.
Easter Lake Estates Mobile Home Court
In 1972, Ronald Woods purchased land along Yeader Creek a short distance
downstream of the dam.

Inquiring as to the feasibility of building a mobile

home park on his land, Council staff informed Mr. Woods that approval of the
Council would be necessary prior to construction.

Notwithstanding, he con-

structed a mobile home park in 1976 and 1977 as Easter Lake Estates, Inc. and
began renting spaces for mobile homes.

The mobile home court is located ·",ithic

the Des Moines city limits and was permitted by the ci ty, which had no floodplain regulations at the time.
National Dam Safety Act
Pursuant to the directives of the National Dam Safety Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C., Sec 47 et seq. (1976), the Council, under contract with the Corps,
began inventorying all nonfederal dams in Iowa.

Initial investigations showed

that the Easter Lake dam should be classified as a high hazard dam due to

me

presence of the mobile home court downstream.
A more detailed investigation of all high hazard dams in 1979 showed that
the Easter Lake dam would overtop during the probable maximum flood (PMF) , the
nearly universal design standard for high hazard dams.
overtop during the occurrence of the 1/2 PMF.

In fact, the dam would

Floodwaters flowing over the da:

would first cut off access to the mobile home court and progressively flood th,
mobile homes by as much as nine feet as the dam embankment eroded.
loss of life and substantial property damage could result.

Clearly,

The dam safety

report classified the dam as a "nonemergency high hazard dam" and recommended
removal of the mobile home court.
Agency Action Against Easter Lakes Estates
Prompted by the dam safety report recommendation, the Iowa Natural
Resources Council commenced proceedings against the mobile home court.

various
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alternatives to removal of the mobile home court were considered (e.g., modifij
qation of the dam) by the Council but rejected as infeasible. The Council
lound that the mobile home court constituted a nuisance and ordered it removed
j

within five years.

Under Iowa law, the Council had specific powers to abate

nuisances related to floods and floodplain construction.

A flood warning sys-

tem and other safety measures were also ordered by the Council for the interim
period.
Court Action
Easter Lake Estates, Inc. appealed the Council's removal order to district
court, which affirmed the order, and to the Iowa Supreme Court which upheld the
district court's ruling Easter Lake Estates, Inc., vs. Iowa Natural Resources
Council, 328 N.W. 2d 906,909 (Iowa 1982).
Although the removal apparently is proceeding as ordered, the mobile home
court has now filed suit for damages against the state, Polk County, the City
of Des Moines, and the assessor who determined the value of the property prior
to pu£chase.

A court date has not been set at this time, but information

available indicates that a variety of allegations have been made, including an
unconsti. tutional "taking."

The order approving the dam contained a condition

that the applicant, Polk County Conservation Board, obtain necessary easements
prior to construction, but downstream easements were not specifically required
by che Council.

:\pparently, the plaintiff feels downstream easements should have been obtained as the presence of the dam encumbered downstream lands.

Needless to

say, the suit raises some interesting questions and bears watching.
Implications of Easter Lake Estates vs. INRC
The supreme court decision, while not addressing all relevant issues, did
endorse some issues that could have relevance in other states.

Some of these

are discussed below.
Public Nuisance
The court agreed that the danger to the mobile home occupants was sufficient to constitute a nuisance which in turn justified the removal order even
though the dam was structurally sound.

An

earlier Iowa case, Iowa Natural

~?rces Council vs. Van Zee, 261 Iowa 1287, 158 N.W. 2d 111

(1968), estab-

lished that the lack of a permit in itself was not sufficient to compel removal
of an illegal levee.

Therefore, removal was justified on the merits of the

nlsance finding alone.

Based on this, other s ta tes may be able to take
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similar actions under a nuisance clause even if they have no state permit
system.
Stringent Design Standards for Dams
The court substantiated the use of an extreme flood event (i.e. probable
maximum flood) for dam design standards.

In view of the catastrophic con-

sequences inherent in a dam failure, the court found the stringent design
standards to be reasonable.

This, of course, contrasts to the usual 100-year

flood standard used in typical floodplain delineation and regulation.
Recognition of the public Use Aspects of a Dam
Accepting the stringent design standards as reasonable, the court then
realized that either the dam and lake had to be removed or substantially modified (which was not feasible) or the mobile home park had to go.

Weighing the

meri ts of both sides, the court recognized that removal of the dam would impair
or affect a beneficial, public use.

And the court found that the mobile home

court had to go, although the illegal nature of the mobile home court was givec
considerable attention.

The implication is that courts will recognize the

public benefits provided by dams.
Other Questions Raised by Ensuing Litigation
The suit now filed against the state, Polk County, the City of Des Moines,
and the assessor raises some interesting questions.

Should easements auto-

matically be required downstream of dams that could fail?

In mapping flooo-

plains below dams and implementing appropriate land use restrictions, should
state agencies accept conditions as they exist and ignore the broader liabilit,
questions that would result from implementing stringent land use restrictions?
Are assessors responsible for recognizing the inherent safety dangers and land
use restrictions below dams (or, for that matter, on any floodplain)?
As this matter is in litigation and the state is a party, prudence prohibits a more weighty discussion of the merits of the case, but the implications of a decision are evident.
Summary
In closing, let me remark that dam safety issues and programs

~

be an

integral part of any floodplain management, flood insurance, or flood hazard
mitigation program.

Hardly a year goes by without a report of a dam failure.

Many dams builtin the 1920s and 30s or earlier are aging, were under-designed,

61

~iessen

we, as floodplain managers, cannot ignore

~and

certainly will not last forever.

~dam

safety hoping it will go away, because, quite simply, it will continue to

Ihaunt us unless we take positive steps to address it.
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NATIONAL DAM SAFETY

Jay B. Scruggs, Jr.
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Background
The National Dam Inspection Act (P.L. 92-367) was enacted in August, 1972,
Ifter a series of dam failures and near failures: the near failure of the Lower
fan Normal Dam in San Fernando, California, on February 9, 1971; the failure of
~e

Buffalo Creek, west virginia, mine refuse embankment dam a year later; and

the dam failure at Rapid City, south Dakota, in June, 1972.

f
~he

The law required

Corps of Engineers to compile an inventory of all the dams in the united

~tates and to perform safety inspections of them.
Congress, however, did not fund the inspection program until late 1977
~fter

the failure of the Kelly Barnes Lake Dam in Toccoa, Georgia.

The results

of the program show that there are over 68,000 dams meeting the size criteria
of 25 feet in height or impounding 50 acre-feet or more of water if six feet or
.hare in height.
federal..

Over 95% of the dams inventoried, or about 64,000, are non-

Of these, the Corps inspected some 8,800 high hazard dams.

About

one-'::lird, or more than 2,900, were determined to be unsafe, and 131 were
JlasEified as emergency unsafe.
III July, 1979, FEMA was assigned the responsibility of coordinating and
promoting
dam safety by Executive Order 12148.
,

FEMA's most challenging task is

to enc,}urage the establishment and maintenance of effective nonfederal dam
safety programs to reduce losses from a dam failure.
Issues
To reduce potential losses downstream of dams in the event of failures,
~ertain

tasks, similar to those undertaken by the National Flood Insurance

Brogram (NFIP), are being addressed by dam safety programs.

~

These tasks in-

qlude but are not limited to the following:
;1
~zard Identification
As the NFIP produces flood hazard maps showing the affected areas of the

~se flood, FEMA recommends the mapping of potential inundated areas downstream
~f dams to notify communities of the potential hazard and to designate areas
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A~I

To assist states, locals, and dam owners to

perform such planning, we will be providing a method developed by Danny Fread
of the National Weather Service for determining downstream flood areas as a
result of a dam break.

This effort will be carried out in addition to those

undertaken by states that received awards from FEMA's Dam Safety Financial
Assistance Program during fiscal years '83 and '84.
Emergency Preparedness Planning
If a dam should fail, it is important that anyone immediately downstream
be notified as soon as possible so that measures can be taken to reduce the
potential for loss of life reSUlting from the impact of the flood wave and
extensive flooding.

Downstream communities should have warning and notifica-

tion procedures, along with plans to evacuate, available and ready to
implement.

Guidelines will be published this year to assist communities

downstream of dams in the development of flood preparedness plans or to
evaluate the effectiveness of existing plans.

FEMA also will be providing,

through the efforts of the Interagency Committee on Dam Safety (ICODS),
guidelines for emergency action planning.
Training
One identified need in the nonfederal sector of dam safety is for tnining
assistance since many states lack personnel competent to conduct inspections
and other safety activities.
training program.

FEMA encourages states to establish their ovm

For states with constraints on funds and staffing, a

c~tal~

of training courses available from federal agencies will be published thL;
summer.

Most agencies will allow nonfederal personnel to attend such courses

on a space-available basis and, in some cases, without a fee.
Public Awareness
Increasing public awareness is one of FEMA's biggest efforts.

Reduction

of loss of life and property can be improved through such public awareness
efforts as simply notifying communities of upstream dams and the status or
classification of the dams.

Inundation maps and warning and evacuation plans

are two means of increasing public awareness of the hazards associated with
dams.

Earlier this year FEMA funded the state of Colorado to develop an aware-

ness program through the Dam Safety Financial Assistance Program.

It is hoped

that the results of this project will be transferable to other states.

One of

FEMA's most successful efforts has been a series of workshops conducted in
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j

with the states to inform participants of not only the hazards but

~lso of the responsibilities and liabilities associated with dam ownership.

~

Risk Management
The flood associated with a dam failure may well exceed the base flood

elevation immediately downstream of the dam and possibly farther downstream as
well.

Yet the flood maps of communities in the NFIP do not take into account

dam failure.

Randomly selecting 100 dams, a Dewberry and Davis study showed

that 219 communities in both the emergency and regular programs would be
affected by flooding above the 100-year flood level in the event of dam
failure.

The identification on flood hazard maps of the areas at risk from a

dam failure would be a means of reducing the potential losses of life and
damage to property, because such identification would facilitate sound local
land use management and emergency planning.
Summary
This focus on the common areas of the Dam Safety Program and the NFIP
demc,llstrates how the Integrated Emergency Management System can be beneficial.
Through I EMS , emergency management organizations, states, and local governments
can maximize their available resources to achieve overall protection of ci tizens from interrelated multiple hazards.
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Introduction 1
Since the beginning of recorded history, sea level has risen so slowly
that, for most practical purposes, i t has been constant.

This slow rate of

'.f'se has allowed plants and animals to thrive along the coast, encouraging a
. iological diversity that was not possible when sea level was rising three feet
,

r century after the last ice age.

At the mouth of the Mississippi, for

·:IxamPle, it permitted the sediments delivered by the river to form a delta with
thousands of square miles of wetlands ranging from salt marshes to cypress

~wamps,
supporting alligators, eagles, fur-bearing animals, and one-quarter of
I

.~e nation's seafood harvest.

Civilization has also prospered along the water.

Aside from temporary increases in water levels during major storms, we have had
.\

~ittle reason to be concerned about rising seas.

Recently, however, the view that sea level changes are unimportant to
i,;today's activities has been called into question.

:l
,relative
i

Tidal gauges have recorded a

rise in sea level of three feet per century along the coast of

~ouisiana (Hicks et al., 1983), and the wetlands there are eroding at a rate of

1
:fO

square miles per year because society has thwarted the processes by which

~ IThe views expressed herein do not represent the official views

:~f the Environmental Protection Agency, the Fish and Wildlife
Service,

or any other agency of

the United States Government.
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the Mississippi delta formerly kept pace with rising sea level (Gagliano et
al., 1981; see also Jantzen, 1981; Baumann et al., 1984; Louisiana Coastal
Commission, 1982; and u.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1984).

(Tidal gauges

measure relative sea level rise, which includes land subsidence and global sea
level rise.)

The rate of relative sea level rise along the highly developed

Atlantic Coast has been one foot per century (Hicks et al., 1983), enough to
cause significant erosion along most recreational beaches (Pilkey et al., 1981:
New Jersey Department of Environmental protection, 1981; and State of
Massachusetts, 1981).
The expected greenhouse warming could accelerate these trends.

Increasi,.;

concentrations of carbon dioxide, chlorofluorocarbons, methane, and nitrous
oxide are likely to raise the earth's average temperature 3-8 o F in the next
century (Charney, 1979).

Such a warming would cause ocean water to expand,

mountain glaciers to melt, and, possibly, polar glaciers to disintegrate.

Al-

though global sea level rose only four to six inches in the last century
(Gornitz et al., 1982), the National Academy of Sciences (Revelle, 1983) and
the Environmental Protection Agency (Hoffman et al., 1983; Hoffman, 1984)

have

estimated that it will rise one and one-half to five feet in the next century.
Local governments throughout the coastal zone of the United States are
formulating strategies in response to erosion caused by current sea level
trends. 2

The decisions they make could involve controversial choices between

individual and community rights.

These officials view the prospect of an

accelerated sea level rise as a sword that could cut either way.

It may gener-

ate the public awareness necessary to enact measures that would be required to
address current problems; but i t also could overwhelm their efforts or, if
subsequently proven to be a false alarm, make their foresight look like folly.
Coastal officials want to know more about sea level rise as soon as they can,
but many fear that they will have to act before they know enough.

2Almost every coastal state has a coastal management agency
affiliated with the federal government's Office of Coastal zone
Management.
These agencies work with local governments such as
Ocean City, Maryland; Atlantic City, New Jersey; and Terrbonne
parish, Louisiana to develop planning and engineering responses ~
erosion.
Many of the participants are unaware of the extent to
which erosion is caused by relative sea level rise, a factor that
has often contributed to local decisions to use groins and other
measures that are ineffective at addressing erosion caused by sea
level rise.
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Nowhere is the need to do something about the erosion caused by relative
sea level rise better established or more urgent than in coastal Louisiana •
•J

For over 6,000 years, nature has allowed the Mississippi River Delta to keep up
and even expand with a rising sea (see Gagliano et al., 1981; and Gagliano,
1984).

Even the additional sea level rise from the greenhouse effect would

not, by itself, prevent more than about half the delta from continuing to
thrive.

Yet human activities are preventing the delta from keeping pace with

current sea level trends to the point that I'll of the wetlands are destroyed
every year, and that rate may be accelerating.
In the last twenty years, scientists have established beyond any reasonable doubt the human causes of wetland loss in Louisiana:
reservoirs, river control activities, and canals.

levees, dams and

No one denies that these

activi.ties have played an important role in the economic development of
Louisiana and the nation.

But it is now time to ask: Is there no way to modify

these activities so that we can avoid losing one of the most important aquatic
"farms" in the united States?
1'he scientists and local governments have done their job; there is a
wealth of information and the public perceives that there is a problem.

But

the questions remain: how much more vulnerable will New Orleans be to a hurricane after the wetlands have vanished?

Where will America get its seafood and

how m"ny fishermen will lose their jobs?
insurance provisions be modified?

How should building codes and flood

How would these outcomes change if the

Mississippi River was diverted or if ring levees replaced river levees?

Would

the public prefer minor variations of the status quo or a fundamental departure
froro C\l:crent policies if it fully understood the consequences that await us and
the opt.ions by which they might be avoided?

How much would the projected rise

in sea level accelerate the destruction of wetlands or change the best way to
address the problem?
\;e hope that our efforts will stimulate the awareness necessary to address
these issues, because time is running out.

This paper addresses human causes

of wetland loss in Louisiana, and proposes a policy study of the possible
sOlutions.

Coastal erosion in Louisiana is no longer an issue of interest only

to scientists, engineers, and analysts.

Our goal is to ensure that the public

and all levels of government have the information to determine and possibly
alter the fate of coastal Louisiana while there is still time to do so.
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Sediment Transport and the Delta
The Mississippi River Delta formed over thousands of years as sediment .,,1
deposited along the lower portion of the river, and through accumulation of
organic material in the associated wetlands.

The river branched out into

several distributaries, each of which carried fresh water and sediment to the
Gulf.

As ridges (natural levees) formed along these channels, the delta would

gradually advance into the sea, with low-lying marshes occupying the areas
between the channels.

Much of the water and natural levee-building concen-

trated around a single main channel, which advanced farthest into the sea.
Because this process lengthened the river's course, the river would eventually
divert most of its flow to a shorter route to the sea, and the process of
natural levee building would repeat itself.

Previous main channels include

Bayou Lafourche and a route extending east from New Orleans.

Today, only the

Old River Control Structure at Simmesport, Louisiana prevents the main flow of
the Mississippi River from switching to the Atchafalaya River.
Thus, coastal Louisiana today consists of numerous thin ridges along
present and former distributaries of the river, on which most development has
occurred.

In between are thousands of square miles of highly productive >let-

lands ranging from freshwater swamps to salt marshes, on which Louisiana's $40:
million seafood industry and many wildlife resources depend (Davis, 1974).
Al though the river has always carried life-sustaining sediment to the
wetlands, natural destruction of marshes has taken place as well.

When the

main flow changes its course, most of the sediment is diverted to the new main
channel and wetlands associated with the former main channel(s) receive less
sediment.

As the deltaic sediments subside and sea level rises, the outer

wetlands along the former main distributary revert to open water.

Furthermore,

because salt water from the sea is no longer held back by the river flow, it
diffuses upstream and kills cypress swamps and other wetlands that cannot
tolerate salt.

until people interrupted the natural cycle, occasional river

flooding provided sufficient sediment for most of the delta to keep up with
subsidence and sea level rise.

New growth fully offset the natural loss of

older delta areas.
Most of us learned in school that the Mississippi Delta is thereby growing
into the Gulf of Mexico.

Unfortunately, this is no longer the case.

The

natural processes that created and sustained the wetlands are being thwarted by
human beings, and the wetlands are now disappearing at a rate of 40-50 square
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~les per year (Gould, 1970)
~ars,

(see Figure 1), implying that in the next 20-25

Louisiana will lose an area equal in size to the state of Rhode Island.

~e projected rise in sea level from the greenhouse effect will further accel:rate the rate of wetland loss.
The Disappearing Delta
The forces of nature once supplied the Mississippi River Delta with sediment in a fashion that maximized the area of marsh creation, but we have modified the plumbing of the Mississippi in a way that comes close to maximizing
the rate of marsh destruction.

As sea level rises three feet per century

relative to the land, the sediment that once allowed wetlands to keep pace with
this rise is deposited off the edge of the continental shelf, because of flood
and river flow regulation.

Salt intrusion caused by a variety of activities is

killing cypress swamps and some types of marshes.
we include 1)

(By "river flow regulation,"

river control structures whose primary purpose is to divert

water; and 2) levees that seal off minor distributaries.

The latter are de-

signed with flood control in mind, but water diversion also occurs, a fact that
is sor.letimes overlooked.)

A quick glance at a map of Louisiana tells the story about sediment supply
(Gould, 1970) (Figures 2 and 3).

Along the main channel of the Mississippi,

the delta has advanced far into the Gulf.
and provide flood

protp.r.~ion,

~he

To facilitate economic development

Corps of Engineers has constructed river

control structures and levees which have sealed off minor distributaries.
These flow regulation activities now confine 70% of the river flow to the main
channel as far downstream as the Birdfoot Delta.

These structural measures

maintatn the flow down the main channel, and by decreasing sediment deposition,
help mair.tain a deep navigation channel to the Gulf of Mexico.

Although the

artificially maintained river banks south of Venice do not protect property
from floods, they have more than paid for themselves in reduced dredging
costs,3 disregarding their impacts on wetlands. 4
3 Por example, see, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (1984).
Page 2
states that a proposed levee system would reduce baseline dredging
requirements from 54.2 to 12.7 million cubic yards per year.
4The ability to estimate wetland loss associated with levees is
fairly new.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers project, for
example, does not estimate the wetland loss associated with
sediment starvation induced by the levee system.
However, Steve
Mathies of the New Orleans District says that a planned levee
extension along the Atchafalaya River will incorporate such an
analysis.
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Without river flow regulation, the Atchafalaya River would capture an
increasing volume of the flow of the Mississippi and cause more wetlands growth
around its mouth.

The many smaller bayous that have been sealed off by levees

would also carry water and sediment; wetland losses from sediment deprivation
and salt intrusion would be much less.
creation would have been greater.

It is easy to understand why marsh

Along most of the coast where sediment would

normally be deposited, the Gulf is less than 20 feet deep, while i t is over 400
feet deep outside the continental shelf where the sediment is now being deposited.

Because the water is over twenty times as deep at the end of Birdfoot

Delta, additional marsh creation requires over 20 times as much sediment.
Thus, flow regulation has caused the delta-building process to be less than
one-twentieth as efficient at creating marshland as i t used to be. 5
Besides sealing off minor distributaries, levees also contribute to wetlands loss by preventing them from flooding.

Much of the sediment that would

normally allow marshes to keep pace with relative sea level rise was supplied
by annual flooding of the river.

By preventing the river from overflowing its

banks, the levees keep life-sustaining sediment, freshwater, and nutrients from
reaching adjacent wetlands.
A final cause of wetland destruction concerns saltwater intrusion.

Both

r,atural and artificial canals for navigation wi thin the wetlands permit salt",dt.er to reach brackish and freshwater environments.

Cypress trees and other

vegetation frequently die, and the wetlands convert to open water.

Flow regu-

lation increases freshwater for some areas and decreases i t for others, allowing saltwater to intrude farther into such areas as distributaries that have
cEen sealed off and the mouth of the Atchafalaya River.

By slowing the flow

rate, sea level rise allows salt water to intrude farther inland everywhere.
Implications of the Greenhouse Effect
A rise in sea level from the greenhouse effect would accelerate the loss
of wetlands that Louisiana is experiencing today.
intrusion both would increase.

Marsh drowning and saltwater

The time required for Terrebonne Parish to

SThis assertion is a result of elementary geometry.
If the
water is twenty times as deep, i t takes twenty times as much
sediment to reclaim land from the sea.
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convert to open water, for example, would be reduced from 100 to 60-75 years,
if no action is taken. 6

The local government there has developed a 25-year

construction plan to help restore natural processes and curtail wetland loss.
Given the long lead time necessary for gaining a public consensus on the public
works that may have to be built or modified, decisions that local officials
might like to delay until 2020 will probably be necessary within the next ten
years.
One of the most important problems concerning the greenhouse effect is our
inability to forecast future sea level rise accurately.

Although much of the

nation has the luxury of being able to wait 20 years until better forecasts are
available, Louisiana does not.

Thus it is very likely that we will have to

develop a wetland protection strategy that addresses the possibility of a
"greenhouse"

rise in sea level before we know what its magni tude will actually

be.
Nevertheless, the sooner we have better forecasts of sea level rise, the
sooner Louisiana will be able to develop strategies that address an accurate
understanding of what lies ahead.

Several federal agencies fund research

concerning the greenhouse effect and sea level rise, including the

Departme~t

of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the National Academy of
Sciences, the National Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
Although the outcomes of decisions involving billions of dollars in Louisial,a
alone will depend on whether we can accurately anticipate future sea level
rise, the federal government only spends about $100,000 per year developing
better forecasts.

Recognizing the need for better information, Terrebonne

Parish recently became the first local government in the nation to call for
increased federal efforts to forecast sea level rise (Terrebonne Parish
Council, 1984).
bThis is a conservative estimate.
Given current trends of
relative sea level rise (3 feet per century), Terrebonne could
completely erode in 100 years.
EPA's "low" scenario implies that
sea level will rise 0.8 feet by 2050, by which time subsidence
should be 2.2 feet for a relative rise of 3 feet by 2050.
EPA'S
"mid-range high" scenario implies a rise in relative sea level of
3 feet by 2040.
Thus, the greenhouse warming could accelerate the
occurrence of a 3-foot rise from 2080 at current trends to between
2040-2050.
We further note that EPA's "high" scenario would imply
a relative rise of 3 feet by 2025, but that scenario is extremely
unlikely.
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Saving the Land
The most fundamental threat to any government is the possibility that its
land will be taken away.

In response to current trends, local governments and

the State of Louisiana have initiated a level of effort unprecedented in the
history of environmental protection. The Louisiana Legislature created a $35
million Coastal Protection Trust Fund to research, develop, and demonstrate
methods to slow coastal erosion.

Local governments have also appropriated

millions of dollars, and have been joined by private landowners such as Texaco
and Tenneco LaTerre.

Terrebonne Parish has initiated a public awareness cam-

paign that includes billboards, pamphlets, slide slows, and its secondary
school curriculum (Edmonson and Jones, 1984).
The federal government, however, has played a much smaller role in trying
to develop a solution to the problem of relative sea level rise and land loss
in Louisiana.

This is unfortunate because a wide variety of federal activities

are inextricably intertwined with both the problem and any possible solution.
The Corps of Engineers is involved with river control, levee construction,
freshwater diversion, dredging, and coastal land loss studies.

The Federal

Emergency Management Agency operates the National Flood Insurance PrograJll,
·,;hich already pays more flood claims to two parishes in Louisiana than anywhere

else.

The Environmental Protection Agency, the Fish and wildlife Service, and

the National Park Service all have vital mandates to maintain the important
·'cosystems of coastal Louisiana, which has one-half the nation's coastal wet-

lunas and produces one-quarter of the nation's seafood harvest.
The history of environmental protection in the United States suggests that
a.ct.hough the state and local efforts are a start, they will not be sufficient
without significant intergovernmental cooperation and a federal mandate to
correct the problem.

Solutions to environmental problems, even when economic-

ali.y justified, are almost always too controversial and involve too many jurisdictions outside of local control for a state government to implement on its
own.

This is even more the case in Louisiana, where federal policies involving

navigation and flood mitigation are largely the root of the problem.

Only the

federal government can undertake the basic research or the reevaluation of its
own practices that will be necessary to adequately address coastal erosion and
wetland loss in Louisiana.
The major reason for optimism is that the river carries enough sediment to
sustain a large portion of the wetlands.

Our challenge is to devise a strategy
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that can take advantage of the forces of nature, without sacrificing the tremendous economic infrastructure that was unfortunately developed without an
understanding of the consequences of subsidence and rising seas.

Terrebonne

Parish has developed such a plan but requires more accurate forecasts of sea
level rise and the actions of other government agencies before final budget
estimates can be solidified.
We cannot rule out the possibility that coastal Louisiana must eventually
choose between becoming like Holland or like Venice.

(Already people discuss

the possibility of a large dike along the marsh to harness the productive
estuary; the possibility of several island cities in the Gulf of Mexico would
not be altogether inconceivable for a culture that relied on water transportation for centuries.)

If we allow events to overtake us, and merely respond to

erosion as i t occurs, these will be our only options.

Only if we reexamine the

activities that are causing land loss, only if we plan today, is there even the
most remote chance that coastal Louisiana will remain the growing delta that it
has been since the beginning of recorded history.
A Proposed Study of Solutions to Land Loss
Many government activities would benefit from a comprehensive study of the
impacts and responses to relative sea level rise in coastal Louisiana.

Such a

study' could provide a clearer understanding of the implications of what is
known, and thereby suggest which coastal protection, wetland management, and
hazard mitigation options warrant additional consideration.

Our objectives

include the following:
1)

Provide the state of Louisiana with an independent overview of the costs
and benefits from each of the wide variety of policy options at its
disposal.

2)

Provide participating parishes with an assessment of the impacts of wetland protection alternatives on their environment, and identify the interrelationships between the actions of particular parishes.

3)

Provide Terrebonne Parish with data, analysis, and recommendations on
optimizing the trade-off between flood protection and the vitality of its
wetlands.

4)

Provide EPA's Office of Policy Analysis with estimates of the environmental benefits of planning for sea level rise in Louisiana, and the value
of better forecasts of sea level rise.
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5)

Provide the Federal Insurance Administration and other offices within the
Federal Emergency Management Agency with estimates of future flood
damages, insurance premiums and payments, and federal disaster assistance
under alternative wetland protection policies. Determine how frequently
the insurance rate maps must be redrawn. Develop data necessary to assess
whether rates should reflect the average risk over the life of a property,
or current risk only.

6)

Provide the Army Corps of Engineers with estimates of wetland impacts of
alternative strategies of flood control, river control, and channelization
under various sea level rise scenarios, and the impact of wetland protection strategies on the Corps' navigation, dredging, levee, and EIS activities.

7)

Provide EPA's Office of Federal Activities and Region VI with estimates of
the wetland loss that will result under alternative policies for various
sea level rise scenarios.

8)

Provide EPA's Office of Drinking Water with estimates of water quality for
alternative policies.

9)

Provide the Department of Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service and the
National Park Service with useful information for management of wetlands
under their control and for compliance with Coordination Act requirements.
Provide the Mineral Management Service with projections of the value to
coastal parishes of making offshore sand more readily available.

10) Provide legislators and people who allocate research budgets with estimates of the value of improving forecasts of future sea level rise and the
resulting impacts.
il)

Provide the research community with a ranking of research priorities.

12) Provide the citizens of Louisiana with an easily read document that explains the choices facing the state.
Research has been completed that sheds light on these issues, and this
information could be used to project the impacts of additional sea level rise
from the greenhouse effect.
posed.

A wide variety of solutions has also been pro-

But the various pieces of the puzzle must be put together in a form

appropria te for deci.sion making.
Table 1 outlines the proposed study.

The study should begin by projecting

shoreline change expected under current management practices for current trends
and two global sea level rise scenarios.

It would rely on existing mapping

studies, estimates of sediment transport, wetland drowning, and salt intrufJion.

Next, a panel of leading coastal hydrologists, geologists, and engineers
would specify a wide variety of technically feasible methods to slow or halt
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net wetland loss. The possibility of the virtual destruction of coastal
Louisiana as we know it is so real and so severe that drastic measures should
not be ruled out in a comprehensive policy study merely because they appear
politically infeasible today.

Thus, the proposed study should cast as wide a

net as possible in considering options, including
•

Do nothing to stop erosion immediately, but build a large levee past which
it could not proceed;

•

Alternative river diversion and rediversion;

•

More dredging in lieu of levees and jetties at South Pass and Southwest
Pass;

•

Alternative flood protection/levee strategies, including supplementing
river levees with ring levees in well developed areas;

•

Stopgap measures such as barrier island restoration, dune building, marsh
building, and minor water diversions that prevent saltwater intrusion.
The costs and impacts of each of the proposed options would then be

assessed.

Flood damages would play an important part; river diversion, ring

levee construction, and river levee destruction could all substantially change
the flood damages in lightly developed areas.

But the wetland destruction that

would otherwise occur may leave New Orleans and other highly developed areas
ripe for a hurricane disaster that would be much worse.

Allowing the river to

flow out of more distributaries would increase the Corps of Engineers' dredging
requirements but might save costs for subsequent water diversion and hurricane
protection projects.
We have no illusions about the level and quality of resources that must be
invested to solve the coastal erosion problem in Louisiana.

A comprehensive

policy study is a small but necessary step in addressing a problem that will be
with us for decades.

The impacts of relative sea level rise are so diverse

that no one government agency can be reasonably expected to address the entire
problem.

But all of these impacts must be laid out and estimated in a single

document.

The importance of Louisiana's wetlands demands nothing less than a

clear picture of where we intend to go and how we intend to get there.
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Table 1
STUDY OUTLINE
I.

Use existing data to project shoreline changes under current levee,
dredging, and water regulation policies, assuming current sea level trends
(3 feet by 2085), a 5-foot rise, and a 7-foot rise by 2085.

II.

Panel Specifies Alternative Coastal Management Options
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

Current policies
Atchafalaya natural diversion
Atchafalaya delta management
Diversion into former or new distributaries
Sediment supplementation via jet-spray or hydraulic dredging
Supplement or replace river levees with ring levees around major
population centers
G. Barrier island restoration
H. Large hurricane protection levee along the Gulf Coast and wetland
management inland of that levee
I. Combinations
III. Estimate the impact on shoreline location and wetland acreage by type, for
each of the management alternatives, using available research.
A. Impacts for alternative implementation dates
B. Saltwater intrusion along main channel of the Mississippi River and
elsewhere.
C. Flood risks to life and property from river and hurricane protection.
D. Impacts on seafood production, loss of land, pelt production, highway
maintenance, unemployment, other.
E. Calculate the value of better forecasts of sea level rise.

IV.

Design a study plan to provide better estimates or reference existing
studies under the Louisiana Coastal protection Trust Fund that would help
secure better understanding of the impacts.
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THE COASTAL BARRIER RESOURCES ACT:
PRESENT STUDIES

Albert G. Greene, Jr.
Division of Special Service projects
National Park Service
u.S. Department of Interior

Coastal studies are presently being conducted by the u.S. Department of
the Interior to meet the requirements of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act
which specifies the submission of a report to Congress in October 1985.

The

first important legislation that formed the basis of our present approach was
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981

(OREA), passed in August 1981.

This Act directed the Secretary of the Interior to conduct a study within one
year that would result in proposed designations of undeveloped coastal
barriers.

As a result of this Act's passage, the Secretary established a

Coastal Barriers Task Force--an interdepartmental group of people who had
expertise in coastal matters.

This group had representatives from the U.S.

Fish and wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the u.s. Geological
Survey, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Solicitor's Office of the
Department, the Congressional Liaison Office, among others.

On August 16,

1982, the Secretary submitted a report to Congress recommending designation of
188 units as undeveloped coastal barriers, which included approximately 750
miles of the 2,700 miles of the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico coasts.

The

principal effect of such designation was that, effective October, 1983, new
development on these units was not eligible for federal flood insurance.

In

addition, the Secretary recommended that the Act be amended to include barriers
that were designated as "otherwise protected."
On October 18, 1982, the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CRBA)
into law as P.L. 97-348.

was signed

This Act superseded the ORBA provisions concerning

coastal barriers; i t established and identified a 186-unit undeveloped Coastal
Barrier Resources System along the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico coasts.
The units included were basically those recommended by the Task Force.

Effec-

tive on October 18, 1982, the areas designated became ineligible for most kinds
of federal assistance for such things as building bridges to the barriers,
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sewage treatment plants, and roads; the federal flood insurance prohibitions
were delayed until October 1983.

In recognition of certain overriding national

interests, the Act includes some areas excepted from ineligibility, such as
defense, channel maintenance, highway maintenance, energy development, and
research.
Included in the requirements of CRBA is the preparation of a report to
Congress with "recommendations for the conservation of the fish, wildlife, and
other natural resources of the System based on an evaluation and comparison of
all management alternatives and combinations thereof," and "recommendations for
additions to, and deletions from," the System.

This study provision reflects

the concern that the removal of federal financial assistance alone may not be
adequate, in and of itself, to protect the identified System units.

This

report is currently being prepared by the Coastal Barriers Study Group, a group
similar to the Coastal Barriers Task Force, with major field work conducted by
four NPS field representatives.

Regarding recommendations for additions to or

deletions from the System, three bureaus within the Department of the Interior
--the National Park Service, the Fish and wildlife Service, and the Geological
Survey--are working together to identify potential sites at these locations:
1)

On the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico coasts: protected areas, and
areas that may be additions to or deletions from the Coastal Barrier
Resources System; and

2)

On the Great Lakes, the Pacific Ocean coasts, and the
u.S. Trust Territorial areas: additional coastal barriers.
We have almost completed the accumulation of data for identifying addi-

tional undeveloped coastal barrier areas, and have tentatively identified on
u.S. Geological Survey topographic quadrangles areas in California, Oregon,
Washington, the Great Lakes, and the Caribbean.
have been completed for most of the areas.

Aerial photography flights

The Trust Territories and Alaska

remain to be studied, but only existing mapping and aerial photography will be
considered as preliminary data indicate that an adequate job of identification
can be done using this information.
The other part of this task--that of identifying the "otherwise protected
areas' (local, state, and federal parks; federal and state wildlife areas;
private conservation organizations' lands)--has just about been completed for
the Atlantic Ocean and Gulf of Mexico coasts.

The affected states have been
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working with the Fish and wildlife Service and the National Park Service to
identify all protected areas by providing maps and documentation of the levels
of protection.

This exercise may lead to a recommendation that CBRA be amended

to include these areas.

It is the Study Group's position that these areas

should be included within CRBA's protection as the exemptions under Section 6
of the Act allow continued federal assistance for protected areas as long as
conservation and recreation are the management objectives.

Inclusion of these

areas within the System under the Act would prevent federal assistance only
should the status of such areas change in the future to allow development.
This amendment, if accepted by the Secretary, recommended to and passed by the
Congress, would greatly enlarge the size of the present System and would increase the consistency of federal policy on coastal barriers.

A similar study

for the other coasts will also be completed.
We are examining proposals from state governments and other interested
parties for additions to and deletions from the Coastal Barrier Resources
system.

One option we are considering is recommending that the definition of a

coastal barrier in the Act be changed to include areas of consolidated sediment
in high energy areas like the Florida Keys, larger bays like the Chesapeake,
and important biological habitats in intertidal zones that do not have a landliard aquatic habitat.

Other considerations involve the possibili ty of re-

defining the "level of development,

n

enlarging units based on state reques ts,

iind adding developed areas destroyed by storms or hurricanes.

In line with the

!eet's manda te, we are cooperating with s ta te and local governments and the
?rivate sector in defining criteria for any mOdifications to the existing
cri teria.

In directing us to consider additional management alternatives that foster
conservation of the Coastal Barrier Resources System, Congress has provided us
','i th the very exciting possibility that a wise federal policy could lead to

further protection without further federal involvement!

In response to this

challenge the Study Group has focused on two major categories of governmental
actions, in addition to financial assistance, that affect the coast: tax policy
and permits/zoning.

These issues are being analyzed at the state and local as

well as the federal level.
The study process itself has been broken down into a series of components.
~he

majority of state and local alternatives are being reviewed by the four NPS

field representatives appointed by the Director specifically for this purpose.
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They are responsible for assessing all state and local issues except the impact
of tax policy as a possible management alternative.

Federal alternatives are

being considered by the Study Group in WASO, and include federal tax policy and
the impact of federal permits on coastal barrier conservation.
To be more specific, the four NPS field representatives are collecting
data on the current use and management of coastal resources on the Atlantic and
Gulf coasts in order to 1) identify and evaluate resource management issues; 2)
compare and evaluate existing state and local laws, regulations, and/or other
mechanisms that encourage, facilitate, or adversely affect protection of the
coastal barriers; and 3) review and assess the impacts and opportunities for
private sector conservation initiatives, such as private land trusts and donations.

The assessment of the feasibility of new management alternatives will

be a part of the effort of both this group and the Study Group in WASO.

These

alternatives will include surplus property land exchanges and mechanisms for
institutional cooperation (regional coastal commissions).
The Secretary will submit a report to Congress in October 1985 with the
study's findings and recommendations.

There are still many opportunities for

the state and local governments, conservation groups, private citizens, scientific groups, and all others to submit their ideas and recommendations to the
Department.

We are trying to keep everyone informed through the Federal

Register and other means.

Remember, this is a cooperative effort.

LONG RANGE MANAGEMENT PLANS FOR BARRIER ISLANDS

Rutherford H. Platt
Professor of Geography
University of Massachusetts

Introduction

Like the Gaul of Julius Caesar, coastal barriers may be divided into three
parts.

The total extent of U.S. coastal barriers along the Atlantic and Gulf

shorelines is estimated to be approximately 1,685 miles in length with a land
area of about 1.6 million acres (Table 1).

For present purposes we may class-

ify this total resource into subgroups according to the state of development
and legal status.

The first subgroup includes coastal barriers protected

through public ownership or as holdings of the Nature Conservancy or other
conservation organizations.

This subgroup accounts for about 36% of the total

barrier shoreline and slightly more than half of the total acreage.

The second

subgroup includes barriers that are undeveloped but not owned by a public or
conservation organization.

This subgroup is now synonymous with the "coastal

barrier resource system" (CBRS) as established under the Coastal Barrier
R8sources Act of 1982.

It comprises about 24% of the total barrier shorelines

and 29% of its acreage.

These barriers are "protected" to the extent that

federal flood insurance and grants for such development infrastructure as
roads, bridges, and erosion protection are precluded under the 1982 Act.
Barriers not included in the preceding subgroups are assigned to a third
category most crucial for management purposes, namely "developed and unprotected."

This subgroup accounts for about 40% of total shoreline length (1,058

miles) but only 17% of barrier acreage.

This subgroup was the subject of the

Conference on Managing Developed Coastal Barriers held in Virginia Beach,
January 15-18, 1985.

Since the other subgroups of barriers enjoy one or

another form of protection, the developed and unprotected barriers clearly pose
the most significant long-term management problems.
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Table 1
Geographical Extent of Atlantic and Gulf Coastal Barrier Features

Shore Length (in miles)
148 Major
Barrier Islands
All Barriers
Miles

Percent

Percent

Land Area (in acre
Acres
~
1,645,000

1,610

2,685

Total

Miles

Undeveloped

644

24.0

334

20.7

480,000

29.0

Otherwise protected

954

36.0

624

38.7

885,000

53.7

1,050

40.0

549

34.0

280,000

17.0

Developed/unprotected

(Ringold and Clark, 1980)
(Godschalk, 1984)

Geographic Variation Among Developed Coastal Barriers
Management options for developed coastal barriers must reflect extreme
geographic diversity that exists among their features.

A paper for the

virginia Beach Conference classified coastal barriers according to various
parameters: e.g., population size and density, date of settlement, economic
function, land values, and political structure.

For present purposes we may

simply note that developed barriers range from full-scale "cities on the beacil"
(e.g., Miami Beach, Florida; Galveston, Texas; Atlantic City, New Jersey) to
resort communities experiencing rapid and high density growth (e.g., Ocean
City, Maryland; Clearwater, Florida) to more isolated resort communities with
carefully planned land use patterns (Hilton Head, South Carolina; Captiva
Island, Florida) to miscellaneous barriers having a mixture of developed and
undeveloped areas (e.g., Topsail Beach, North Carolina; Amelia Island,
Florida).
Developed barriers may also be distinguished according to the status of
planning control.

Jekyll Island, Georgia, is owned and totally planned by the

State of Georgia.

Some barriers are divided among multiple jurisdictions, both
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municipal and county, while others are within a single political unit of local
government.

Some are governed by municipalities that are limited to the

barriers such as Galveston, while others are part of much larger urban governments such as Rockaway Beach in New York City.

Counties govern unincorporated

areas. These and other factors complicate the problem of recommending long-term
management policies for developed coastal barriers.
Assembly of appropriate data would facilitate the preparation of long-term
management plans for barriers by states and their subunits of authority.

Such

plans should embrace at least the following elements of public policy concern:

•

Ultimate population/development levels;

•
•

Infilling policy;
Erosion;

•

Emergency warning and evacuation;

•

water supply;

•

Wastewater management;

•

Public open space and beach access;

•

Cultural and historic preservation; and

o

Natural area preservation.
Inevitably, federal policies and programs influence the realization of

planning goals set forth above.

The "federal consistence" provision of the

Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 may be operative to the extent that longterm barrier management plans are incorporated into overall state CZM plans.
But several specific areas of federal influence should be targeted for particular attention.
Federal Subsidies for Infrastructure
Distinction between developed and undeveloped barriers in many places is
arbitrary.

The Department of Interior had to make many judgment calls in

drawing boundaries around units designated for the Coastal Barrier Resource
System (CRBS).

The areas omitted from the system for political or planning

reasons nevertheless are substantially undeveloped at this time but remain
eligible for federal infrastructure assistance on flood insurance.

It makes

little sense to deny federal incentives for development in one part of a
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barrier while allowing other areas, nominally outside the CBRS, to develop even
more intensely to meet the existing demand.

Indeed, the arguments made on

behalf of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act largely recited conditions of
overcrowding, hurricane hazard, and other problems afflicting developed
barriers.

It would undermine the intent of Congress if federal aid to areas

outside the CBRS induced additional development and intensified these
problems.
Accordingly, a distinction must be made for developed barriers, between
federal aid that simply replaces and updates infrastructures serving existing
development and aid that facilitates expansion of development into new areas or
to a higher level of density.

The latter would be inconsistent with the spirit

if not the letter of the Coastal Barrier Resources Act.
I am suggesting that, for purposes of federal assistance, each developed
coastal barrier should be viewed as subject to a "growth cap" at its present
level of development.

Minor infilling, of course, may occur, if it can be

accommodated by existing infrastructure.

But where federal assistance would

significantly expand population and investment risk, it should be curtailed.
This is presumably the intent of Executive Order No. 11988 regarding federal
investment in flood hazard areas.

This does not mean that further development

may not occur; it means that state, local, and private sources will have to
foot the bill for expansion of necessary services.
Flood Insurance
In a study of six coastal and barrier communities, the General Accounting
Office (1982) found that new development was occurring in the Coastal High
Hazard areas of each with the benefit of flood insurance.

There has been

considerable improvement of the administration of flood insurance for coastal V
Zones through the consideration of wave height in hazard mapping studies and
the requirement of engineer certification of first flood elevations.

Neverthe-

less, the very definition of "coastal high hazard areas" suggests the folly of
providing any flood insurance in this zone.

Furthermore, where beach recession

is occurring due to sea level rise and other causes, the coastal hazard area
may be entirely under water within a matter of a few years (Kaufman and Pilkey,
1983).
with regard to A Zones and other areas of coastal barriers landward of the
V Zone,

flood insurance for new development must be carefully monitored to

ensure that true actuarial rates are charged.

Frequent updating of rates and
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maps are necessary as shoreline recession and other physical changes occur.

In

view of the dynamic nature of coastal barriers, the NFIP should consider establishing a special zone for such features which would involve a surcharge above
normal coastal A Zone rates.
Land Acquisition
The optimal long-term management strategy for coastal barriers is to
acquire them for public purposes.

According to the Conservation Foundation

(1982, p. 311), the Federal Land and Water Conservation Fund (LAWCON) between
1965 and 1978 allocated $51 million to state and local governments for open
space acquisition on barriers.

It allocated another $128 million to federal

agencies, chiefly the National Park Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service,
for this purpose.

These amounts are surprisingly modest for a 13-year period

which spanned the "era of environmental awareness."

Certainly, the extremely

high values of shorefront property preclude extensive acquisition.

Yet un-

developed parcels within "developed coastal barriers" are local targets for
public acquisition.

The National Park Service has lengthy experience in the

use of easements and leasebacks to cut costs in a long-term acquisition
p::ogram.

ConSidering that LAWCON derives much of its funds from off-shore oil

and gas revenues, it is appropriate that a portion of the fund be earmarked for
coastal barrier acquisition.
Furthermore, Congress should increase the federal share in LAWCON from 50%
to 80% of project costs in the case of coastal barrier projects.
~qlJivalent

This would be

to the federal share in coastal zone management grants and would

reflect the limited state and local resources available for barrier acquisition
activities.

A larger federal share for barriers than for other open space

acquisition is justified by the greater national interest in preventing further
d·,velopment of barriers and avoiding increased disaster relief outlays.
postdisaster Mitigation
In 1980, ten federal agencies at the direction of the Office of Management
and Budget signed an interagency agreement to

cooperate in the identification

of opportunities for mitigating future flood losses.

The agreement provides

that an interagency and intergovernmental team will convene under the direction
of the FEMA regional office immediately after a presidential flood disaster
declaration.

An initial report recommending mitigation actions within 15 days

after the disaster must be submitted to the appropriate federal, state, and
local authorities.
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This procedure affords a unique tool for long-term coastal barrier management.

As hurricanes and northeasters occur, all levels of government should

strenuously seek to alleviate future hazards.

Measures available include

acquisition and relocation, redesign or elimination of certain public infrastructure (such as bridges or roads), the adoption of tighter building codes
and land use regulations, and floodproofing for remaining structures.
and evacuation capabilities should be examined as well.

Warning

Since adoption of the

agreement, only two major hurricanes, Frederic (1980) and Alicia (1983), have
significantly damaged coastal barriers.

Mitigation procedures were novel in

1980; the aftermath of Alicia should be instructive as to whether postdisaster
recommendation are in fact followed.
Essential to this process is advance planning and identification of "hot
spots" that require immediate attention in the event of a disaster.

According

to Frank Petrone, Director, FEMA Region II, preparation of the 15-day mitigation report in his region strongly reflects ongoing contact between federal,
state, and local planners and emergency managers.

To start from scratch in the

wake of a major disaster is most difficult.
Conclusion
This brief paper has indicated certain avenues for long-term management of
coastal barriers.

The CBRS is only a first step to limiting federal incentives

to further barrier development.

It addresses only the easiest case.

harder cases are those where development now exists or is in progress.

The
CBRS

will worsen settlement and hazard trends for such areas unless policies and
programs are promptly modified, as outlined above, to limit federal investment
in still developing areas.
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COASTAL HIGH HAZARD AREA PROBLEMS
IN MASSACHUSETTS

Gary Clayton
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
Coastal Zone Management Program

Introduction
High rates of erosion as well as rapid and/or long-term inundation are
characteristic of coastal high hazard areas in Massachusetts.

The risks

associated with these natural hazards may be substantial in areas where development has occurred.

In Massachusetts, these high hazard coastal areas are

generally associated with barrier beaches and coastal banks.

Such sedimentary

landforms are found along all the Massachusetts coast and are continually being
modified by physical processes including storms (northeasters and hurricanes)
and rising sea level.
The development now encroaching upon these coastal high hazard areas is a
relatively recent phenomenon.

An awareness of the land use history associated

with barrier beaches and coastal banks offers an important perspective on the
resource management problems that exist today.
Historic Background
The earliest European settlers of the Massachusetts coast were sustained
by the abundant resources of the land and sea.

These settlers were also wary

of situating their homes and structures too close to the coast.

As early as

1635 they had observed serious tidal flooding along the coast during storms.
An important event promoting the subsequent development of the coastal
region was the development of a railroad and, eventually, the highway network.
By the late 1800s and early 1900s shorefront resort development increased, a
trend accelerated by the rising popularity of the automobile.

Unlike the early

coast-wise residents, summer dwellers and vacationers unfamiliar with the
natural processes of the coast built in areas that would have been considered
unsuitable by the early settlers.

By the 1950s the edges of cliffs and dunes

had become valuable real estate and more and more of these areas had been
developed.

Today, the seasonal housing stock in these areas is being rapidly
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converted to year-round use.

The results are problems that previous genera-

tions had not encountered.
The response of these new shoreline dwellers to the loss or potential loss
of property due to flooding and erosion was often the development of various
coastal engineering structures.

Each of these structures is designed to act

either as a barrier to trap sediment being transported along shore, or as a
wall to protect cliffs, dunes, or buildings from destructive wave action.
Until the 1960s, engineering structures were perceived as the optimum solution
to coastal hazards.

With increased recognition of the natural processes gov-

erning coastal change came public pressure to preserve the features which
provide the natural protection of the coast.

In Massachusetts, various regula-

tory, acquisition, and planning programs have been established to address land
use management problems associated with coastal high hazard areas.
significant progress, important problems still remain.

Despite

This paper identifies

some of the problems that remain not only in Massachusetts but in many other
states and recommends possible solutions.
Coastal High Hazard Problems
Identification of Hazard Zones
One serious difficulty associated with many mapping programs in coastal
high hazard areas is a failure to account for the potential of relatively rapid
changes in shoreline position.

Barrier beaches and coastal banks are two

examples where changes in the location, form, and elevation of the landforms
can be catastrophic.

In Massachusetts, some of these landforms in open coast

areas are eroding at an annual average rate of one to three feet per year.
extreme cases, annual rates of retreat may exceed ten feet per year.

In

Obvious-

ly, maps that portray high hazard boundaries such as velocity zones as static
features are seriously flawed.
Maps for coastal high hazard areas must reflect the dynamic nature of the
coastline.

For example, Massachusetts has initiated a comprehensive historic

shoreline position mapping program to identify the direction and rates of
shoreline change.

These digitized data will describe three historic and one

present-day shoreline for much of the state's 1,500 miles of tidal shoreline.
Only shorelines that have been heavily urbanized and stabilized and the upper
reaches of estuaries and embayments that have existed for long periods of time
have been excluded.
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The digitized shoreline change data provide an opportunity to utilize
rates and trends of shoreline erosion or accretion for more effective coastal
zone management.

This information may be used for new or strengthened local

erosion setback bylaws, Executive Orders regarding the use of state funds, and
modifications in existing regulatory programs.

Finally, i t will be an impor-

tant educational tool for increasing the public's general awareness of the
dynamic nature of the shoreline.
Use of Fill in a Flood Zone
Filling in coastal floodplains can often exacerbate flooding problems by
increasing the velocity of floodwaters on adjacent properties.

Filling can

also change the direction and depth of flow, thereby inducing or intensifying
erosion.
Wave action in the A Zone is generally less severe.

In the A Zone of

coastal high hazard areas like barrier beaches, however, wave action and high
velocity flow can eventually be a problem as the landform is modified by overwash, submergence, and new tidal inlet formation.

These physical processes

make fill undesirable in A Zones even if proper slopes are provided for the
fill and protective measures such as riprap or vegetation are applied to seaward slopes.

Building codes should be modified to require all new or substan-

tially reconstructed buildings in A Zones in coastal high hazard areas to be
elevated and firmly anchored on pilings.
Subsurface Wastewater Disposal Systems
Development in coastal high hazard areas may include the disposal of
r·,sidential wastewater in subsurface disposal systems.
include subsurface concrete structures and pipes.

These septic systems

In coastal high hazard areas

these facilities can present potentially serious public health problems if they
or their contents are exposed by erosion or flooding.

In addition, the con-

crete subsurface structures that are exposed by erosion may also lead to additIonal scouring of adjacent areas if floodwaters are diverted.
regulatory decision in Massachusetts [DEQE Wetlands File 19-188)

(A recent
denied con-

struction of a single-family residence on a barrier beach based on the high
probability that the system would eventually be exposed by erosion.)

Sub-

surface septic systems located in coastal banks also contribute to increased
erosion of these areas through accelerated bank slumping caused by groundwater
seepage.

In coastal high hazard areas, board of health regulations should be
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modified to prohibit the placement of new septic systems in the velocity zone
or in rapidly eroding coastal banks.
Flood Insurance
The high risks of flooding and erosion on barrier beaches and coastal
banks are directly reflected in the significant costs associated with repairing
and rebuilding storm damaged structures in these areas.

A study of developed

barrier beaches in Massachusetts provides an example of the potential magnitude
of these costs.

There are approximately 2,100 structures on intensively de-

veloped barrier beaches in 29 Massachusetts coastal communities.

These commu-

nities account for over half of the flood insurance policies written in the
state and half of the $1.1 billion (1983) in flood insurance coverage for high
hazard areas.
The disproportionate flood insurance coverage clearly indicates the relative risk associated with development on barrier beaches.

It is imprudent to

cuntinue to subsidize insurance for new development on barrier beaches as the
subsidies promote a costly cycle of destruction and rebuilding.

Action is

needed now to at least contain the costs associated with development in high
hazard areas.

This should include no new flood insurance coverage for 1) new

structures; 2) substantial improvements to existing structures or; 3) structures that have been destroyed or substantially damaged.

In addition, a com-

plete phaseout of the national program for direct federal flood insurance at
subsidized rates must be accomplished.

Over the past five years, the national

program has cost the federal taxpayer approximately $140 million per year.
Enforcement of flood insurance program regulations and federal Executive Orders
on wetlands and floodplains needs to be vigorously pursued.
Acquisition Program
Public acquisition of coastal high hazard areas is one of the most effective techniques to reduce future storm damage losses while providing increased
open space, recreation, and public access opportunities.

Unfortunately, local

and state acquisition of these areas is sometimes precluded by lack of funds.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
ing flood-damaged structures.

offers two programs for acquir-

The 1362 program allows FEMA to purchase proper-

ty from willing sellers when the insured buildings have been damaged more than
50% in a single storm or at least 25% in three storms over a five-year period.
The local or state government is then given the land to manage for open space
purposes.

The Constructive Total Loss (CTL) Program authorizes FEMA to pay up
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to the full face value of the flood insurance policy in force where local
regulations do not permit rebuilding and when the structure is in an extremely
hazardous location.
Even when funds are limited, governments can acquire coastal high hazard
areas at less than fair market value by exercising foreclosures on tax delinquent properties.

Communities can adopt a local subdivision bylaw that re-

quires developers of large parcels to place a restriction on a certain percentage of that land for use only as recreation or open space.

A landowner may

also be willing to sell land to the community at a price lower than the property's fair market value in return for a tax deduction equivalent to the
difference.
Coastal Barrier Resources Act
The Congress, through the Coastal Zone Management Act, has found that the
protection of high hazard areas serves the national interest and that states
should be "encouraged and assisted to exercise effectively their responsibilities in the coastal zone through the protection of natural resources ••• to
help minimize the loss of life and property caused by improper development in
flood-prone, storm surge, geological hazard and erosion-prone areas."
The Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CRBAl represents a step toward implementing this policy by prohibiting and/or discouraging further growth and
development in coastal high hazard areas.

The Act should be strengthened by

expanding the prohibition of federal expenditures already in CBRA to other high
ha~ard

coastal resource areas.

This would include floodplains, erosion-prone

areas and coastal barriers, whether developed or undeveloped, along all coastlines of the United States.

Other forms of federal subsidies such as casualty

loss tax deduction for property loss in high hazard areas should also be elimina~ed

through CBRA.

Public Awareness and Opinion
Effective management of high risk flood areas requires identification and
implementation techniques often based on scientific, engineering, and economic
analyses.

These analyses can provide a compelling justification for insti-

tuting or modifying public policy.

Yet implementation of such a policy may

f21ter or fail unless the perception and attitude of the affected population
are adequately considered.

Consequently, improving land management standards

and other flood loss reduction measures requires more than merely developing
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methods and guidelines.

Sound floodplain management policy also addresses the

concerns, expectations, and awareness of landowners in high risk flood areas.
In Massachusetts public attitudes concerning coastal high hazard areas
have been assessed in several opinion surveys.

These surveys identified that a

large percentage of landowners on developed coastal barriers are unaware of
local evacuation plans; few of them have experienced a serious storm.

Another

survey indicated a majority of citizens across the state strongly support the
acquisition of remaining undeveloped coastal hazard area lands for conservation
and recreation use.

The sampling results offer an opportunity to develop

policies and target funding more effectively.
Storm preparedness
Storm preparedness includes addressing the problem of evacuating large
numbers of people from hazard-prone areas when a major storm approaches.

Storm

evacuation plans for affected communities are intended to accomplish this.
These plans, however, may not be sufficiently comprehensive especially in
coastal areas where population growth is rapidly increasing.
Comprehensive storm evacuation plans should be fully integrated with
similar plans of adjacent communities, counties and sometimes nearby states.
This can be particularly important with respect to the transportation network
and the provision of emergency supplies and shelter.
A comprehensive plan should also incorporate the National weather Service
use of probabilities in hurricane forecasting.

These probabilities are intend-

ed primarily for decision makers in government and private industry who must
begin protective actions prior to 24 hours before forecasted landfall.

For

example, residents in coastal areas with very long evacuation times will have
to begin evacuation when probabilities of a hurricane landfall are as low as 12
to 20%.
Comprehensive plans must also recognize that the potential for damage

a~d

loss of life from a hurricane varies greatly depending on the intensity of the
storm.

On the Atlantic seaboard, for example, hurricanes can rapidly increase

in size and speed, moving hundreds of miles in less than 24 hours.

Unfortu-

nately, even within 24 hours, forecasts of a hurricane landfall can be made
only with a maximum probability of 50%.
Conclusion
Despite the significant risks to property and life, the pressure to develop coastal high hazard areas is unlikely to abate.

Prudent public policy
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for these areas, however, should seek to ultimately minimize and avoid further
loss and damage.

Otherwise, the potential for extensive and recurrent storm

damage will increase substantially.
Immediate steps can be taken by public agencies to improve coastal hazard
area management through planning, funding, legislative, and regulatory changes.
These changes, some of which are suggested in this paper, do not necessarily
require the investment of additional public funds.

Effective measures can be

implemented by redirecting or eliminating the use of public funds and resources
for hazard-prone areas.

Other techniques, such as land acquisition, will

involve substantial public expenditures although these expenditures can be
significantly less in the long term than if these hazard-prone areas are
allowed to be developed.

These and other measures can be part of a coastal

hazard area management program to reduce or avoid storm damage and loss.
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PREDISASTER PLANNING FOR
POSTDISASTER RECONSTRUCTION

Clark Gilman
New Jersey Division of water Resources

Through its Bureau of Flood Plain Management, the New Jersey Division of
water Resources acts as the state coordinating agency for the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP).

A primary goal of the Bureau's program is the reduc-

tion of flood damage potential throughout New Jersey and not just within the
coastal zone.

The Bureau pursues a three-stage program aimed at reducing flood

damage potential.

The three steps or stages of this program are basically the

same regardless of the source of the flooding, which in the coastal zone would
be the result of storm surge combined with wave action.
The first step is to identify hazard areas.

This is accomplished by

undertaking floodplain delineation or flood insurance studies, wave height and
vulnerability analyses.

The second step requires adoption or modification of

municipal flood damage prevention ordinances and monitoring new construction
and substantial improvements to existing structures to insure enforcement of
these ordinances.

The third and final step requires development of hazard

mitigation plans to reduce the damage potential to existing structures to the
maximum degree possible.
Coastal storm or flood predisaster planning, or more properly flood hazard
mitigation, of the type described as step three, has only recently been recognized as a separate work element in New Jersey.

This recognition is primarily

the result of New Jersey involvement in the Coastal Storm Planning and
Preparedness Program through which FEMA has funded vulnerability analyses of
three of our barrier islands.

The vulnerability analyses of the Atlantic

County barrier islands, namely Absecon and Brigantine Islands and Ocean City,
Cape May County, has indicated that most of the damage from an intense storm
generating a 100-year surge would not be a result of the hazards identified by
either a Flood Insurance Study or Wave Height Analysis.
Wave runup on seawalls and timber bulkheads and waves overtopping these
structures together with the scour and erosion caused by overwashing waves
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appear to be the primary source of potential damage.

In areas where stillwater

surge depth exceeds 3.5 feet, flotation of unanchored or inadequately anchored
structures will be a primary cause of damage, and battering by floating debris
will increase damage throughout the hazard areas.
Our vulnerability analyses have further indicated that advanced warning
time could be quite short.

The National weather Service attempts to provide

hurricane warnings that leave 12 hours of daylight before the arrival of
hurricane force winds and peak storm surge.

These 12 hours unfortunately

cannot be fully utilized to evacuate residents, since time is required to
mobilize citizens, and escape routes become impassible due to flooding two to
three hours before the peak surge occurs.

These analyses have indicated that

the area studied is highly vulnerable to loss of human life and property damage
and is relatively unprepared to withstand a major coastal storm or intense
hurricane.

Since the find{ngs of these studies can be generally applied to

most of the coastal areas of New Jersey, hazard mitigation has been included
this year as a task assigned to the State Assistance Program of the NFIP and
has been included in the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement for Emergency
Management Services between FEMA and the State of New Jersey.
During the current fiscal year, members of my staff will be required to
meet with and investigate the feasibility of developing hazard mitigation work
plans for twenty-five New Jersey municipalities.

Though this work has been

delayed by the storms and severe flooding experienced this spring, damage
caused by these events still should stimulate interest in this program and
provide motivation for its implementation.
The specific methods of mitigation being considered under this program
are:
1)

An update of municipal Emergency Operations plans (EOPs) is needed. Our
studies, furthermore, recommend rudimentary situation plans for individual
structures--such as condominiums, retirement communities, and nursing
homes--located in vulnerable areas.

2)

Though our Community Assistance and Program Evaluation activities have
indicated that NFIP floodplain management standards are generally being
enforced in New Jersey, more specific standards arp needed in some instances. A committee of construction officials has been established to
review and develop required detailed standards. State and FEMA representatives are also members of this committee.

",
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3)

DUring the recent flooding advance warning failed to filter down to the
citizens. It appears that a standard operating procedure must be developed and adopted by local governments to alert residents of vulnerable
areas.

4)

Though preliminary investigation has indicated that only limited
contents removal plans is feasible on barrier islands due to the
amount of time available for evacuation, such plans appear to be
in other coastal municipalities and within inland municipalities
experience riverine flooding.

5)

Many of the older structures located within areas prone to flooding are
either unanchored (gravity unanchored) or inadequately anchored.
Anchorage surveys to determine which structures (particularly single-story
timber-frame buildings) require retrofitting to properly anchor them can
ultimately reduce damage related to flotation, lateral movement, and
collision of floaters.

6)

Field reconnaissance within areas recently studied has identified poorly
maintained or deteriorated seawalls and timber bulkheads in both public
and private ownership. While the total replacement of these structures
may be undesirable and the cost excessive, repair or reinforcement of some
of them is feasible. The false sense of security created by seawalls and
timber bulkheads has resulted in many structures being constructed close
behind these barriers, where they are vulnerable to damage from wave
runup. Establishment of adequate setbacks by local governments before the
next storm is being encouraged. The need for setbacks can be determined
as part of local inspection programs which also identify structures requiring maintenance.

7)

Traditional flood fighting techniques are under-utilized as a way of
reducing damages in New Jersey, primarily due to short warning times and a
lack of plans that employ them. Planning at the present time for their
use and stockpiling of the material required to utilize them could expand
their use.

8)

use of
limited
feasible
that

Finally, though the purchase of flood insurance is encouraged in New
Jersey and is the primary way in which damages are recovered, it really
should not be considered as a mitigation technique.
Unfortunately, the success of our prestorm mitigation program cannot be

assessed at this time.

We do feel that the techniques listed and discussed, if

seriously considered, thoroughly investigated, and fully implemented, can save
lives and considerably reduce storm damage, and thereby reduce the effort that
will have to be expended during the recovery phase.
Significant damage is undoubtedly going to occur in certain areas where
vulnerability is the greatest.

Total destruction, in fact, is almost inevi-

table should overwashing and breaching occur in some places.

Long-term hazard
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mitigation and recovery planning is, therefore, needed to develop strategies
and ultimately to adopt policies that can be applied to these areas.
The New Jersey Division of Coastal Resources, under the final phase of the
Coastal Storm Planning and preparedness program, is investigating mitigation
strategies.

They have recently established steering committees within each of

the five municipalities being studied on the Atlantic County barrier islands
and in Ocean City, New Jersey.

They plan to meet with these committees during

the summer and prepare a report containing recommendations by the end of
September, 1984.

PREDISASTER PLANNING FOR
POSTDISASTER RECONSTRUCTION

Ruth Ehinger
Division of Coastal Resources
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection

Background

I will briefly describe the approach the Division of Coastal Resources is
presently taking in coastal storm planning and preparedness and then focus on
three municipalities, Brigantine in Atlantic County and Avalon and Upper
Township in Cape May County.
The Division is working with municipalities individually to incorporate
coastal storm hazard mitigation into their master plans, zoning, and other
ordinances.

In part, New Jersey has taken this approach due to a lack of

regulatory au thori ty to guide most development in these areas.

All of New

Jersey's barrier islands are densely developed, but many are redeveloping at an
ever greater density.
A northeaster hit the New Jersey coast on March 28 and 29, 1984, and remained through two successive high tides.

Besides its occurrence on average

ti(:es of the month, the factor that saved the New Jersey coast from a possible
nevI storm of record was the fact that after two destructive high tides,

wind dropped and shifted to the NNW before a third high tide.

the

The storm was

termed only a 10-year event, based on surge or tidal flood elevations of 8.4
feel MLW, but resulted in damages estimated by the state at $24 million for
sand and dune replacement and an additional $6-10 million for debris removal.
Damage surveys have not yet been finalized.
cle.red disaster areas by President Reagan.

Four coastal counties were deThe storm has increased the aware-

ness of the public and municipal officials of the storm hazards they face and
increased their interest in and support of the Division's efforts.
Avalon, New Jersey
The Division of Coastal Resources began working with the Borough of Avalon
in the late 1970s to build dunes in the community, providing technical advice,
and sand fencing.

This was followed by a grant for prestorm planning.

The
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grant provided for a geologist, Stewart Farrell from stockton State College,
and a planner, John Sinton, to study the island's geological processes and
storm vulnerability and devise short- and long-term hazard reduction
strategies--including changes in building codes, dune nourishment, and zoning
changes.

Proposed changes included establishing setbacks from dunes and

changing residential zones to conservation zones.
prepared for publication.

The report is now being

It has not yet been implemented by Avalon, although

they are agreeable to the recommended changes.
Avalon's dune protection and restoration program has been quite successful.

There was Significant dune erosion in the March, 1984, storm, less than

or similar to that throughout the state, but no structural damage.

Only a two

to three block area with no dunes in the nodal zone of the island was
overwashed.

Estimates for damages to public facilities were $44,000 for dune

repair, $14,000 for debris removal, and $18,000 for repairing a parking lot.
Farrell and Sinton recommended that this parking lot be fronted with a
protective dune due to its vulnerability, and it has been recommended by the
Hazard Mitigation Team that disaster aid funds be so conditioned.
Brigantine, New Jersey
At present, the Division is working with six municipalities, including
Brigantine, Atlantic City, and Ocean City, under a FEMA funded program.

The

Division has reviewed a variety of hazard mitigation strategies in use thro'l''lhout the country and presented them to municipal steering committees with the
goal of incorporating such techniques at the municipal level.
concerns are being addressed separately.

Evacuation

I will use Brigantine as an example.

Brigantine is a developed barrier island in Atlantic County, which is
accreting at the southern,end due to stabilization of Absecon Inlet by a large
jetty (3,730 feet long) built in the 1950s and incrementally extended in the
early and mid-1960s.

Wide dune fields have grown in one portion of the island.

However, the northern end of the city is experiencing erosion and has narrower
beaches, little dune protection, and therefore is bulkheaded.
in this section is on the order of three to five feet per year.
1900s a now abandoned hotel was 1,000 feet from the beach.

The erosion rate
In the early

We are most

concerned about the north end of town in the narrowing section of the island.
Many areas were overwashed during the March, 1984, northeaster.

The damage

survey reports for public facilities eligible for federal disaster aid funds
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were surveyed at approximately $1 million, about $800,000 of which was for dune
fencing and restoration.
The Brigantine hazard mitigation steering committee is composed of the
mayor, two commissioners, the city administrator, engineer and emergency
manager, and the county planner.
At our first meeting, the vulnerability analysis prepared by the Bureau of
Floodplain Management was presented.

The vulnerability map and report were

used in conjunction with the shoreline change map, and photographs of New
Jersey's last major destructive storm (March, 1962) in discussing and identifying hazards.

The vulnerability map indicates the presence of high hazard

areas, wave runup zones, flotation zones, and structures with evacuation
problems.
We superimposed the city zoning map on the vulnerability map for use by
the committee in considering zoning problems and changes needed.

This pointed

out the high risk areas presently zoned for high density residential use.
zoning and master plan changes are a major focus of the effort.

Among

these changes are widening of the oceanfront conservation zones and establishment of setbacks.
dune areas.

The present conservation zones consist of most beach and

Extension of this zone to allow dune migration or creation is

essential to protect property.

In addition, areas are being identified where

dunes can be augmented and dune cuts eliminated or reoriented to the southeast.
Trading of low density uses for high density is also being considered, as is
establishment of seasonal recreational uses rather than year-round residential
use.

Specific consideration is being given to identifying target poststorm
acquisition areas and areas where destroyed infrastructure should not be rebuilt.

Anchoring of homes in flotation zones and elevation of low homes are

also being pursued; the construction official will be recommending needed
changes to the uniform construction code.

The local steering committee will be

reviewing the hazard mitigation techniques and vulnerability maps prior to our
second meeting next month when specific applications will be discussed.
One possible result of this effort would be the expansion of the conservation zone, establishment of setbacks, abandonment of a segment of road, and
rezoning.

Several more workshops are planned throughout the summer to discuss

and evaluate specific proposals.
recommendations this fall.

The Division will prepare a report containing

ultimately, the municipality will decide what
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mitigation measures to adopt, allowing it to better face and recover from the
next major storm.
Upper Township, New Jersey
Another hazard mitigation planning effort is beginning in Upper Township,
Cape May County.
segment.

This municipality consists of mainland and a barrier island

The municipality and the Division of Coastal Resources are presently

negotiating a contract for the township to study the use of Transfer of
Development Rights (TDR) as a hazard mitigation technique.

TDR involves the

establishment of conservation zones with attendant development rights and the
establishment of receiving or transfer zones where development rights can be
purchased to exceed the zoned density.

In the context of storm hazard mitiga-

tion, high-hazard, high-erosion areas would be designated preservation zones
and safer areas as receiving zones.
The barrier island portion of Upper Township is heavily developed.
Whale Beach area is about 200' wide and less than 10'
is in the V zone.

The

(MSL) in elevation; most

The high water line has moved inland at the rate of

approximately five feet per year since it was first mapped by the USCGS in
1842. A more recent erosion rate of 2.8m 3 /m/yr from 1963-1972 was established
in 1978.
The March, 1962, storm devastated the island, requiring the building of
6.5 miles of emergency dunes costing over $1 million.

six shore protection

projects, both groins and beachfill, were undertaken at Whale Beach between
1964 and 1983 at a cost of nearly $1.7 million.
is proposed for 1985.

A $3 million beachfill project

Whale Beach was overwashed in the March, 1984, storm;

Ocean Avenue covered by approximately four feet of sand; and the few dunes
present lost.

Damages were estimated at $400,000 to replace the dunes alone.

There is presently very little to no beach at high tide.
The excessive costs to protect Whale Beach, the relatively low number of
structures located on that section of the island (about 80 single family homes
and 20 condominium units), and the extreme high risk to people and property in
the area have led the state and municipality to look for alternative solutions.
The proposed study will evaluate the feasibility of TDR.

The Whale Beach area

and perhaps high hazard portions of Strathmere could be designated
conservation/recreation zones and mainland portions of Upper Township would
become receiving zones.
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The study will explore TDR in terms of market considerations, equity for
landowners in the preservation district, evaluation of transfer zones and
availability of infrastructure, and economic benefits--cost savings and
avoidances.

The approach is attractive as it would ideally eliminate develop-

ment in the high hazard area, greatly reduce federal, state, and local
spending, and monetarily compensate property owners for not developing or
redeveloping their property.

This effort has been supported by the Interagency

Hazard Mitigation Team assembled in response to the Presidential Disaster
Declaration of March, 1984.

The Team's 15-day report recommends that an

acquisition/relocation project be implemented for the area, changing the use
from single family residential to open-space/recreational.

TDR is one

suggested means of financing this change.
Summary
The Division of Coastal Resources is pursuing predisaster planning on an
individual basis with municipalities and has found interest and support from
those towns, along with a desire to utilize the state's technical expertise.
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ASSESSING COMMUNITY FLOOD MANAGEMENT CAPABILITY

Cynthia J. Rummel
Senior Environmental Analyst
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection

Background
The management of coastal high hazard areas generally brings to mind the
Gulf states

~nd

southeastern coastal regions.

The Connecticut shoreline has

not experienced a multitude of hurricane events, but nonetheless has been and
remains vulnerable to such occurrences.

A long period has elapsed since the

last major storm struck Connecticut's coast.

Unfortunately, from a state flood

management point of view, this has resulted in a general feeling of apathy and
disinterest to hurricane preparedness among the shoreline municipal officials.
In a local newspaper article about the State's flood management program they
claimed, "The sea is not furious here.

Cottages nestled as close to the water

line as possible in Old Lyme and Old Saybrook are testimony to owner's faith in
the stability of Long Island Sound's waters."
An interesting contrast is found in the following description of those
same waters written on September 23, 1938.
Millions of dollars in property damage and heavy loss of life, despite
examples of heroism and fortitude wrote finis to the 1938 season at the
various Connecticut shore resorts strung along Long Island Sound. Surf
which did not wait for high tide to top sea walls, rushing waters which
twisted and tore cottages from their foundations, floated furniture into
ditches and boats onto highways caused monetary loss which chaotic highway
and communication conditions Thursday made it impossible to estimate. A
long list of persons unreported or known to be missing held an ominous
threat for the expansion of a long casualty list.
The shoreline has not suffered a major coastal storm in approximately
thirty years but during that period has undergone intensive development.

These

factors led two years ago to an inventory of coastal flood damage potential
along Connecticut's shoreline.

The results showed that 40,000 structures are

located in flood hazard areas, 4,000 of them in the coastal V Zone.

A major

coastal storm hitting Connecticut could potentially cause millions and millions
of dollars in damages and could severely disrupt the state's economy.

These
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findings led to the development of a municipal assistance program designed to
document and upgrade local ability to deal with flood events.
The Municipal Assistance Program consisted of several elements.

First,

after completing the inventory of flood-prone structures, "municipal profiles"
were developed for each of Connecticut's 25 coastal towns. They included the
names of local officials who would be key players in flood preparedness and
response activities; a survey of the population and structures occurring within
flood zones; the town's history of flooding; flood studies that had been completed; a list of flood control structures and projects' flood warning systems;
the status of Emergency Operations Plans; an analysis of public ownership in
flood zones; National Flood Insurance policy and claims data; and a survey of
watercourses, impoundments, wetlands, dams, bridges, marinas, utilities, and
water supply information.
Second, local zoning regulations governing floodplains were reviewed.
Next, existing emergency operations plans were reviewed and carefully
evaluated, looking specifically for flood preparedness and flood mitigation
measures.
Finally, additional flood insurance needs were identified; local road,
bridge, and culvert design standards and stormwater management plans were
examined; and the feasibility of acquiring flood-prone areas was explored.
Results
Are Connecticut's communities prepared for a major coastal storm?

In

working with the coastal towns, we found a great diversity in levels of preparedness.

Those communities that seem best prepared are either those that

experience frequent "nuisance"

flooding or those that have the highest proper-

ty values, and even these towns have welcomed our assistance.
The City of Milford has 600 buildings (including a number of apartments
and condominiums) on the direct shoreline, many of which flood practically
every time high tide rolls in.

Milford heeded our suggestion that they write a

flood annex to their emergency operations plan, and now has an extensive and
very specific warning and evacuation plan.
Westport, one of our "gold coast" towns, has an extremely well prepared
and well-equipped emergency response team.

Their police and fire departments

have access to amphibious vehicles, maintain a list of every handicapped and
elderly resident who may need assistance in evacuation, and stage regularly
scheduled drills.

While they appear to be very well prepared in emergency

Rummel

121

response, they are seriously considering some of our other suggestions.

After

reviewing our assessment, the Public Works Director wrote to his First
selectman:
The recommendation that the Town develop a Comprehensive Drainage plan is
one that should be given much consideration. The Town has never developed
a comprehensive plan for handling all storm drainage. This could be
costly, but also could save the Town money by having developers provide
drainage projects that fit a Town wide plan. Our small drainage projects
are often a band-aid approach; a comprehensive plan would tie everything
together.
Stamford, the home of many corporate world headquarters, became the first
municipality in the state to install an automated flood warning system.

The

results of our inventory played a role in their securement of financing for
this effort.

Stamford furthermore requires that an evacuation plan be sub-

mitted with any proposal for an office building or multifamily housing unit to
be constructed within a flood zone, and has used our recommendations as guidelines in reviewing such plans.
At the other end of the spectrum are the town officials who rely on the
cmll"lon sense and "go-wi th-the-flow" approach to flood management.

One town

se'.ectman, when asked about his Emergency Operations Plan, was "quite" sure
that his Civil Defense Director had some sort of "plan" stashed somewhere.

He

then concluded that since his CD Director worked a long distance from town, he
likely would be unavailable during an emergency anyway.
Most towns fall somewhere in the middle of this range.

They do maintain

10(,,11 emergency operations plans which are updated every two years

(as required

by the State Office of Civil Preparedness), but these plans address nuclear
considerations and not natural disasters.
Many local officials simply do not perceive coastal flooding as an issue
that demands much attention or planning and, therefore, do not address it.
Coastal flooding occurs infrequently in Connecticut.

The federal and state

governments have historically done a good job of funding disaster assistance
and recovery, and the events are forgotten within a surprisingly short period
of time.

While these towns have not developed planning that addresses coastal

flooding, there was not a single local official who was not extremely confident
that his or her town could prevent loss of life in most any situation.

So, in

summary, while the towns are prepared to undertake life saving actions, with
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very few exceptions they are unprepared to implement any measures to reduce or
minimize property losses.
Deficiencies
What are the most serious deficiencies?
has to top the list.

Inadequate coastal flood warning

While most local officials are confident that, in hurri-

cane situations, the National Weather Service would provide more than adequate
warning, they feel strongly that the more frequently occurring "Northeasters"
will never be predicted.

Even minor coastal floods have proven that either the

warning simplY is not there, or if a warning is available, it will likely not
reflect the extent of flooding which will ultimately occur.
Last March, I visited the Mayor and civil preparedness Director of Milford
after that city sustained over $1 million in private property damages from a
"minor" coastal winter storm.

When I asked what kind of warning time they

received, they replied, " We're still waiting!"

When the Mayor called a local

radio station to encourage public cooperation with evacuations the station
personnel doubted the validity of the information, as most of Connecticut was
unaware that a serious storm was underway.

While Connecticut is presently

installing a statewide automated flood warning system, the system will not
adequately address coastal flood warning, at least in the first few years.
Another area of concern is that of floodplain zoning.

While zoning regu-

lations in all coastal towns were found to be adequate and consistent with
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP)
lacking.

standards, enforcement was very often

Some towns admitted they had problems requiring a new structure to be

elevated to base flood elevation when surrounding existing buildings are much
lower.

Other towns seem to do a fairly good job of either ignoring the regu-

lations or misinterpreting them.

One of the coastal towns indicated to us that

the only way to correct this problem would be to have either the state or
federal government provide better "watchdog" service, and require quarterly or
even monthly reports (vs. annual reports) on building permits granted in flood
zones.

They expressed doubt that the annual reports they submit to FEMA are

ever even reviewed.
Public awareness, or rather lack thereof, of storm damage potential was a
major problem, and this resulted in inadequate flood insurance coverage.

The

Municipal Assistance Program included a public awareness section, in which
questionnaires regarding flood preparedness were distributed to a representa-
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tive sample of coastal homeowners.

Fifty percent of the respondents had pur-

chased their coastal property within the last ten years and had never witnessed
a major coastal storm.

It appears that many of these individuals believe that

the "abnormally" high tides and routine street flooding they have experienced
represent the extent of the effects of a coastal storm.

Even the folks who had

lived through the 1938 and 1950s storms appear not to have been in the major
damage centers, and, surprisingly, from their responses, seem no better prepared than the newcomers.
As a result, flood insurance coverage hit a low of 17% of the structures
subject to the 100-year flood in one town, with the average coverage being 58%.
When we distributed our questionnaires, we had homeowners write back who had
not even heard of the National Flood Insurance Program; and our office was
instrumental in the actual sale of approximately one hundred policies.

other

property owners expressed disinterest in the NFIP because the maximum coverage
limits only approached a fraction of the true value of their real estate.
These people must be made to understand that the chances of a flood completely
destroying their property are small, and that, in most cases, the flood insurance will cover the losses sustained.
This problem must be addressed through a more aggressive and continuing
public awareness program.

While the Connecticut program involved questionnaire

distribution and display exhibits, we were able to reach only a small percentage of the population who may be affected.

This year we plan to work directly

wi.th the beach associations along Connecticut's coast, arranging informational
meetings and distributing information through them.

In addition, we are con-

sidering providing "flood audits" to interested homeowners.

The flood audits

would be similar to energy audits performed in New England; the home would be
inspected and specific recommendations made to the property owner that would
minimize future flood losses.
Conclusion
The Municipal Assistance Program has proved to be valuable in a number of
ways.

The towns are working with our recommendations and are taking steps to

improve their local flood management programs.

The communities, for the most

part, seem eager to do the best job they can but have had neither the personnel
nor the expertise to develop comprehensive programs.

At the state level, we

have taken care of much of the legwork and have spelled out specific measures
for local governments to take--providing a good deal of initiative for local
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action.

In addition, this program has gone a long way in improving state/

municipal liaison.
staffing and budget limitations will certainly preclude the implementation
of some aspects of this program and will, therefore, force us to seek "creative
financing."

One possible source that we are optimistic about in Connecticut

(and may be applicable in a number of states) is the Integrated Emergency
Management System.

The preliminary analysis of hazards in Connecticut clearly

identified flooding as the number one hazard.

It is hoped that this finding

will result in the channeling of additional resources towards flood preparedness planning.
Finally, this program has been successful in convincing the towns that
the state has documented and is well aware of the coastal flood hazard potential.

Even more importantly, by providing specific measures the locals can

take to reduce flood losses, the state has assured that the towns cannot claim
ignorance of flood management techniques when the flood occurs.

This is a very

important consideration given the shift of responsibility for flood preparedness and recovery from the federal to the state and local governments.

PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES IN MAPPING VELOCITY
ALONG THE U.S. COASTLINE

Christopher D. Miller
Bernard Johnson, Incorporated

Introduction
In the coastal zone, storm effects are varied and complex.

Not only do

the high velocity water associated with surge and waves challenge the structural integrity of buildings, but also the erodibility of the shore itself can be
a cause of structural degradation or failure. The hazard potential of a site is
further complicated when coastal protective devices are present (e.g., seawalls, groins, and breakwaters.)
To assess the absolute, or total, hazard requires that the interactions
water~~sediment~~structure~~water

be understood and quantified.

Specification of the water motion (e.g., surge elevations and currents, wave
heights and runup) on a nonerodible shoreline in the absence of human-made
structures can be accomplished with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

When the

movement of the sediment and the modification of the flow by structures are
included, such a specification becomes much more inexact.

That is, the inter-

actions can neither be described nor modeled in minute detail.

Approximations

are required.
A few examples illustrate the nature of these interactions.

When a shore-

line is attacked by waves, waves running up the front face of the dunes excavate material and transport i t offshore.

The consequent shoaling and flatten-

ing of the beach profile seaward of the dune reduce the height of the incoming
waves and the rate of dune erosion.

This type of feedback mechanism is common.

A groin, whose purpose is to stabilize the shoreline (at least locally) can,
because of its blocking action, induce a rip current.

This narrow jet of water

may transport sediment seaward and scour a channel parallel to the groin.
Upland property could be destabilized and larger waves allowed to impact the
groin.

When coastal areas are filled in and bulkheaded for development (e.g.,

backshore lagoons and marshes) surge waters can no longer disperse their energy
at low velocity over a wide area.

Rather, the channelization funnels and
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intensifies the surge currents.

Scour and possible undermining of structures

result.
How these and other interactions evolve over the course of a storm is only
partly understood.

The easiest study approach is to combine poststorm obser-

vations (beach profiles, location and degree of damage) with gross storm
characteristics (peak surge level, significant wave height) to develop predictive relationships among the governing physical parameters.

Even this "easy"

approach has not realized its full potential.
In conducting flood insurance studies, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) has attempted to strike a balance between ease of implementation
and level of technical sophistication.

The goal has been to provide a reason-

able description of the hazard and to do so in a uniform, evenhanded manner
along the entire u.S. coastline.

At the same time it has been recognized that

science does not have all the tools necessary to accurately and economically
predict the full range of storm hazards.

Of necessity, FEMA's technical

procedures have evolved gradually over the past decade as the program has
become more established and the scientific community has been stimulated to
study coastal phenomena in greater detail.

Limitations in the past have

related to the practical implementation of such a broadly based program and to
gaps in our knowledge of the physical processes governing the coastal zone.
Although these two considerations still pertain today, technical procedures have become more comprehensive and more defensible.

The storm surge

hydrodynamic model has advanced in sophistication; wave heights and wave runup
have been incorporated in the "base flood elevation; n be'ach and dune erosion
are being considered to some extent.
responded to local conditions.

The flood insurance program has also

One example is the prediction of wave runup in

the northeast U.S.; previously only the stillwater (surge) elevations were
computed, and these levels consistently fell below the observed storm damage.
Now with the inclusion of wave runup, the predicted upland penetration of high
velocity water more closely mirrors historical observations.
always presented a problem for program implementation.

Erosion has

This is because of its

multifaceted nature and our scientific ignorance about how moving water and
sediment interact.

Recently some quantitative approaches have been introduced

to partially address this deficiency (Tayfun et al., 1979; Balsillie, 1982;
Vellinga, 1983).
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Erosion--Approaches and Constraints
Not all aspects of surge and wave-induced erosion can realistically be
accommodated in a flood insurance study.

Erosion due to currents is to be

differentiated from erosion due to direct wave action; scour at the base of a
structure is different from scour at the base of a dune; the dramatic shortterm erosion experienced during a single storm may contrast with a long-term
trend of accretion for a particular segment of the shoreline.
some first tentative steps to account for the phenomenon.

FEMA has taken

However, because

FEMA's mandate is to establish flood elevations, all the nuances of the erosion
phenomenon are beyond the scope of the flood insurance studies.

An eroded

ground profile is the starting point for the computation of wave crest elevations; the direct impact of the erosion itself on a structure is not the focus
of attention.
Consideration of erosion at all represents a significant leap forward.
Since FEMA's objective has been to establish minimum national criteria, i t is
incumbent on the individual states and communities to provide the detailed
analyses and engineering criteria necessary for the siting and design of buildings in their respective localities.
Some of the kinds of erosion are described below:
1)

Wave-induced buildup of pore pressure internally in soils may lead to
liquefaction, i.e. the soil behaving like a fluid.

2)

Currents associated with the surge can cause scour around the foundation
of buildings and breaching of low-lying sections of barrier islands. In
backshore areas the storage of surge water during a storm can eventually
lead to the formation of strong currents directed toward the backside of
the barrier island when onshore winds cease and/or reverse direction
(Leatherman, 1983; Miller, 1983; Miller and Bachman, 1984). Channels and
other rigid human-made structures may exacerbate these flows.
The primary objective of coastal flood studies is to predict water
elevations, not currents, although the two are mutually dependent.
Currents may be examined during the model calibration process (i.e. evaluation of the capability of a hydrodynamic surge model to reproduce
observed elevations), but no hazard assessment is made based on the magnitude of these currents.
In addition, in areas inland from the open coast,
the water motion is usually resolved at a scale of about one mile; the
effect of physical features (either natural or human-made) with dimensions
less than this may not be revealed by the modeling.

3)

Scour at the base of a seawall (or other protective structure), or removal
of supporting backfill by overtopping waves, can undermine the structure
and allow higher waves and progressive erosion to threaten upland
buildings.
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4)

Deposition of sand or debris under an elevated building, as might Occur
because of overwash, would restrict water flow underneath the building and
concentrate wave energy on the structure.

5)

An inlet prone to migration or erosion may be destablized during a storm.
The large volume of high velocity water that is conveyed could erode the
banks of the inlet. Additionally, accumulation of littoral drift on the
updrift side of the inlet would favor erosion of the downdrift shore and a
net migration of the inlet. Erosion or inlet migration of modest proportions could endanger nearshore development.

6)

Shorelines are ephemeral. They are subject to change on short and long
time scales. There are reversible seasonal changes; reversible and
irreversible long-term trends (e.g. end points of a barrier island
eroding, or retreating; the middle section of the island accreting, or
prograding such as on Kiawah Island, South Carolina); and episodic changes
due to individual storms. Summer beach profiles are obviously more appropriate for a determination of velocity zones due to hurricanes; winter
beach profiles are more appropriate for northeasters.
Data on the long-term rate of change of U.S. shorelines, including
the Great Lakes, have been assembled (May et al., 1982; Dolan et al.,
1983). This data set, which draws upon various individual and organizational sources for 1,689 coastal sites, is designed for presentation as a
series of U.S. Geological Survey maps at a 1 :2,000,000 scale. The original rate-of-change data on 3-minute grid cells, and statistical summaries,
are provided in a Computerized Erosion Information System (CEIS) at the
University of Virginia.
(More detailed local information is available
from other sources, e.g. Benton, 1983).
The Atlantic and Gulf coasts are experiencing long-term shoreline recession rates of 0.8 and 1.8 meters/year. The Pacific Coast has a
recession rate of only .005 meter/year. These are averages. Not all
coasts are eroding; some are accreting (e.g. the rocky shores of Maine,
and parts of South Carolina).
Arguments have been made that risk assessment should acknowledge the
fact that not all barrier islands are created equal (Hayes et al., 1981).
Many of the barrier islands of South Carolina have been categorized as
"regressive", i.e. developed through the seaward accretion of beach
ridges/land-based sediments, which are deposited atop more seaward sediments (Nummedal, 1983). In contrast, "transgressive"
(landward moving)
barriers have formed seaward of the mainland on the continental shelf
during a period of lower water and have migrated shoreward as the water
level rose (e.g. the Outer Banks of North Carolina).
A stable or growing barrier island is one for which the vertical rate
of sedimentation (material supplied by rivers, for instance) exceeds the
rate of sea level rise. In the case of an eroding barrier the balance has
swung the other way.
In other words, a shoreline may actually build
seaward even though sea level is rising. From this observation one can
argue that a setback line for development must incorporate local dynamics.
The shore adjacent to an inlet may be unstable, but toward the central
portion of the island long-term stability could pertain.
Long-term erosion or accretion is a response to storm surge and
waves, aeolian (wind transport) processes, rising sea level, and littoral
transport mechanisms (rivers, wave-induced longshore currents, inlet tidal
flows). Delineation of these trends and fluctuation is important when

establishing setback lines for development. However, the task is often
difficult because long-term trends can be masked by short-term fluctuations and patterns of erosion/accretion can migrate alongshore. In flood
insurance studies analyses are performed with a topography that is contemporary (as best as can be estimated with available maps) or is the
expected shape of the landform immediately following the 100-year storm
event. Realistically, long-term shoreline changes can only be accommodated by adjusting study results periodically.
7)

The scour/undermining of dunes is a dramatic short-term event. Because it
occurs coincident with the surge and waves generated by a storm, the
inland propagation of the surge and the maximum attainable wave height are
functions of the rate of erosion of the dune field. Therefore, specification of the "base flood elevation" must include this interaction. various
approaches have been adopted. The method most widely used at this time is
historical reference--examining pre- and post-storm beach profiles to
identify shoreline adjustments to severe storms. An example is the beach
profile data gathered in Alabama after Hurricane Frederic. This method is
obviously limited by the availability and quality of historical data. A
variation on this technique is to assume that a reasonable erosion profile
is obtained by drawing a line from the toe of the dune to the point on the
leeside of the dune where the first slope break occurs. A more general
approach, based on field observations and laboratory experiments, has been
applied in North Carolina (Tayfun et al., 1979; Tetra Tech, 1983; Hodges
et al., 1984) following the work of Edelman (1968, 1970). The method
assumes that dune material is deposited directly offshore, and, consequently, the volume of sediment eroded from the dune equals the volume
of deposition. Beach slopes are reduced (flattened) by a set factor.
Recent work by Vellinga (1983, 1984) offers the prospect that the shape
of the eroded profile (slopes) can be adjusted on a site-specific basis as
a function of the sediment size.
The drawback of these methodologies is that they are not explicitly
designed for the case of surge overtopping, i.e. cases in which the storm
surge level is above the crest of the dune. Practical modifications have
been made to model this case (Hodges et al., 1984), although the results
are only indicative of the erosion pattern to be expected. The transition
to onshore sand transport (washover) is not accounted for.
Investigations
parallel to those in North Carolina have been undertaken in Florida
(Balsillie, 1982; 1983).
Scour of the beach and dunes is a process that cannot be ignored in
flood insurance studies. scour was a major damage factor--second only to
wind--during Hurricane Alicia, a moderate storm that struck the GalvestonHouston area in 1983 (Miller, 1983). Once it was recognized that storm
waves were capable of inflicting substantial damage, the establishment of
V Zones was undertaken. There have been and continue to be problems in
identifying and delineating this special hazard; however, as the work has
proceeded the gap between problems and solutions has gradually narrowed.
The incorporation of beach and dune erosion can be expected to follow a
similar path. At the moment a uniform approach is not forthcoming. The
effort should be made to sift through and synthesize the various data and
methods. What is required is a comparison and consolidation of the
several pieces of work that exist today--the scientific stUdies and the
procedures that some states have already implemented. The increased
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interest in erosion mandates that more sophisticated thinking be brought
to bear on the problem.
All of the erosion categories described above are worthy of further attention and study.

However, the diversity and subtleties of the erosion phenomena

defy complete analysis.

Of the seven (nonexclusive) categories identified,

only category seven can be implemented with some degree of confidence.

Never-

theless, FEMA should work with and encourage coastal states in their efforts to
quantify the erosion potential in all its aspects and to establish appropriate
setback or land use criteria.
Coastal Structures--Protection versus Hazard
When protective structures are placed in the coastal zones (e.g., seawalls, groins, breakwaters, bulkheads, beach fill) some disturbance of the
balance among waves, currents, and sediment is inevitable.

The natural forces

will tend to realign themselves to accommodate the presence of the structure.
Although ambivalent feelings are often expressed about the benefits to be
gained with the use of such structures, it can probably be stated that the
adverse effects generally outweigh the benefits.
exceptions.

However, there are several

When an absolute need, or some other justification (usually eco-

nomic) exists, then a structure may be considered.

A nuclear power plant, with

its cooling requirements, has to be sited where large quantities of water are
available; an established development may have to be "retrofitted" with a
floodwall because current protection proves inadequate; a resort area that
anchors a community economically may require periodic renourishment of its
beaches or maintenance of its shorefront facilities; a port or harbor needs
jetties to stabilize an inlet for navigation or a breakwater to intercept and
reduce wave action.
In assessing the protection afforded by coastal structures there are
several considerations (and potential unknowns):
1)

Was the structure designed for a 10-year storm? a 100-year storm?

2)

Is the design adequate for the specified design period?
procedures adequate?

3)

Is this a major structure or does it protect only a narrow stretch of the
shoreline (e.g., one residence)? What is the diversity and density of
structures along the shore?

4)

To what degree does the structure destabilize the beach or ground around
it?

Were construction
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During Hurricane Alicia the failure of oceanfront bulkheads and grade
slabs on Galveston Island was fairly common (Miller, 1983).
were obviously not designed for a severe storm.

These bulkheads

In contrast, on the same

island sits the Galveston seawall, a formidable structure built to withstand
severe stresses.

Large, publicly funded projects, like the Galveston seawall,

have a built-in risk factor that is usually predictable.

Small and/or private-

ly funded projects are less likely to have design and construction criteria
that can be easily accessed and evaluated.

Therefore, i t becomes problematic

how to assess the vulnerability of individual structures to a 100-year storm.
The problem is compounded when the structure varies in design and type
from point to point along the shore.

For example, one homeowner may elect to

protect his property with a stone revetment; his neighbor may rely upon a
timber bulkhead.
bility.

Each protective device has different dimensions and surviva-

In both cases, however, the 100-year storm will probably exceed the

structures' design thresholds.

In fact, parts of the structures could become

projectiles during a storm, endangering the residences they were presumed to
protect.

During design this presumption can promote a false sense of security

and lead to insufficient setback of the residence.
Ideally, each protective structure along the shore should be individually
certified by an engineer.

In practice this is not entirely feasible in flood

insurance mapping where a broader brush stroke is applied.

If, for instance, a

group of protective structures is shown or assumed to remain intact during an
extreme storm and their top elevations do not vary appreciably one from the
other, then they may be treated as a single structure for the purposes of
computing wave heights.
The creation or renourishment of a beach is a nonstructural protective
device.

The elevation of the beach berm will control the maximum heights of

the wave that propagates inland.

Losses and reworking of the placed fill mean

that the shoreline and the beach profile vary over time.

Fill projects are

often characterized by relatively rapid loss or migration of material (both
offshore and alongshore), especially in the initial stages of the project.

If

these losses have been accommodated in the design and/or periodic renourishment
is scheduled, then i t may be possible to define a "stable" berm elevation.
However, the art of beach design and the prediction of maintenance requirements
is still rather primitive.

More comprehensive measurement programs are needed

to be able to identify those conditions for which an efficient design is
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possible.

If a beach has demonstrated stability over a number of years, then

that beach configuration can be the starting point for the V Zone
determination.
The destabilizing influence of solid structures on contiguous sediments
has been alluded to earlier.

Immobile, nonyielding structures can concentrate

flows and intensify local scour.
of a seawall.
storm.

The beach profile tends to deepen at the base

This in turn could precipitate structural failure during a

A seawall that is not properly tied back into the shore at its end

points may be flanked by wave action and undermined.

In California, winter

storms require that periodic reconstruction of destroyed seawalls and bulkheads
be undertaken.

Along these same lines, it appears that in some cases a family

of groins will induce a steepening of the offshore beach profile, permitting
larger waves to approach the shore and promoting offshore transport of beach
sediment.

Because solid structures inhibit the natural transfer of material

between the beach and the offshore area, a disequilibrium can occur whereby
additional erosion of adjacent, unprotected shorelines is required to reestablish the sediment balance in the nearshore area.

Thus, the presence of a

seawall can enhance the local rates of erosion (Walton and Sensabaugh, 1976).
In North Carolina there is a policy to disallow any shore hardening and a
special setback to account for the immobility of structures.
Are there situations in which coastal structures provide a level of protection that would otherwise be absent?
will protect the property behind it.

Certainly a well-engineered structure

Seawalls will break the incoming waves,

as will an offshore breakwater or a shore-attached breakwater.

FEMA's wave

height method accounts for wave transmission over thin, human-made barriers
(seawalls, floodwalls) but not over or around more massive structures such as
breakwaters.

Wave runup on sloping revetment structures mayor may not be

considered depending on the level of detail brought to the study.

A groin,

because i t is oriented perpendicular to the shoreline, does not supply appre-ciable protection against waves arriving perpendicular to the shore.

With

respect to its sediment gathering capability, a groin has a differential effect
on the shoreline, causing accretion in one area but erosion elsewhere.

There

are special cases in which groins can have a long-term beneficial effect.
Sediment that is being lost from the tip of an island due to longshore drift
may be retained by the placement of a single groin.

Since the sediment was not

feeding downdrift beaches, no detrimental effect ensues.

Considerations like
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this are somewhat academic, since it is a "snapshot" (not a history) of the
beach and shoreline that is incorporated in the V Zone calculations.
Summary
The impacts of erosion and structures on the determination of V Zones have
just begun to be explored and quantified.

This is partly due to program con-

straints (the inclusion of wave heights alone was, and is, a formidable undertaking) and partly due to the state of the science.

variations on the water-

structure-sediment interaction theme defy current analysis.
discussed here, others may be important.

Some have been

It is imperative that there be in-

ternal consistency in the methods to compute V Zones.

With respect to erosion,

in particular, the establishment of a uniform procedure(s) is needed.

As the

study guidelines are routinely updated, they should be made more explicit
concerning the options available to the study contractor, conditions that
require special attention, and procedures to be followed.
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EROSION RATES AND HAZARD MAPPING IN
COASTAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

David W. OWens
Director, Office of Coastal Management
North Carolina Department of Natural Resources
and Community Development

Introduction
Developing a clear delineation of natural hazards is an essential element
in coastal resource management.

Knowing the magnitude, frequency, and impacts

of various natural hazards is a necessity in properly managing development
aloDg the coast.

It is therefore important that data

gath~ring

and analysis on

hazards be an integral part of a management system to insure that the necessary
information is available and that it meets the legal and political needs of the
management program.
In the North Carolina coastal management program, properly managing development in natural hazard areas has long been a principal goal.

The state's

Coastal Resources Commission, in adopting its standards for development along
Norch Carolina's 320 miles of ocean beaches, set three specific objectives for
its oceanfront development:
1)

Minimizing the loss of life and property;

2)

Reducing the encroachment of permanent structures onto the active beach
system; and

3)

Reducing the public costs of improper development, particularly the costs
of disaster relief, infrastructure repair and replacement, flood insurance
losses, and income tax losses through casualty loss deductions.
Operating primarily through the regulatory and planning provisions of the

Coastal Area Management Act, the state actively manages the location and design
of new coastal development to meet these three objectives.
In order to successfully implement such a management program, accurate
information on natural hazards is necessary.

In determining how large an

oceanfront setback to adopt and how stringent building design and construction
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standards should be, the Commission had to secure accurate hazard delineation
data.
To be used in such a management program, hazards data have to meet three
standards.

First, they must be realistic.

If they are not accurate, the

management system that is based on them will be ineffective.

It is critical to

test hazards data not only against academic models, but also against past
experience and other studies.

Second, the data must be available for use.

If

they are too costly to secure or too time-consuming to generate or use, they
cannot be used practically in a management scheme.
legally defensible.

Third, the data must be

This standard does not require perfection, but it does

require reasonable accuracy.

The level of detail and accuracy required varies

with the uses to which the data are put, but this factor must be carefully
considered when selecting a method for hazard delineation.

These three factors

again emphasize the importance of developing hazards data and a management
system concurrently and in close coordination.

Knowledge of how the data will

be used and what standard of accuracy and detail is required is essential in
determining what information to collect and analyze.

Similarly, knowledge of

what data are or can be made available and their limitations is critical in the
design of management systems.
Hazard Delineation for the North Carolina Oceanfront
In designing North Carolina's coastal management program, three natural
hazards received particular attention--long-term erosion, inlet formation a::d
migration, and flooding.

Such hazards as fire or high winds in coastal storms

were deemed to be adequately addressed by other programs.
Erosion Studies
Erosion along North Carolina's oceanfront has two dimensions--the longterm fluctuation of the shoreline over many years and the dramatic short-term
fluctuation of the shoreline in major storms.

Attempts have been made to

address both in the state's management program.
Long-term Erosion.

It has long been known intuitively that many segments

of the state's ocean shoreline are receding.

Structures first built along the

ocean 50 years ago have been moved landward several times.

Highways built in

the 1940s have washed to sea, with segments being replaced in more landward
locations.

Subdivisions platted in the 1950s now have ocean front cottages on

what were once second and third tier lots.

While understanding of the impacts
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of sea level rise is relatively recent, this experience has confirmed the fact
that much of the state's coastline is indeed eroding over the long run.
After reviewing over 93 studies delineating erosion rates for the state's
beaches, it was concluded that none met the required standards of being
adequately realistic, available, and defensible for use in the state's management program.

Those that seemed reasonably accurate were only available for

small segments of the coast.

Those with statewide coverage were either too

general for use with regulations or were early efforts with untested scientific
reliabili ty.
Because of the critical need for accurate long-term erosion rate information and its central part in the emerging management program, the state decided
to invest in a new study that would generate the needed data.

This study,

completed in 1980 and updated in 1981, is the most detailed, accurate, and
comprehensive oceanfront erosion rate study conducted in the state and is now
used as a key part of the management system.
These erosion rates, which depict past erosion and do not purport to
project future erosion

~

se, were produced using a method developed largely

by Dr. Robert Dolan (Dolan, Hayden, and Heywood, 1978).

Low altitude aerial

photography, dating from 1935 to 1980, was compared to ascertain shoreline
movement.

This time period reflects both the period for which high quality,

accurate photography suitable for analysis is available as well as being the
40-50 year time frame that much of the state's management program is designed
to address.
In summary, the methOdology involves: 1) enlarging 7-1/2 minute quad
sheets to produce standard 1 :5,000 base maps; 2)

establishing a base line on

this map parallel to the shoreline, with transects at 100-meter intervals for
campara tive shoreline measurements; 3) overlaying aerial photographs on the
base map with a reflecting projector or zoom transfer scope; and 4) tracing and
digitizing the projected shoreline to allow computerized analysis of the vegetation and high water line movement.
While the accuracy of this raw data is acceptable (Dolan, Hayden, May, and
May, 1980), further data manipulation was undertaken to improve its usefulness
for management purposes (Benton, 1983).

In order to eliminate the impacts of

possible operator error in individual measurements and to filter out short-term
localized erosion phenomena, smoothing of the raw data via a running mean was
undertaken.

For each 100-meter transect, an average erosion rate was generated
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using the 15 stations on either side of it.

This produces, at lOa-meter inter-

vals, an erosion rate for the 3,100 meter segment of shoreline centered on that
transect.
data.

This procedure provides increased statistical reliability for the

Where fewer than 31 stations were available, as near inlets, linear

regression was used to smooth the raw data.
In addition to smoothing via a running mean, blocking of areas with similar erosion rates was done to make the data administratively useful.

Segments

with similar erosion rates, using a minimum length of one-half mile, was
assigned a common erosion rate factor to be used in determining permit jurisdiction and minimum oceanfront setbacks.

The data was then displayed on

1"=400' aerial photographs for use by the permitting staff and on 1"=2 mi. maps
for public information and general planning purposes.
While constant updating of these data is required and developing methods
must be evaluated constantly (Leatherman, 1983), the hazard data developed i.n
this manner have proven to be realistic, available, and defensible.

The re-

sults produced are generally compatible with older studies, including data from
longer-term analysis using 19th Century U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey charts.
Also, since 1980, the state has expressed a willingness to modify the data for
individual sites if more accurate and reliable localized data can be produced,
and, to date, only one such request has been made, and the submitted data in
that instance were found to be unreliable.

The method has been challenged and

upheld in administrative appeals, and none of these has continued to judicial

review.
Short-term Erosion.

In contrast to this active and successful use of

long-term erosion data, the state has been less successful in developing useful
short-term erosion data.

While it is certain that the shoreline is subject to

dramatic short-term changes in storms, often measuring several hundred feet in
major storms, there have been only a few studies documenting the change in
North Carolina.

The models predicting shoreline recession in storms are still

evolving and to date have not successfully resolved the question of predicting
the impact of dune overtopping on recession rates, a factor that likely will be
common when a lOa-year storm strikes North Carolina.
Still, since short-term recession is such a critical factor for coastal
management, efforts have been made to incorporate this aspect of coastal hazards into the state's management program.

A study was conducted in 1979 to

generate the best possible estimate of projected erosion in a lOa-year storm
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(Tayfun, Rogers, and Langfelder, 1979).

The method used was a semiempirical

model that balanpes areas of upland erosion and offshore deposition in a major
storm.

Three hundred and eighteen beach profiles were used to generate the

recession estimates, which were then mapped on a 1"=400' scale.

While these

data were not deemed precise enough for use in regulations establishing minimum
ocean setbacks, the figures were used to delineate the hazard zones that set
permit jurisdiction.
applied.

within these hazard zones minimum building standards are

For this more limited purpose--building standards rather than set-

backs--the data were deemed sufficiently realistic and defensible, since more
accurate data are not available.
Inlet studies
The inlets connecting the Atlantic Ocean to North Carolina's extensive
estuarine system of rivers and sounds appear to be stable and permanent.

A

number of the inlets have been bridged and development along their shores has
increased, lending credence to this popular perception.
However, analysis of the inlets' creation, closing, and migration show
these to be among the state's most dynamic and hazardous areas.

With the

exception of the few with jetties or those that are naturally stable, the
state's inlets are constantly shifting.

Some move continuously in one direc-

tion, while others fluctuate back and forth.

All are subject to swift change

that can destroy any improperly located development.
Delineation of a hazard zone for existing inlets was carried out via
statistical analysis of past inlet movement (priddy and Carraway, 1978).
Surveys and aerial photographs of past inlet location were mapped and analyzed
to predict future inlet migration within varying confidence levels.

This

mapping also took into account such natural features as an unusually narrow
barrier island or overwash area, and existing human alterations such as jetties
and channels.

The confidence intervals were then used to locate a minimum

inlet setback and a broader hazard zone within which density and construction
standards are applied.

These inlet hazard area delineations, first applied in

1978 and updated in 1981, have been successfully used in the management program.
Establishing hazard zones where there is a high potential for new inlets
has not yet been accomplished.

While new inlet formation occurs only rarely on

the barrier islands that are large enough for substantial development, it is
recognized to be a serious and real hazard.

Formation of an inlet during a

ARE~
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major storm would obliterate development in its path and sever vital transportation and utility links.

However, the state has not yet been able to

generate data with sufficient reliability to justify use in the management
program.
Flood Studies
To avoid unnecessary expense and duplication, the state generally uses
flood insurance rate maps published by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) to delineate flood hazard areas.

Any area shown as a high hazard flood

area (the open velocity zones) on such maps is automatically brought within
state coastal permit jurisdiction.

Use of the V Zones has the advantage of

using a familiar map that is readily available and generally recognized to be

accurate.
However, FEMA's recent remapping of the coastal flood areas to incorporate
wave heights has caused several difficulties in North Carolina.

While the

state had requested and supported this move to produce maps that more real-·
istically portray flood hazards, the results depicted in the draft maps prepared under contract for FEMA were disappointing.

The first draft maps sub-

mitted to the state for review showed generally small V Zones when wave heights
were added.

In fact, in one case the V Zone depicted on the map was entirely

seaward of the current mean high water line.
Ensuing discussions with FEMA over the course of 1981-83 revealed that
several disturbing assumptions were made in preparing the updated maps.

First,

the maps totally ignored long-term erosion, even though the state had detailed,
reliable, and readily available data on past erosion rates.

While this pre-

sents few difficulties in stable areas with high elevations, it leads to a
major understatement of risk in high erosion areas.

Locating a 60-foot wide V

Zone in an area with a 15-foot/year erosion rate without taking account of
erosion is folly, unless new rate maps are going to be issued semiannually.
Second, the models failed to take account of storm-induced erosion.

As

with long-term erosion, flooding and wave action in past storms clearly indicate that this is a seriously fallacious assumption.
Third, the models assume that sand dunes are stable physical features in
storms.

Basing a V Zone on the seaward 15-foot elevation contour of a 16-foot

oceanfront dune, and assuming this will be stable in a 100-year storm, ignores
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reality and seriously understates risk.
Fourth, there are some indications that storm surge levels were underestimated.

Finally, outdated base maps may have been used, further exacer-

bating the above problems in high erosion areas.
Fortunately, some of these concerns appear close to resolution after two
years of discussion with FEMA.

The models have been revised to take account of

at least some estimation of storm-induced erosion.

However, FEMA has concluded

that policy and legal constraints require them to ignore long-term erosion as a
factor in mapping and that this can only be addressed through periodic map
updates.
In addition to these technical concerns, the lack of coordination with the
state has been troublesome.

As an example, FEMA has recently explained the

two- to three-year delay in finalizing the maps to local governments (who in
some cases are anxiously awaiting the maps in order to move from the emergency
to the regular program) as being due to state requests to include erosion
effects.

Since this problem has been identified by numerous reviewers on a

national level over the past years and since FEMA does have a responsibility to
promulga te reasonably accurate maps, such intergovernmental complaints are
misleading and contribute little to effective coordination.
Management System for Oceanfront Development
Regula tory Provisions
Using the studies described above, the state has established a program to
manage development in the most hazardous areas along the oceanfront (Owens,
1981) •

The regulatory program applies in three delineated high hazard areas that
are officially designated in administrative rules adopted by the state Coastal
Resources Commission.

The "ocean erodible area" starts at mean low water and

extends inland a distance equal to 60 times the long-term average annual
erosion rate plus the projected 100-year storm recession (this distance being
measured from the vegetation line).

The "inlet hazard area"

includes areas of

potential inlet migration adjacent to existing inlets, and the "high hazard
flood area" includes all numbered V zones on published flood insurance rate
maps.
with these three areas, permits are required for any development or landdisturbing activity.

The principal locational requirement in the permit stan-

dards is the minimum oceanfront setback.

The setback rule establishes four
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tiers for development.
vegetation line.
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First, no development may be located seaward of the

Second, in the zone extending from the vegetation line land-

ward, a distance 30 times the annual erosion rate (a GO-foot minimum), no
permanent substantial structures are allowed although parking lots, tennis
courts and the like can be located there.

Third, small structures (those with

fewer than four units and/or less than 5,000 sq. ft. of floor area) can be
located between 30 times and GO times the annual erosion rate landward of the
vegetation line.

Larger structures must be at least GO times the annual

erosion rate behind the vegetation line.
ments.

Figure 1 illustrates these require-

Development must also be landward of the inlet setback, the landward

toe of small frontal dunes, and the crest of larger primary dunes.
Beyond this setback, any development in the delineated hazard areas must
meet minimum construction standards.

For the most part these standards arE

based on those required by FEMA for floodplain zoning ordinances and the
state's minimum building codes.

Some standards, such as minimum piling size

and penetration, have been increased.

New moves by FEMA to establish grad"ated

insurance rates based on the quality and survivability of structures will help
reinforce these standards.

community risk rating would also contribute to the

coordination of state and FEMA programs.
Other state development standards include density limits in the inlet
hazard area (only single family detached units are allowed), limits on any
growth-inducing public investments in hazard areas, and limi ts on oceanfront
erosion control structures.

significant new policy initiatives now being

proposed in this last area would preclude any permanent shoreline stabilization
and any projects that would block public use of the beach or increase erosion
on neighboring properties (Outer Banks Erosion Task Force, 1984).
Nonregulatory Provisions
The state also actively employs nonregulatory techniques for managing
oceanfront development.

Coastal local governments are required to prepare

comprehensive land use plans that are consistent with state standards.

As of

1983, the plans must include a poststorm planning element that addresses steps
to be taken prior to coastal storms to minimize damage, specifies evacuation
and recovery operations, and sets forth poststorm rebuilding policies.

In

addition, the state has actively used land acquisition to further its management objectives (Owens, 1983).

This includes a beach access acquisition pro-

gram with an explicit priority for acquiring lots unsuitable for development,
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tax credits for the donation of hazardous areas, estuarine sanctuaries and
other programs.
The state has strongly encouraged FEMA to more aggressively use relocation
as a means of reducing certain future flood insurance losses, but to date this
effort has been unsuccessful.

The state is still pursuing adequate funding for

Section 1362 acquisitions and coverage of prudent relocation under flood insurance policies.
Conclusions
The state of North Carolina has made substantial progress in the past five
years in identifying hazard areas along its oceanfront and assessing the magnitude of risks there.

Accurate oceanfront erosion rates have been determined in

a cost effective manner.

Additional research is needed to quantify projected

short-term erosion during major storms, and careful attention must be given to
new flood insurance rate maps to assure that they do not significantly
understate very real and serious hazards.
Similarly, the state's management systems, at both the state and local
level, have dramatically improved over the past five years.

There remains a

strong need for continued federal funding of these efforts to assure that these
gains will not be lost and that progress in reasonable resource management will
continue.
Continued and improved coordination is badly needed.

Academic efforts to

study and delineate hazards must be closely related to management needs.
Federal programs affecting development in hazardous areas--especially flood
insurance, emergency management, land acquisition, public investment, and
coastal management programs--must be coordinated to avoid counterproductive
efforts.

Through such renewed cooperation, better delineation of hazard areas

and better management of inevitable coastal development is possible.
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MAKING MAPS USEFUL FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Donna M. Mack
water Resources Management
State of Georgia

The possible approaches to making maps more useful would be unlimited if
one had unlimited funds.

Since this is not the case, we, as state floodplain

managers, must be innovative in helping local officials to use the maps.

Many

local officials are not aware of the true hazards associated with high risk
areas such as coastal V Zones.

Most have not been fortunate enough to have

heard Neil Frank's message and perhaps do not understand the seriousness of the
threat.
Before I tackled this issue, the problem had to be clearly defined, which
seems like an easy enough task.

Yet, as I have discovered during my six months

as Georgia's Floodplain Coordinator, when you are dealing with the NFIP,
nothing is simple.

So I distributed a questionnaire to 15 coastal communities

in Georgia to gain insight irito the day-to-day struggles facing the officials.
The questionnaire covered topics such as:

problems encountered with the maps;

whether officials felt the maps were useful; and what suggestions officials
could offer to improve the maps.

Ten of the 15 local governments responded to

the questionnaire, and the others were contacted by phone.
In response to the question concerning problems encountered with the maps,
there was a broad range of responses.
quit8 legitimate.

Some of the cited deficiencies were

They ranged from a lack of benchmark locations for survey-

ing, to inadequate base maps, to the generality and difficulty of referencing
the maps.

There seemed to be a common feeling of frustration among the offi-

cials having to enforce these maps.
Most of the officials I dealt with were generally knowledgeable about the
maps.

I discovered that if there was confusion, it was primarily with the

insurance aspects of the program and not with actual flood mapping.

Most

officials were aware of what a V Zone defined and why the storm surge/wave
height had recently been added to the maps.

They did not agree with the wave

height elevations or think that they were a necessary addition, but they did

SPECIAL HIGH RISK FLOOD

150

understand fairly well the concept behind wave height mapping.
thought that the maps were technically sound and reliable.
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Most officials

Their concern was

not that the data was correct, but rather that it was too general and therefore
open to differing interpretations from homeowners, developers, or local
officials.
One of the most common complaints was that the base maps, which included
roads, streets, legends, contour intervals, topography, and scale, were inadequate.

Many officials find it incredibly difficult to reference any speci-

fic site on the maps and determine, without a doubt, what the site elevation is
and in which zone it lies.

This is further complicated in McIntosh County,

because there are few benchmarks there to determine first floor elevations.
Another dilemma is posed to some Georgia communities because of height
restrictions on buildings located on barrier islands.

For example, off the

southern coast of Georgia, on St. Simon's Island, which is currently experiencing a condo boom, the county had restrictions in effect limiting building
heights to four stories before the adoption of the flood maps.

The velocity

zone elevations of those maps have resulted in requests for variances to build
five-story buildings with parking below the first floor.

Thus, the well in-

tended flood program has left local officials with the problem of deciding
between local and federal regUlations.
Regarding the insurance applications of the maps, many local officiaL;,
being planners and engineers, are ignorant of FIA requirements.
standards are reviewed, many FIA requirements are not considered.

When design
A prime

example of this occurred in Chatham County, where misunderstanding of the
requirements for an elevation certificate caused chaos for several weeks.
Engineers there refused to sign the elevation certificate for several structures because they had not been built according to FIA standards.

These

particular structures were built with garages below the first floor level-which is allowed if the walls are breakaway or have openings every several feet
to allow the free flow of water.

Since these stipulations were ignored, the

first floor elevation for these structures was determined to be garage level,
even though that level might have been used for storage purposes only.

Need-

less to say, the Chatham County developers were more than slightly annoyed when
they were told this.

This problem was not a direct result of the flood maps

but does reflect the confusion that can occur when not everyone is properly
informed of the maps' use and the pertinent regulations.
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The suggestions local governments offered for improving the flood maps
centered on 1) improving the base maps; 2) providing training and education for
those individuals who enforce V Zone regulations; and 3) conducting more detailed mapping.
Inadequate base maps are usually a result of the map being out of date so
that other maps must be used for reference.
Training and education does seem to be widely needed.

Improved interac-

tion between state and local officials, federal and local officials, and FIA
and local officials was specifically requested.

Local officials also desper-

ately need information on current construction standards and floodproofing
techniques for commercial structures in A and V Zones.

Increasing the aware-

ness and understanding of officials as well as private citizens concerning the
prediction of, forces involved with, and damages resulting from a hurricane
should help discourage development in V Zones.

If it does not discourage

development, at least it will increase awareness for evacuation purposes.
The third suggestion made by the officials was to make the flood maps more
detailed, so that officials would have a scale they could work with and be
conEdent with.

The method used for mapping does not seem to be the problem.

Instead it seems to be the unsatisfactory way in which the data is presented on
the maps.

A larger scale map would definitely help.

Most officials are able

to enforce the wave height regulations but not without resistance from locals.
From my standpoint, the major difficulty for local officials in dealing
with the maps results from the maps' representing a predicted or theoretical
flood potential rather than a perceived flood potential.

This makes it diffi-

cult to impose wave height regulations on individuals who have lived in the
area for a number of years and have never experienced anything more than average seasonal rainfall.

This problem is, of course, not specific to the coast,

but has been magnified there because of the recent imposition of increased wave
height elevations.

Because Georgia has not experienced a storm with hurricane

force winds in several years, locals generally do not believe that a storm
sufficient to produce the wave heights shown on the FEMA flood maps could, in
fact, occur.

In conclusion, there are several possible steps that could be taken to
guide local officials:
First, more training and education should be provided.

workshops that

review Federal Insurance Administration regulations are definitely needed.

The
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flo.od maps have limited usefulness without some understanding of the corresponding regulations.

The maps should not be presented to local officials

without also providing a clear understanding of the objectives and goals to be
met in using those maps.

A coastal construction workshop to better acquaint

local officials with construction designs and standards required by the FIA and
NFIP would also be of tremendous assistance.
Second, the relevant published research information--including handbooks,
brochures, and manuals--should be distributed generously to officials.

Again,

the officials are able to benefit from the program only if they are knowledgeable about its maps and regulations.
Third, hurricane awareness should be promoted and adequate evacuation
measures taught.
Fourth, local officials should be requested to record the type of construction, floodproofing methods, and standards used on various projects for
reference, so that successful and not-so-successful techniques can be determined.
Fifth, and most importantly, local officials should be provided with
realistic planning guidelines in areas of high risk.

The maps should be used

as a tool to identify and recognize the areas that are most vulnerable.
Sixth, areas such as inlets, beach frontages, and hazardous erosion zones
should be emphasized to the officials as extreme high risk areas, so that
management in these areas is more effective.
I am certain there are many other possible ways to help local officials
with the flood maps, but I think we can all agree that the number one priority
is simply to educate them so that they can understand the maps and, perhaps
more importantly, the NFIP.

There will be little accomplished if we decide to

improve the flood maps and ignore this basic lack of understanding.

PART THREE
STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS:

Mapping
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THE FUTURE OF FEMA'S FLOODPLAIN
MAPPING PROGRAM

John M. Gibson
Assistant Administrator
Office of Risk Assessment
Federal Insurance Administration
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Introduction
The future direction of FEMA's flood mapping program can be thought of as
being divided into three major areas: 1) the direction the program will take
between now and the end of FY 1987; 2) the direction the program will take in
FY 1988 and subsequent years; and 3) related goals we intend to accomplish
along the way.

Before I begin, let me tell you of a telephone call I received

Friday as I was leaving the office.
called.

Jim Holton, Director of Public Affairs,

"John," he said, " we would like to feature your office in our next

issue of the Emergency Management newsletter."
forward to getting my copy."

"Great," I said, "I will look

"OK," he said, "but that is not why I'm calling.

Just what is it you guys do up there?"
Like Jim, many of you might not know what the Office of Risk Assessment
does.

Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the Office's position within the Federal

Insurance Administration, and Figure 3 lists its goals and activities.
The most important thing I can tell you of my office is that it, along
with <,he Office of Loss Reduction, was reintegrated as a unit of the Federal
Insurance Administration on November 20, 1983.

This was an important reorgani-

zaUon in that it now permits a more direct approach to resolving inconsistencies in insurance, mapping, and regulations that might have come into being
during the past few years when units responsible for these functions operated
more or less autonomously.
Near Term Direction (NFIP)
Flood Insurance study Program
FY 1984 to FY 1987
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 established a 1983 deadline for
the completion of all initial flood insurance rate studies.

However, that Act
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MISSION STATEMENT:
THE OFFICE OF RISK ASSESSMENT DEVELOPS POLICIES, PROCEDURES AND
METHODOLOGIES AND CONDUCTS FLOOD HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK
ASSESSMENT STUDIES WHICH PROVIDE DATA NECESSARY FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ACTUARIALLY SOUND NATIONWIDE FLOOD
INSURANCE PROGRAM AND THE REDUCTION OF FLOOD LOSSES THROUGH
LOCAL FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS. THE FUNCTIONS OF ITS TWO
MAJOR DIVISIONS ARE:
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS DIVISION
•
•
•
•
•

INITIATE NEW STUDIES AND RESTUDIES
PROCESS REQUESTS FOR LETTERS OF MAP AMENDMENT/MAP REVISION
PRINT AND DISTRIBUTE MAPS AND REPORTS
TRACK FLOOD STUDY FUNDS
RESPONSIBLE FOR SPECIAL CONVERSIONS

RISK STUDIES DIVISION
•
•
•
•
•

MANAGE FLOOD RISK STUDY AND MAPPING PROGRAM
DEVELOP TECHNICAL POLICIES, GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES
PROVIDE A NATIONAL FOCAL POINT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF FLOOD HAZARD
AND RISK DATA
PERFORM TECHNICAL REVIEW OF FLOOD INSURANCE STUDIES
RESOLVE TECHNICAL ISSUES OF APPEALS

Figure 3
Office of Risk Assessment Functions

assU!ned that there were only about 5,000 flood-prone communi ties in the na tion.
Today, we know that there are almost 22,000 flood-prone communities in the
United states.

We have prepared Flood Hazard Boundary Maps for about 19,100 of

these communities.

As of the start of FY 1984, about 17,500 of these communi-

ties participated in the NFIP.

The status of these communities is shown in

Figuce 4.
',he near term direction of the flood study program will focus on providing
full ~rogram status--that is, conversion to the regular program--to the 7,826
comm,mities presently in the emergency program.
Although well over the original estimate of 5,000 community studies have
been completed, the question remains:

how many emergency program communities

warrant a flood risk study, and what level of effort should be expended to
develop risk data for them?
In 1983, the

u.s.

General Accounting office released a report, "The

Federal Emergency Management Agency Can Reduce Mapping Costs,· in response to
the desire by Congress to consider options for expediting the conversion of
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21,926 FLOODPRONE COMMUNITIES NATIONWIDE

PARTICIPATE IN THE NFIP
DO NOT PARTICIPATE

17,542 COMMUNITIES PARTICIPATE IN THE NFIP
REGULAR PROGRAM
EMERGENCY PROGRAM

4,384 COMMUNITIES DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE NFIP
MAPPED
UNMAPPED

Figure 4
Status of the NFIP as of the Start of FY 1984

remaining unstudied communi ties to the Regular Program.

The GAO recommend'ed

that FEMA undertake a systematic approar.h to determine the level of study
needed, including the following actions:
•

Rank communities on the basis of development potential;

•

Incorporate other mapping approaches in the decision-making process; and

•

Weigh the benefit of additional detailed study against study costs in
making decisions.
In November, 1983, Congress passed P.L. 98-181, which amended Section

1360(a)(2) of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, to extend the flood
insurance study program to September 30, 1985, and added a new subsection requiring the Director of FEMA to submit to Congress a plan for converting all
communi ties to the Regular Program of the NFIP by September 30, 1987.

congress

also extended the Emergency Program and the initial studies completion date to
September 30, 1985.
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FEMA has responded to this legislation and the GAO report by initiating a
number of actions which will determine the future directions of the flood
insurance study program.

In FY 1983, FEMA initiated a study to evaluate the

floodplain development potential in the remaining unstudied communities.

This

contract was awarded to Donnelley Marketing Information Services, a company of
the Dunn and Bradstreet Corporation.
demography.

Donnelley is a leading firm in small area

The final results of this study were received in May 1984, and

include an assessment of existing floodplain property at risk and projected
future property at risk for the period 1984-1998.

About $13.8 billion in new

development is expected to occur in the unstudied floodplains during this
period (Figure 5).

The Donnelley study indicates that only 3,712 communities

would experience significant new development in their unstudied special flood
hazard areas--the 100-year floodplain--during this period.

The rest of the

communities would experience steady or declining development in their 100-year
floodplains.

The unstudied communities were then ranked based on the value of

property at risk in the 1 ~O-year floodplain.
In FY 1984, FEMA entered into an Interagency Agreement with the u.s.
Geological Survey to review all remaining unstudied communities that had been
recommended for detailed study by the FEMA Regional Offices.

The purpose of

that review is to assess the applicability of less costly and less time consuming methods for assessing the hydrologic and hydraulic condi tions wi thin
those communi ties and to recommend various types and levels of study based on
those findings.

The location of the 2,400 communities being screened by the

u.s. Geological Survey is shown by state on the map of the united States in
Figure 6.

The U.s. Geological Survey will complete most of its screening

efforts this summer.
F2MA is currently in the process of preparing the report to Congress
required by the 1983 amendments to the National Flood Insurance Act.

This

report will detail the number of communities to be converted to the Regular
Progra~

by the various methods (i.e. full detail study, limited detail study,

existing data study, minimally flood-prone conversion or non-flood-prone conversion), the funding required, and the time required.

The decision whether a

community warrants a flood insurance study and, if so, what level study should
be performed, will be based on a benefit/cost analysis.

This analysis con-

siders the costs associated with the various types of study in relation to the
future benefits of reduced flood losses that can be expected as a result of
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PROPERTY
AT RISK

} FUTURE PROPERTY AT RISK

(S)
- - - - - - - - - -} EXISTING PROPERTY AT RISK
1984
TIME
1998
3,712 COMMUNITIES WITH
INCREASING RISKS

PROPERTY
AT RISK

PROPERTY
AT RISK

(S)

(S)

1984

TIME

1998

TIME
1998
1984
1,415 COMMUNITIES WITH
DECREASING RISKS

~,370 COMMUNITIES WITH

NONCHANGING RISKS

Figure 5
Results of the Demographic Survey of 7,497 Communities

Figure 6
Number of Study Areas to Be Evaluated by USGS
for Less Detailed Study Methods
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improved floodplain management based on the data provided by the study.

We

have determined that the benefit of a flood insurance study, in these terms, is
about 2.5 cents per one dollar of future development that would have been
otherwise unwisely sited in the 100-year floodplain.

By comparing this benefit

with the average study cost of the different types of flood insurance studies
and Donnelley's estimates of the value of future development, we have been able
to determine the most cost-effective means of converting the 6,476 unstudied
communi ties to the Regular Program.
Results of our analysis show that some 820 full detail studies and 770
limited detail studies can be supported by future floodplain development.

We

also find justification for studying about 190 additional communities using the
existing data study process.

The remaining unstudied participating communi-

ties, approximately 4,700, will not receive a study and will be converted to
the Regular Program as either minimally flood-prone (with approximate flood
hazard mapping) or non-flood-prone (without a map).

These study initiations

and special conversions will all occur between FY 1984 and FY 1987 (Figure 7).

o THE ACTUARIAL SOUNDNESS OF THE NFIP AND ITS LEGALITY REST ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF ACCURATE AND CURRENT FLOOD
HAZARD DETERMINATIONS.
\1

A CONTINUING PROGRAM IS NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE TECHNICAL
ACCURACY AND USEFULNESS OF EXISTING FLOOD RISK DATA WHICH
FORMS THE BASIS FOR ACTUARIAL INSURANCE PREMIUM RATES AND
LOCAL FLOOD PLAIN MANAGEMENT.

t}

PUBLISHED FLOOD INSURANCE MAPS MUST BE REVISED TO:
• REFLECT CHANGES IN FLOOD PLAIN HYDROLOGIC OR HYDRAULIC
CONDITIONS
• REFLECT ADVANCES IN STATE·OF·THE·ART METHODOLOGIES
• ACCOMMODATE THE EMERGENCE OF NEW OR REFINED DATA
• CORRECT SCIENTIFIC OR TECHNICAL ERRORS IDENTIFIED IN THE
ORIGINAL STUDY
• EXTEND AREAS OF DETAIL STUDY TO OTHER PARTS OF THE
COMMUNITY

Figure 7
NFIP Need for Flood studies Maintenance Activity
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•

MORE THAN 19,000 FLOOD INSURANCE MAPS HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED SINCE
THE INCEPTION OF THE NFIP. HISTORICALLY, MORE THAN $100 MILLION OR
ABOUT 20% OF TOTAL APPROPRIATIONS HAVE BEEN SPENT TO KEEP THESE
MAPS ACCURATE AND UP TO DATE.

•

PUBLISHED FLOOD INSURANCE MAPS AND STUDIES MAY BE UPDATED BY
FOUR MEANS:
PERFORMED WHEN
• FLOOD INSURANCE RESTUDIES
CHANGE IS EXTENSIVE

A~S

I

• FLOOD INSURANCE STUDY REVISIONS
} PERFORMED WHEN AN
LETTERS OF MAP REVISION
(LOMRs)
R
LETTERS OF MAP AMENDMENT (LOMAs) APPELLANT P OVIDES DATA
•

WITH THE START OF FY 1988 THE STUDIES PROGRAM WILL BEGIN TO
OPERATE AT THE FULL MAINTENANCE LEVEL.

•

ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF ABOUT $36 MILLION WILL BE REQUIRED TO
SUSTAIN THE ESTIMATED LEVEL OF MAINTENANCE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED
liN FY 1988 AND SUBSEQUENT YEARS. THESE FUNDS WILL SUPPORT THE
FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES:
• 215 FLOOD INSURANCE RESTUDIES
• 400 FLOOD INSURANCE STUDY REVISIONS
• 1,520 LOMRs/LOMAs

Figure 8
NFIP projected Flood Studies Maintenance Activity
FY 1988 and Beyond

OUr plan to Congress will recommend that, after netting out studies

started durinq FY 1984 and FY 1985, funding be provided to initiate the remainil!lllJ oost.-effective studies in FY 1986 and FY 1987 and authorization to conduct

1these ne'" st:udies be extended to cover those two years.
tiated durinq FY
~t.

i

The new studies ini-

984 will be those recommended to us by our regional offices.

of the FY 1985 funding for new studies will be used to initiate those

limted. detail studies recommended by the U.S. Geological Survey.

All minimally and non-flood-prone communities will be converted to the
i!l.equlLar Prograa during FY 1984-1987, with an average of about 1 ,200 communi ties
sdllednled for conversion each year during this period.

Our plan to Congress

will also recomDend that the Emergency Program be extended to September 3D,
]990. to allow all communities that had studies initiated in FY 1986 and FY
]987 to be converted with effective Flood Insurance Rate Maps.
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Long-Term Direction of the NFIP
Flood Insurance Study Program
FY 1988 and After
FEMA intends to begin a full maintenance-level progra3 of flood ~nsurance
rescudies and aap revisions beginning in FY 1988.

The philosophy of

appl~'inq

benefit cost relationships in study decision making will continue in t.'te restudy prograJll.
In FY 1986, FilMA will establish a formal restudy decision-making process
that will take into consideration both insurance and floodplain aanagement
benefits to be derived from restudies relative to their cost.

~~

will also

be encouraging cost sharing, either by direct contribution of funding or by
actual performance of various study eleJIents by state or local goven-ments. as
a means of increasing restudy priority.

FEMA will ,also respond to appeals by

individuals or cOllmlunities to revise maps when such appeals are supported ...·ith
technical data supplied by those groups.
My best estilllate of the level of activity that will occur as the flooo
study program operates in the maintenance lIIode is that we will be revising
about 5% of all the effec)tive flood insurance studies with base flood elevations each year (Figures 7 and 8).

We project that one-third of these updates

will be accomplished by the restudy process and the other two-thirds through
the rr,,-p revision/amendment process.

This would translate into initiating about

215 restudies per year, performing about 400 map revisions, and issuing about
1,520 letters of lIIap revision or amendment.

Congress would have to provide

fund!.ng of about $36 million per year to support this level of activity.

We

will have a more realistic picture of FY 1988 and beyond after we have completed the formal study we will be undertaking next year.
Actions Related to the Flood Insurance Study program
In January we had ambitious plans for having the map initiatives program
far enough along by now that I could talk to you about likely alternative map
products and whether we would continue to print separate Flood Insurance Rate
Map and Flood Boundary Floodway Map panels.

Unfortunately, we underestimated

the time it would take to get input from agents, lenders, appraisers, others in
the insurance industries, and public officials.

Our original timetable was

premised on piggybacking the map ini tia ti ves survey onto already scheduled
workshops.

After conducting two insurance workshops in this manner in

February, we realized that the project was too important to squeeze it into an
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•

Changes common to all new samples:
•

Zones.compressed - maximum of 5IAE. VE, A. V. and 01

In coastal communities and 3 In riverine communities IAE. A. and 01
•
•

•

Changes in new FIRM Index Panels:
•
•
•

•

F100dprone straat index
SFHA delineated shown
Map information shown beyond corporate limits

Changes in new FIRM Panels:
•
•
•

•

Differences between sample and current format in explanatory box.
Map repository address and zone identification dates eliminated.

Alpha-numeric street locator grid
RectiHnaarized SFHA
Small scale single panel FIRM for entire community

New FIRM/FBFM Panels:
•
•

New Initiative to show all information on one map
Shows insurance information IS FHA. Zones. BFEsl and floodplain
management information Ifloodwav. cross-sections. river milesl

Figure 9
Map Initiatives Project
Final Map Sample Selection

already ambitious agenda.

We want it to be given the attention it deserves,

The last workshop was conducted on June 7, 1984, and the tabulation of the
questionnaires is to be completed by June 30.

The sample maps and question-

naire relate to changes shown in Figure 9.
We have received from the Association's Mapping and Standards Committee
Chair about 220 completed questionnaires with a preliminary evaluation of the
results.

Likewise, we have received a preliminary analysis of the 180 re-

sponses submitted during three agent/lender workshops and 14 completed questionnaires from four of our regional offices.

Preliminary findings based on

these partial samples are shown in Figure 10.

I am pleased with the reaction

received from all survey respondents.

The response has been overwhelmingly

enthusiastic, and it looks as though we will have more than 800 opinions from
all sections of the country upon which to base our future decisions.
I have given you the bad news--the survey was not completed as originally
scheduled.

The good news is that we can make up the slippage in the schedule.

All cost-effective recommendations for alternate formats are scheduled to be
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NO. OF RESPONDENTS
PRELIMINARY FINDING
ELIMINATE TWO MAPS
(FIRM/FBFM)
PREFER RECTILINEAR FIRM
PREFER CURVILINEAR FIRM
PREFER LESS DETAIL ON FIRM
PREFER MORE DETAIL ON FIRM
PREFER SFHA ON FIRM INDEX
PREFER STREET INDEX" GRID
PREFER CROSS HATCHED
FLOODWAY
INCLUDE AREA BEYOND CORP.
LIMITS
PREFER MAP SAMPLE NO.

AGENTSILENDERS

ASFPM

FEMA REGIONS

180

219

14 in 4 Regions

80%
86%
14%
YES
NO
YES
YES

88%
9%
91%
NO
YES

YES
YES
F2

100%
0%
100%
NO
YES
YES
NO
YES

YES
R3

YES
R3

MAP F2 = NEW FORMAT -SINGLE PANEL, SMALL SCALE FIRM WITH RECTILINEAR
SFHA COMPRESSED ZONES, FLOODPRONE STREET
GRID AND STREET LOCATOR GRID
MAP R3 = NEW FORMAT-MULTIPLE PANEL, LARGE SCALE COMBINED
FIRM/FBFM WITH COMPRESSED ZONES, CONTOUR
LINES, LANDMARK BUILDINGS, SPOT ELEVATIONS AND
INFORMATION SHOWN BEYOND THE CORPORATE
LIMITS

Figure 10
Map Initiatives Project preliminary Findings

implemented at the start of FY 1985 as new maps are issued or as existing maps
are revised.
Some of the innovative mapping initiatives we are pursuing are a feasibility study of providing users with microimages of our maps rather than paper
copies; a feasibility study of the LIDAR laser ranging system to produce topographic maps; and the use of geographic information systems to produce digitized maps and to fully automate the production and distribution of flood
insurance maps.

A summary of the future directions of the NFIP Flood studies

Program is given in Figure 11.
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NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM

•

EMPHASIS FY 1984-1987
COMPLETE THE INITIAL STUDIES PROGRAM
• INITIATE ALL COST·EFFECTIVE STUDIES BY SEPTEMBER 30, 1987 AND
COMPLETE THEM BY SEPTEMBER 30, 1990
• INITIATE AND COMPLETE ALL SPECIAL CONVERSIONS BY
SEPTEMBER 30,1987

•

EMPHASIS FY 1988 AND BEYOND
• BEGIN FULL MAINTENANCE LEVEL ACTIVITY IN FY 1988 AND OPERATE
IN THIS MODE DURING SUBSEQUENT YEARS
• FY 1988-90 COMPLETE PIPELINE OF STUDIES STARTED IN FY 1986·87

•

RELATED ACTIVITIES
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

IMPLEMENT MAP INITIATIVES PROJECT RECOMiVlENDATIONS
ISSUE COMPREHENSIVE APPEALS PROCESS MANUAL
COMPLETE COUNTY-WIDE MAPPING FEASIBILITY STUDY
COMPLETE HURRICANE CLIMATOLOGY STUDY
COMPLETE STORM SURGE MODEL REVISIONS
COMPLETE ALLUVIAL FAN METHODOLOGY UPDATE
COMPLETE LIDAR LASER RANGING SYSTEM FEASIBILITY STUDY
COMPLETE ALASKA COAST TSUNAMI STUDY
COMPLETE MICRO IMAGING FEASIBILITY STUDY

Figure 11
Future Directions of the FlOOd Studies Program

APPLICATION OF INNOVATIONS IN MAPPING TECHNOLOGY
TO FLOOD INSURANCE STUDIES
Brian R. Mrazik
Chief, Risk Studies Division
Federal Insurance Administration
Federal Emergency Management Agency

Introduction
Technology presently exists for fully automating nearly all of the flood
insurance study and mapping process.

Yet in present application, many flood-

plain mapping processes for flood insurance studies and other purposes remain
largely manual operations.

This brief paper examines the elements of a fully

automated floodplain mapping system, some of the reasons why greater automation
is not yet applied, and a possible transition plan for phasing into a fully
automated process.
Automated Floodplain Mapping System:
An Idealized Concept

Top?graphic Data Collection
Figure 1 illustrates the components of, an idealized floodplain mapping
system which are summarized in Table 1 and can be compared to conventional
flood insurance study approaches.

Under the conventional approach, topographic

data is collected by field surveys or a combination of field surveys and photogrammetric methods.

Additional topographic data may be obtained by manually

taking data points off available contour maps.

This data is then hand encoded

and keypunched for input to hydraulic or hydrologic computer models.
The development of profiling laser ranging systems such as the LIDAR
(Light Detection and Ranging) system under study by the Corps of Engineers and
the APTS system (Aerial profiling of Terrain System) under development by the
United States Geological Survey (USGS), provides opportunity for the rapid
collection of ground elevation data, in digital map format, which can be
directly input to computer based Geographic Information Systems (GIS).
Scanning laser mapping systems have also been proposed that would allow for the
generation of an entire topographic map in digital format.
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Digital
culturall
land cover
DATA

Digital
Topographic
DATA

Computer
Geographic
Information
System

Flood Plain Maps

Interactive
CRT

Terminal

Flood Pro files

Figure
Conceptual Diagram of Fully Automated
Flood Insurance Study System

DATA Tables
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1. Collection and utilization of topographic data in digital format
using laser profiling (e.g., LIDAR), laser mapping systems, or
Analytical Photog ram metric Systems (APS).
2. Collection and utilization of land cover and cultural data in
digital format by manual or scanning digitization of existing
mapping or by purchase of such data generated from satellite or
photographic imagery.
3. Utilization of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to develop
direct input of digital topographic and land cover data into
hydrologic and hydraulic models.
4. Utilization of GIS to generate flood plain maps and profiles from
hydraulic model outputs and to store and revise maps and
profiles.

Table 1
Elements of a Fully Automated
Flood Insurance Study System

Analytical Photogrammetric Systems (APS) rely on conventional aerial
photography with human interpretation but provide for computer-assisted set up
and maintenance of the stereo model.
coordinate data in digital format.

In application,

~PS

records x, y and z

Attributes can be assigned to digitized

point, line, and polygon features at the same time.

The resulting digital data

base can also be used to create a GIS.
Planimetric and Land Cover Data
In addition to topographic data, flood insurance studies utilize other
map-based information, including land cover and soils data required to determine runoff coefficients in some hydrologic models.

Cultural data and other

planj.metric information such as roads are usually obtained from existing map
sources to formulate a base for the floodplain mapping.

A fully automated

floodplain mapping system would utilize land cover, soils, and cultural data in
digital format.
Land cover data can be digitized manually from aerial photography using
ilie APS system.

Landsat systems, including the Thematic Mapper and Multi-

Spectral Scanner can also be used to provide digital land cover data at a
some\~ha t

lower resolution.

Another al terna ti ve is the manual digi tiza tion of

land cover data from existing maps such as USGS quadrangles.
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Planimetric data can be digitized from aerial photography utilizing APS,
but more frequently it is digitized from existing mapping sources.

Planimetric

line data can also be digitized automatically through the use of various map
scanning devices such as the sysScan system.
Interfacing with Hydrologic Models
Under the conventional approach, topographic and land cover information
are manually encoded, keypunched ,and utilized as input data to various hydrologic and hydraulic models to generate flood discharge-frequency and elevationfrequency data.

This is an iterative process whereby the engineer interprets

the output, primarily in printout format, and then adjusts various input parameters to correct, calibrate, or "fine tune" the model.

This can be an expen-

sive and time consuming process because adjustment to the input data, such as
adding an additional cross section, or subdividing a watershed, requires additional manual operations.
Using state-of-the-art digital mapping technology, much of this process
can be automated, including the interfacing between digital topographic and
land cover data, and hydrologic and hydraulic models, as well as the computer
generation of flood profiles and maps.
computer-based GIS.

At the heart of this process is the

GIS technology permits the storage and manipulation of map

data by geographic coordinates such as lati.tude and longi.tude.

Many "overlays"

of attributes such as elevation, land covers, and soils can be assigned to c.
particular point, line, or polygon defined by various coordinates.
In application to flOOdplain mapping, digital topographic, cultural, and
land cover data would be fed into the GIS as separate overlays and registered
to the same coordinate system.

Watershed and sub-basin boundaries would also

be digitized if hydrologic modeling is to be utilized to obtain flood frequec',cy
estimates.

The GIS can then be used to directly generate input data required

for the hydrologic and hydraulic modeling.

For example, graphic display termi-

nals could permit engineers to select the location and alignment of stream
cross sections, which the GIS would evaluate and encode for input to the
hydraulic model.

As a second example, GIS overlaying of watershed and sub-

basin boundaries on land cover and soils map information could be used to
automatically compute runoff curve numbers for sub-basins as input to the SCS
TR-20 program.
Real time interfacing of hydrologic and hydraulic models with a GIS in
conjunction with graphic display terminals can permit the engineer to see
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almost immediately the impact of a data input decision or calibration adjustment on the final flood profile or floodplain or floodway boundary.

Such a

system could greatly reduce the iterative processing time required to calibrate
and tune such models to achieve an acceptable result.
Generation, Storage and Revision of Flood Mapping
Under the conventional mapping approach, when a satisfactory hydraulic
result is achieved, computed flood elevations are usually read manually from
the computer printout and plotted to form flood elevation profiles which are
incorporated into the flood insurance study text.

Elevations from the flood

profiles are also used in conjunction with a topographic base map to plot the
floodplain limits in a fully manual process.

Floodplain limits are then over-

laid on a planimetric base map to produce a Flood Insurance Rate Map using the
standard manual cartographic processes.

Under a fully automated system, a GIS

can be used to drive plotters and generate hard copy floodplain maps and profiles using the digital topographic and planimetric data in conjunction with
digital output from the hydraulic model.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of the GIS is the potential to readily
revise and update floodplain maps.

Because all input data as well as the

floodplain maps themselves can be stored in digital map format, changes such as
in watershed land use or floodplain topography can be digitized to update the
various overlays and input for revised hydrologic and hydraulic analyses.
Output from the revised analyses is then used by the GIS to generate new floodplain maps and store the revised map in digital form.
Current Limitations
Topographic Data Collection Systems
Although the state-of-the-art in computer mapping technology has advanced
to the point where fully automating the flood insurance study process is
possible, there are a number of constraints which preclude this being a costeffective alternative in the near term (Table 2).
For topographic data collection, LIDAR is a representative example of
airborne laser profiling systems.

LIDAR is the acronym for Light Detection and

Ranging and works on a principle similar to RADAR or SONAR.

LIDAR systems

measure distances by measuring the time difference between laser pulse generation and return of the pulse after reflection by the target.

Mounted on air-

craft, LIDAR can be used to collect elevation data by measuring the distance
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1. Vertical elevation accuracy of current laser systems.
2. Field surveys required for hydraulic structures and underwater
sections.
3. Availability and cost of hardware within the private sector.
4. Existing digital data bases at a usable scale (e.g., 1:24000) are
very limited.
5. Creation of digital data bases by manual digltization or even
scanning digltlzation with manual assignment of attributes Is
costly and time consuming.
6. Large study areas are required to achieve cost break-even.
7. Digital map data from different sources is not in a standardized
format.

Table 2
Factors Currently Limiting Full utilization of
Automated Insurance study Systems

between the aircraft and the land surface.
wi thin centimeters over miles.

This measurement is very accurate,

However, the overall accuracy of airborne L.i.DAR

data is a functiun uf how accurately the aircraft position can be determined.
This accuracy does not yet approach that of aerial photogrammetric or landbased surveys, although this limitation will probably disappear in the near
future.

Recent and future advances in satellite navigation systems such as the

NAVSTAR Global Positioning System will provide a capability for precisely
locating ground station control for airborne laser systems.

Inertial naviga-

tion systems aboard the aircraft will also maintain accurate aircraft position
data to increase the overall accuracy of airborne laser systems.
A second factor limiting the usefulness of airborne laser mapping systems
is the continuing need to obtain field surveys of hydraulic structures such as
bridges and underwater channel cross sections.

Thus, the costs of field survey

efforts are not completely eliminated by this approach, so that they add to the
cost of the total survey effort.
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A third key limiting factor is that the availability of hardware and
software systems as well as operational experience is extremely limited within
the private sector.

This is the result of the large investment which most

conventional surveying and mapping firms have been unwilling to make at this
time.

As a consequence, although airborne laser systems offer the advantages

of speed and direct collection of data in digital format, they may only be cost
effective in situations where large mapping jobs are required in more remote
areas.

These constraints do not presently conform to current flood insurance

study efforts in which the collection of topographic data is usually limited to
small reaches of floodplain in developed and developing areas.
For the near future, the APS offers the greatest promise for reducing
surveying costs for floodplain mapping studies.

Although the basic data ex-

traction techniques remain the same as for conventional aerial photogrammetry
(i.e., manual interpretation of a stereo image), stereo model development and
aerotriangulation procedures are performed by computer with the APS system.
These automated functions may offer up to a 40% time savings over the traditional photogrammetric methods.

Another advantage of APS is that topography,

cultural line work, and land-use polygons can be digitized and stored to create
a spatial data base for later computer manipulation by GIS.

The primary factor

limiting the use of APS in floodplain mapping is its limited availability in
the

~rivate

sector.

This will probably be a short-term limitation.

Geographic Information Systems
computer generation of floodplain maps from digital data likewise has a
number of limitations that currently preclude its cost-effective use as a
stanJard production method.

The main advantages of GIS cartography are that

once spatial data have been entered into the data base in the form of a series
of overlays, computer cartographic software allows the overlays to be analyzed,
combined, revised, changed in scale, and manipulated in other ways that would
be extremely time-consuming by hand.

The major drawback of GIS cartography at

present is the lack of available map data in digital format and, therefore, the
cos~s

of establishing digital data bases.
Existing digital map data at a usable scale (e.g., 1 :24,000 or larger) is

still quite limited.

The USGS has recently established a program to digitize

its quadrangle maps at the rate of 300 per year.

Eventually this type of "off

the shelf" digital map data will greatly reduce the cost of creating a GIS for
floodplain mapping purposes.

However, immediate implementation of computerized
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mapping for the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) would require an extremely heavy investment in digitizing existing base map data.
Although the encoding of map information through scanning can greatly
reduce manual digitization efforts, computer analysis of scanned data beyond
overlay and reproduction is extremely limited.

More complex computer analysis

generally requires manual digitization to assign attributes to particular
points, lines, and polygons in the data base.

This remains a costly and time

consuming process.
Another limiting factor in computer generated mapping is the availability
of hardware and software systems within the engineering community.

At present,

the requirement for production of maps in digital form by study contractors
would limit the number of contractors capable of performing such studies.

One

option would be to convert studies to digital format at the Technical
Evaluation Contractor (TEC) stage, but this would be an expensive digitizing
effort.
Finally, the development of uniform digital cartographic standards and
guidelines within the federal sector should probably precede any major effort
by FEMA to produce floodplain mapping in digital format.

In an effort to

initiate such action, the Office of Management and Budget has created a Federal
Interagency Coordinating Committee on Digital cartography, in which FEMA is
represented.

This group is headed by the USGS and is engaged in identifying

the status of digital

cartograph~

in the federal sector.

After this assessment

is complete, the committee will move toward the establishment of uniform standards, which is expected to take several years to complete.
plans to Incorporate New Mapping Technology
Table 3 provides a proposed schedule for phasing new mapping technology
into flood insurance study production.

Since essentially all initial flood

insurance studies will be underway or completed by FY 1987, this technology
will be applied primarily in the maintenance level restudy program.

Because

the National Flood Insurance Program will not be a major producer of new mapping in the maintenance level program, FEMA's efforts will follow the trend set
by the primary federal mapping agencies (USGS and the Defense Mapping Agency)
rather than attempt to operate on the fringes of new technology which could be
considerably more expensive.

Therefore, the actual incorporation of new tech-

nology will occur only after a clear benefit-to-cost relationship has been
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ASCAl
YEARS
84-87
84
85
86
87
88-90
86
89
90
91·93
91
92
93

TASKS
PHASE I: PROOF'()F-CONCEPT
LIOAR demo
LIOAR & APS _ . GIS leasIbIllly
LIOAR & APS applications
Conduct GIS Pilot & ...... Technical EvoIuItIon ~ (I'EC)
Guidelines
PHASE II: TEC OPERATIONS
Award high technology TEC controcta
Begin TEC production 01 maps In GIS 'ormat ,. . . . . . Begin digitizing older studies' convef1lng to GIS
PNpore Study
COntractor Guldollnes ""Iulring study 1UbmIu.t In GIS 'ormat
PHASE III: STUOY CONTRACTOR OPERATIONS
Award high technology Study Contractor controcta
Begin receiving ",stud Ie. In GIS 'ormat
Begin fully automated system

'ormat.

Table 3
Proposed Timetable for Phasing New Mapping Technology
into Flood Insurance Studies

established.

FEMA proposed a three phase transition plan:

Proof-of-Concept,

TEC Operations, and Study contractor Operations.
Phase I--Proof-of-Concept
During the four-year Proof-of-Concept phase, demonstrations will be used
to prove the effectiveness of new technology for flood study purposes.
particular, LIDAR and APS systems will be tested.

In

GIS's will also be created

and used to pilot test the production of floodplain mapping.
During the first year (FY 84) one LIDAR demonstration will be performed.
FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have entered into an agreement to
test airborne LIDAR as part of an ongoing Flood Insurance Study (FIS) for Hays
County, Texas.
1984.

The LIDAR data is expected to be collected during september

FEMA hopes to have thoroughly examined the results of this demonstration

and have developed conclusions and recommendations by late FY 85.

FEMA is also

exploring the possibility of testing LIDAR in some other locations during
FY 85.

Based on these tests, guidelines for LIDAR use in FIS's will be

prepared and operational applications may begin as early as FY 86.
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phase II--TEC Operations
During the next three-year phase, TEC operations will be geared for the
production of studies in GIS format.

During FY 88, studies for which many

revision requests are being received will be digitized and used to demonstrate
efficiencies of computer-assisted revisions and to fully establish operational
systems.
During FY 89, full production of flood study mapping in digital form will
begin for new studies being processed through the TEC contractors.

Also in

FY 89 a conversion priority for communities with older maps in hardcopy will be
established.

The priority a community receives will be based on the number of

revision requests expected, demographic trends, and other data.

Digitizing

existing studies based on this listing will be initiated in FY 90.
preparation of study contractor guidelines requiring submittal of studies
and mapping in GIS format will also be developed in FY 90.
The first APS demonstration will be conducted during FY 85, to be folloHed
by further applications in FY 86.
of a data base for a GIS.

Use of the APS will result in the creation

Presently, flood maps are not tied to a horizontal

coordinate system that would facilitate the creation and use of a GIS.

As part

of a GIS feasibility investigation, FEMA will examine the need and requirements
for horizontal control in floodplain mapping in FY 85 and incorporate such
requirements in study contractor guidelines in FY 86.

Testing lhe use of L!,e

GIS to produce studies will occur during FY 87 and will inClude processing at
least one complete pilot FIS in digital format by a TEC.
During Phase I there will be a need to revise the TEC Guidelines and
Specifications to require GIS techniques and provide guidance on procedures.
This effort should be completed by FY 87.

The TEC A&E selection criteria for

new FY 88 contracts would include a requirement for the ability to produce
flood studies and maps in digital format.

This will set the base for phase

III.

phase III--Study Contractor Operations
During Phase III, lasting three years, study contractor operations will be
shifted to increase automation.

Beginning in FY 91, study contractors with

high technology capabilities will receive preferential treatment during contractor selection and by FY 93 only firms with acceptable technology levels
will receive contracts.
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The effort of digitizing older studies will continue through, and perhaps
beyond, phase

The time frame for accomplishing this task will depend on

III.

resource commitment and advances in scanner technology that will minimize the
resources required.
Summary and Conclusion
Technology currently exists to fully automate the flood insurance study
process.

Great strides are being made in digital topographic data collection

and in the collection and processing of other map data in digital form.
Advances in computer hardware and software capable of processing map data in
digital form allow for the creation of Geographic Information Systems with the
potential to create, revise, store, and transmit map information in far less
time than conventional cartographic approaches.
Such systems are not presently used in the standard production of floodplain mapping because of current limitations that inhibit their costeffectiveness.

These limitations include vertical accuracy constraints of

airborne mapping and profiling systems; limited availability and cost of
hardware and software systems within the private sector; limited availability
of existing digital map data bases at usable levels of resolution; the high
cost of the digitization process required to create digital data bases; and the
lack of standardized digital mapping specifications among agencies producing
uigital map data.

All of these limitations will be reduced in the future with

the lmprovement and mass production of the hardware and software systems
involved.
FEMA, as a second-level map producer, will follow the lead of the primary
mapping agencies in the conversion to fully automated cartographic processes.
It is estimated that this process will take approximately 10 years beginning

with feasibility studies and demonstration efforts followed by conversion of
TEe operations and finally by conversion of study contractor operations.
Transitions will be made at points where benefit and cost considerations
justify doing so and in a prioritized fashion.

The rate of total conversion of

all community maps to digital format will depend on funding levels designated
for this purpose.

This
page

.

IS

intentionally
blank

FEMA USE OF AERIAL IMAGERY:
A LAYMAN'S VIEW

Timothy E. Maywalt
FEMA Region VIII

Background
since October of 1983, I have been managing a project involving the analysis of aerial imagery applications to FEMA programs.

Its purpose is to identi-

fy proven, affordable remote sensing tools that can improve FEMA programs.
Research and development was neither intended nor performed.

The project's

scope includes only those applications that have been used successfully by
oiliers.
purp~ses;

The activities to be reviewed included mapping for flood insurance
monitoring community implementation of the National Flood Insurance

Program (NFIP); activities associated with presidentially declared disasters;
and those associated wi th "other hazards"--unique hazards as defined for the
purposes of this conference--managing dam breaks, mudflows, lake-rise flooding,
liquefaction and others.
The IILayman"

FEMA did not choose a practitioner of remote sensing, e.g., a photogrammetrist, to perform this analysis.

There seemed to be some concern about the

objectivity of such practitioners based on previous experiences.

FEMA wanted

reports that were credible (not products of an advocate), understandable (not
written in the jargon of a practitioner) and persuasive in their objectivity.
I was selected because of my extensive experience in the fields of floodplain
management and disaster mitigation, project management, policy analysis and
program evaluation.

As a geographer, I had some familiarity with air photo

interpretation, but my experience in remote sensing was, in general, quite
limited.

I was assisted throughout the project by a technical advisor, Mr.

Monte Mingus of the FEMA Region VIII staff, who has had several years' practice
in air photo interpretation.

In studying mapping applications, we were

assisted by Mr. Daniel Cotter of FEMA's Risk Studies Division, a highly competent engineer and experienced practitioner of remote sensing, to whom credit
for much of the success of our project belongs.
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Method
Our approach was straightforward.

We reviewed the literature, interviewed

the practitioners, visited their facilities, and evaluated what we read and
heard.

For many applications, our task was easy, since much of what FEMA does

is also done by other government agencies, most of which are far advanced in
their reliance on aerial imagery.

Several of the applications we reviewed are

tried and tested and have long since been well-established as routine procedure.

As an example, in our literature search we found a document entitled

"Fifty Years of Aerial Surveys of Floodplains," (Miles, 1979).
In the case of floodplain mapping, we focused our interviews On Flood
Insurance Study contractors and their aerial survey subcontractors.

We asked

what they were doing and how; the relative costs of air vs. ground surveys;
their comparative strengths and weaknesses; the effects of the contractor
Guidelines' constraints on reliance on air surveys; and what benefits might be
derived by changing current FEMA procedures.

For some applications we per-

formed field tests, for others where we were not equipped for testing, we
recommended that such tests be performed.
Findings and Recommendations
The two applications of interest to participants in this workshop involve
unique hazards and mapping.

Unfortunately, from the standpoint of making

comments relevant to this conference's overall theme, unique hazards have yet
to be reviewed.

Three recommendations have been made on mapping: 1) modify the

Flood Insurance Study Contractor Guidelines to expand reliance on air vs.
ground surveys as a cost-saving technique; 2) test LIDAR or other state-of-theart remote sensing tools for elevation data gathering and test computerization
of study-related data handling, again as cost-saving techniques; and 3) inventory air survey based techniques for performing "limited detail" studies to
select workable, low-cost methods.

Brian Mrazik and the Risk Studies Division

of FEMA are addressing our second recommendation.

That division is also

arranging to have the Corps of Engineers perform a comprehensive review of
potential improvements to the FIS Contractor's Guidelines (recommendation 1)
and to have the U.S.

Geological Survey inventory limited-detail study tech-

niques (recommendation 3).
Our findings on the use of air photos in priority setting are not as
positive.

There appear to be little measurement ~ata suitable for priority

setting available through air photo interpretation that is superior to existing
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sources in strength as an indicator of rank, reliability, or accessibility.
our findings on the use of air photos in monitoring efforts allowed for only a
subjective assessment to be made because of difficulties in establishing cost
effectiveness.

We stated in the report that the benefits appear to offset the

costs, but continued evaluation since then has yet to result in an objective
assessment.

We are continuing our review.

We have not yet reviewed activities

associated with presidentially-declared disasters.
Conclusion
As a nonpractitioner (I've graduated to slightly beyond the layman level
after nine months
viewpoint.

involvement in the project), I can provide an "objective"

There are practicable, understandable, and affordable ways to

improve floodplain management, especially mapping, by adding or increasing
one's current reliance on remote sensing tools.

However, as with most tech-

nology, its use has limitations and needs to be pursued with an open, but
cri ti cal mind.
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INNOVATIONS IN LAND DATA SYSTEMS

David A. Tyler
Surveying Engineering Program
University of Maine

Introduction
Land information used in the regulation and management of high risk flood
hazard areas is inadequate.

One cannot fail to reach this conclusion after

studying the material provided to participants in this conference and looking
at the recent history of flood zone administration.

Existing mapping and land

information systems are often of low or unknown quality and accuracy, contain
inappropriate data, are not easily accessible, and are not in a form or location that allows integration with other data sources.
While this paper will deal primarily with the technical aspects of the
land information situation, it should be understood that a significant COmponenL of the problem is political, economic,

little to do with technical innovations.

institutional in nature and has

Our ability to organize institutions

to collect, integrate, and disseminate land data and information lags far
behir,d our development of technological devices.
In the United States we still tend to think in terms of ad hoc data
collection and single-purpose mapping.
problem in a systematic manner.

We do not approach the land information

This condition is slowly changing and there is

reason to believe that progress will be made on the political and institutional
front.

Recently, publications by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS, 1983,

1980) have indicated possible solutions.

Innovative people and organizations

in places such as the Southeastern Wisconsin Regional Planning Commission are
showing us examples of what is possible.
In spite of all this, serious technical problems remain to be solved.
Surveying and mapping has been and still is a time-consuming and costly
proposition.

This paper will be devoted to recent and projected developments

and innovations that may reduce the time and cost of mapping operations and
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allow the presentation of geographic data in a meaningful and useful format.
Any land data or information system must contain several essential components.

The following discussion will be organized around the geodetic refer-

ence framework, the base map, and data base management schemes--three of these
components.
Reference Framework
A geodetic reference framework or control system is an essential part of
any land information or mapping system.

In the past, the cost of establishing

required control has often been a major portion of the total cost of a mapping
project.

In many' cases, time and cost constraints have resulted in the genera-

tion of local maps not tied to a geodetic control network.

Such maps and

information tend to be of minimal use beyond an original narrowly defined
purpose.

A number of recent developments promise to revolutionize the ways in

which we establish geodetic control.
Global Positioning System
The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), an array of 18 navigational
satellites, is expected to be fully operational in the latter half of this
decade.

The system is designed to provide instantaneous three-dimensional,

all-weather navigation to an accuracy of 200m to civilian users and 16m to U.S.
government agencies and other authorized users (Heuerman and Senus, 1983).
Signals recorded over a period of one to three hours can be used by surveyors
to compute much more accurate positions.

Six satellites have been placed in

orbital planes that provide a "window" of several hours each day when survey,ng
observations can be made.

Several receivers are in the development process,

and one instrument, the Macrometer, is already in commercial production and
use.

A typical observation with the Macrometer requires occupation of two or

more survey stations for two to three hours and produces a computed vector
connecting the occupied stations accurate to 1:1,000,000 in all three components.

Versions of the Macrometer now in the development process promise to

be even more accurate than the current generation and more compact and easily
carried in the field (Leick, 1984).
The potential of GPS surveying is enormous.

It is suddenly conceivable to

measure relative positions over almost unlimited distances to centimeter
accuracy in a few hours with no requirement for intervisibility between
stations.

All one needs to see is the sky.

with currently available receivers

costing in excess of $100,000 each, it is already possible to reduce the cost
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of many control surveying projects.

It is anticipated that equipment and

project costs will be even lower in the near future.
Airborne Laser Ranging System
The NASA Goddard Space Flight Center has done research and development on
a multibeam Airborne Laser Ranging System (ALRS)

which measures distances

simultaneously to six ground-based passive reflectors with centimeter precision.

By flying over a grid of ground reflectors at two altitudes, the

system can provide reflector positions in latitude, longitude, and elevation
over an extended area.

High altitude aircraft such as the U-2 and RB-S7 can

potentially survey areas of up to 60,000 square km in one six-hour flight with
an error growth rate of one cm per 100 km (Degnan, 1982).
ALRS represents another possible technique that could significantly reduce
the cost and effort required to establish precise geodetic control.

originally

conceived as a device to monitor crustal deformation and tectonic plate motion,
the system could have many land information applications.
not heavily supported by NASA.

ALRS is at this time

It is not clear if the system will be developed

to a working prototype in the near future.
Photogrammetric Triangulation
Photogrammetric triangulation is a mature and well-documented approach to
geodetic control establishment and densification.

This technique involves

photographing an area with a block of aerial photographs usually with more than
the normal amount of forward and side overlap.

A few previously established

ground control points must be available around the perimeter of the area.
These points, and all new points to be established, are marked with targets
that will form clear, well-defined images on the photographs.

Photo coordi-

nates of the target images are measured with precise comparators or analytic
plotters.

The ground horizontal and vertical positions of the new stations can

be computed in the same coordinate system as the original control.
l1any of these techniques have been used routinely to extend existing
horizontal and vertical ground control used in topographic mapping.

A recent

series of four papers describes an application by the National Geodetic Survey
(NGS) of photogrammetric triangulation to the densification of a county-wide

geodetic control network to support large scale mapping (Henriksen, 1984;

STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS

186

Gergen, 1984; Perry, 1984; Lucas, 1984).

A block of 750 photographs was taken

at a height of 12,000 feet over a rectangle of 900 square km.

Seventeen exist-

ing geodetic control stations and 380 new stations were targeted.

The triangu-

lation yielded horizontal positions on the new stations accurate to approximately 5 cm horizontally and 10 cm vertically.

This was accomplished at a

total cost of $132,000 (in 1979 dollars) or approximately $350 per new station.
This is certainly a lower cost than one would expect had conventional survey
techniques been employed.

It is not clear if satellite or inertial techniques

would have been able to compete with this cost.
Inertial Surveying
The inertial surveying system is based on an inertial navigation unit
designed for use in aircraft.

A precise inertial platform is oriented in space

with gyroscopes on three orthogonal axes.
local vertical, north, and east.

The three axes are oriented to the

A sensitive accelerometer is attached to each

axis and defines acceleration in each of the three directions.

The accelera-

tions are integrated with respect to time--once to give velocity and again to
yield distance traveled in each of the three orthogonal directions.

The compu-

tations are performed in an on-board computer.
The inertial platforms employed in aircraft navigation systems have a
drift rate that is often on the order of one km per hour of flight.

This ra.te

is, of course, totally unacceptable for most surveying applications, but the
performance can be improved by a factor of several thousand by periodically
bringing the inertial platform to a complete stop, i.e., stopping the truck or
helicopter in which the instrument is mounted.

During these stops, which are

called zero-velocity updates, residual velocities attributable to drift are
sensed and observations can be at least approximately corrected in real time
with the on-board computer.

Based on extensive field tests, accuracies on

ground stations of 13 cm + 12cm/hour horizontally and 10cm + Bcm/hour can be
expected (Mancini, 1977).
The cost of inertial surveying instruments is quite high, with a unit cost
of several hundred thousand dollars, but these systems can establish control
positions very quickly, and, when a dense control network is required, the cost
per point may be quite competitive with other techniques.
Base Maps
A base map is the graphic representation at a specified scale of selected
fundamental map information.

It is used as a framework upon which additional
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data of a specialized nature may be compiled (American Society of photogramme try , 1980).

In the context of floodplain mapping, the base map provides

the primary medium by which the floodplain data can be related to the geodetic
reference framework and all other land data sets.

The base map may be drafted

on mylar or other drafting material or may be in digital form stored in a
computer.
Progress has been made in the technology compilation of base maps in
recent years, but the progress has not been as dramatic as that described in
the field of geodetic control surveying.

Topographic maps at the scales and

accuracies usually required for floodplain mapping are still compiled from
overlapping aerial photographs using stereo plotters with human operators.

The

plotters are more efficient than those used a few years ago, and the computer
is often more intimately involved in the mapping process than i t used to be.
The output may even be in digital form, but the mapping process is still labor
intensive and costly.

A few promising areas of anticipated progress are

described below.
High Al ti tude Photography
Since 1978, the u.s. Geological Survey (USGS) has been taking both black
and white panchromatic and color infrared 9-inch by 9-inch photographs from a
flight al ti tude of 40,000 feet above sea level.

The panchromatic photography

is at a scale of 1 :80,000 with a frame centered on each 7.5 minutes USGS
quadrangle map.

The infrared photography is at a scale of 1:58,000.

The NASA U-2 aircraft, based at the NASA Ames Research Center, has a
maximum operating altitude of 70,000 feet above sea level.

These planes are

equipped with a variety of cameras ranging from 100 mm focal length mul tispectral cameras used for remote sensing to 610 mm focal length panoramic
cameras.

At a flying height of 65,000 feet above mean terrain, the panoramic

camera is capable of a ground resolution of 0.3 m (National Aeronautics and
Space Administration, 1978).
Neither of these sources of high altitude imagery has been exploited
fully.

Significant economies would be possible if, for example, panoramic

photography could be used to compile base maps and floodplain data.

This would

require analytical stereo plotters and the software to handle panoramic
imagery, but i t is reasonable to expect these capabilities to become more
commonly available in the civilian mapping community in the near future.
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Satellite Systems
The principle satellite images available for civilian resource mapping
applications are those obtained by the NASA Landsat series.

These images are

useful if repeated coverage of an area is important, and they have been used to
revise maps with as large a scale as 1 :50,000, but they do not provide particularly high resolution and have very limited potential in floodplain mapping.
Automation
When first introduced to the photogrammetric map compilation process,
people often ask why further automation has not been introduced.

At first

glance, the procedure appears to be a natural for automation, and research and
development work has proceeded with some success for the last twenty years.
When the compilation process is examined in detail, it is seen to be very
complex, posing many difficult automation problems.

Elevation data and plani-

metric detail, two types of data almost always needed in floodplain mapping
applications, are two of the types of data extraction least amenable to automation.
This is not meant to suggest that automation of the mapping process is
impossible.

A great deal of good research has been done over the last twenty

years, and much has been learned.

Indeed, many of the fundamental problems

have been identified, and research is now progressing (Horn, 1983; Wood, 1983).
However, the solutions to these fundamental problems are not around the corner,
and, at least in the near future, floodplain maps will be compiled by manual
methods.
Data Base Management
Frank has identified three generations of interactive graphics systems
used to prepare and edit maps (Frank, 1984).

The first generation systems were

graphics editors capable of storing maps that could be graphically edited and
redrawn.

A second generation of systems provided the same capability as the

first but allowed the user to attach certain types of data to the graphic
elements.
functions.

For example, pipes could be labeled with pipe diameters and pipe
Such systems could also potentially answer questions such as how

many feet of a particular diameter pipe of a particular age existed within a
given region.

The third generation of systems, which are still in the develop-

ment stage, store internal models of reality.

Drawings and reports are simply

operations to make the internal model visible to the user.
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These third generation systems will incorporate the principles of database
management systems in which the data storage is separated from application
programs by a central database management program.

Generalized database

systems have been developed for a variety of commercial applications, but these
are probably not fast enough to treat geometric data.

The primary advantage in

the database-oriented systems is their increased capability for structuring
data.

As the internal computer model approaches the external reality, addi-

tional applications become possible.

The data can be used not only to create

maps but also to direct simulation programs such as power flow calculations in
an electric utility net or flood routing in a drainage basin.
Research in the third generation systems is relatively new, and many
possibilities have yet to be explored.

Floodplain mapping would seem to be a

natural area of application for these ideas.
Conclusion
A number of technical ideas and developments in the areas of geodetic
control, map compilation, and database management have been reviewed.

It must

be re-emphasized that in floodplain mapping and many other areas of land information management, we already have a great deal of technology that is not
always applied in the most efficient or logical manner.

Of course, the techni-

cal developments discussed here will not necessarily lead to good floodplain
management or even high quality floodplain information.

There are, however,

exciting possibilities in all of these developments that should lead to improved land management decisions.
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COMPUTER GENERATED MAPs:
USE OF AUTOMATED DIGITIZING TECHNOLOGY
IN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Michael G. Pavlides
Greenhorne & O'Mara, Inc.

Resource management requires the assimilation of a multitude of data, much
of which are derived from or appear on maps.

Overlaying maps and identifying

areas of intersecting or nonintersecting data is a common technique used to
develop information for proper resource management decision making.

When

multiple overlays are involved, manual procedures become tedious, expensive,
and prone to a high rate of error.

Due to advances in computer processing

speed and data handling, and to the refinement of the mathematical algorithms
for spatial analysis, computer mapping is becoming an economical alternative to
manual overlay analysis.

However, the drawback now, particularly when enormous

quantities of data are involved, is the speed and accuracy of capturing the
necessary data into the intended computer system.
Two commonly used terms in data capture are "vector" and "raster,"

A

vector-based data capture system encodes data digitally by capturing coordinate
pairs to describe line geometry.

The (x, y) value of each point is input to

the system--first keyed to a general reference grid such as digitizing table
(or CRT)

units, and then converted in the computer to the real coordinate

values based on the true geographical position of the points.
value can also be input.

A third "z"

It is most often used to describe a third dimension

(such as elevation) or as a key to an attribute (such as soil type) assigned to
the digitized feature.

A raster scan system captures data in a column/row

matrix with an intensity value (i.e., grey value) representing the artwork
assigned to each matrix element.
short for picture elements.

The matrix elements are called "pixels,"

The raster data is then "vectorized" and each line

fea ture "tagged" wi th an a ttr ibute.
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Types of Automated Data Capture Systems
vector Input and Processing Systems
Typical data entry devices include manual digitizing tables with hand-held
cursors; direct keyboard entry; or interactive CRTs.

Our Autogis System uses

this method of data capture.
Raster Input (with Conversion to vector)
Typical data entry devices include optical raster scanners, line
followers, and electro-optical rectification aids with magnification capabilities to assist in manual digitizing.
Kartoscan™ and the Scitex.

Examples of raster scanners include our

The Kartoscan™1has a built-in video unit which

allows the user to view the material through the scanner and select various
line qualities for calibration.

The system measures the grey value intensity

of the line work being viewed and builds a histogram of the values.

By setting

the level of grey values desired off the histogram, the operator actually
selects the line work to be scanned.

Once scanned, the data can be vectorized,

edited in vector format, and transferred to other systems (generally in vector
format).

Several software enhancements are available:

smoo~

square corners,

curves, the removal of solid fills and the leaving of boundary polygons.
Raster Input (without Conversion to vector)
The data capture devices here are the same except that data need not be
vectorized.

with data remaining in raster format, editing on a color rastpr

CRT is much faster and more precise.
System Attributes
The advantages and disadvantages of each system vary.

Vector systems

basically employ a redrafting process that is subject to human error, dimensional inaccuracies of the source document, and equipment accuracy tolerances
(typically 3 and 5 mil).

Data capture is slow.

The principal advantage is

that a skilled operator can make decisions about the data while digitizing.
This "intelligence" and decision-making ability is only partially available in
the newer automated systems and consequently remains an advantage of manual
digi tizing.
Automatic raster scanning is highly accurate and extremely fast.
throughput speed to end product (i.e., digital tape)

Total

is, however, a function

of how much data must be tagged with attribute information, and this system

--rKartoScan is a

registered

trademark of SyScan,Inc.

pavlides
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can, in cases, be a slower overall process then manual digitizing.

Since

scanning duplicates the original source document, the problem of positional
versus dimensional accuracy is also prevalent as with manual digitizing.

That

is, if the original document scanned is not dimensionally accurate, then when
true dimensions are inputted to the document, the output plot will be distorted
relative to the original.

Another major problem with raster scanning is the

amount of data captured to replicate the original document.

Too little data

(i.e., low resolution) will not reproduce the source document satisfactorily.
Too much data (i.e., high resolution) increases computer processing time
dramatically and also causes problems in data transfer between systems.

Other

problems occur due to source document inconsistencies (e.g., feature overprints, crossing lines, varying line thickness, etc.).

without software post-

processors, a considerable amount of human manipulation is needed.

Quality of

vectorization is no longer a problem with most systems.
To summarize, data capture by faster scanning becomes economical when the
maps or documents to be encoded contain large amounts of dense data or when
throughput is a factor.

Manual digitizing of data remains economical if the

input documents are primarily low in density or mostly straight lines.
Resource management projects for which our systems have been used
include:
State of Colorado, Digital Data Base--all attributes are callable either
individually or by total topic.
Fort Leonard Wood, Military Assessment--automated combination of soils,
slopes, and vegetation overlays to identify helicopter landing zones.
Thailand GIS--combination of seven overlay maps to determine land suitable
for agricultural development.
References
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A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT MITIGATION

James Morentz
Research Alternatives, Inc.

Natural hazard mitigation is not a program carried out in isolation from
other activities of government.

Quite the contrary, its success will be found

in an integration with ongoing efforts of governments at all levels.

Because

this study is about how state governments can best contribute to natural hazard
mitigation, the focus of our framework for thinking about mitigation is on the
state government.

States playa pivotal role in natural hazard mitigation, and

a strengthened program at the state level could improve the implementation of
mitigation.
In thinking about mitigation, we can begin by recognizing that mitigation
can fit into ongoing efforts of society.

These ongoing activities provide an

opportunity for mitigation to take place within the context of existing programs and processes.

What we are suggesting is that the end product of effec-

tive natural hazard mitigation can be achieved in some measure by finding the
"right" place and time to intervene in existing programs and processes in order
to piomote and conduct mitigation.
Let us consider the programs or processes of society where mitigation
might find a home.

We suggest there are three, each of which represents an

opportunity for mitigation at the state level.

They are:

•

During new development, which offers crucial points of review during which
the mitigation opportunity can be seized;

•

At any time there are existing risk conditions that are recognized as
amenable to risk reduction through mitigation;

•

During the immediate postdisaster period during which redevelopment takes
place, while risk conditions are fresh in the minds of policy makers
and/or outside programs act to encourage or enforce mitigation.

These three circumstances offer an opportunity for intervention in the normal
flow of a jurisdiction's life.
What kind of risks can be mitigated through some form of intervention in
~ese

processes?

We suggest that there are two basic risks--those to people
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and those to property.
reduced risk to people.

In general, mitigating the risk to property implies a
However, a rich body of mitigation experience can be

found in programs or projects that reduce the risk to people alone.
as we look at the broad areas of 1) new development, 2)

Therefore,

existing risk con-

ditions, and 3) postdisaster recovery, we suggest that looking at people and
property independently offers increased mitigation opportunities.
Up to this point, we can illustrate the framework for thinking about
mitigation in the following way:

PROGRAMS OR PROCESSES RIPE FOR MITIGATION

NEW DEVELOPMENT

EXISTING RISK

POST-0 I SASTER

people property

people property

people property

What Have We Observed About Mitigation
One of the clearest observations about natural hazard mitigation is that
it is implemented at the local level.

While some huge programs have been

initiated (that is, authorized and funded) at the federal and state levels, the
actual implementation occurs at the local level.

Indeed, we need only look at

the reverse of the situation, in which a local jurisdiction blocks a state or
federal mitigation program through nonparticipation, to see the leverage of the
local government and its citizens.
In our 1980 study of both natural and technological hazard mitigation, we
observed this crucial local role in 81 sites across the country.
study, and in FEMA's current (draft)

In that

guidance on mitigation ("A Mitigation

Strategy for the Integra ted Emergency Management System," February 1984), it is
suggested that mitigation can be accomplished by producing changes in one or
all of three parts of the hazardous condition.
•

Specifically:

Mitigation can act on the hazard to eliminate it or reduce the frequency
and intensity of its occurrence;

Morentz
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•

Mitigation can change the way a hazard interacts with human systems by
protecting people and their support systems that come into contact with
the hazard; and

•

Mitigation can alter the way people live and the systems and societies
they create in order to avoid or reduce the hazard.

Numerous examples of these three classes of mitigation are available and will
be included in our final publications.

NOw, as examples to make certain that

all reviewers of this concept and guidelines paper are on the same track, let
us suggest cloud seeding as a way to reduce hail and thunderstorm intensity;
flood walls, dikes, and levees as people- and system-protecting structures; and
relocation of people out of flood-prone areas as altering the way people live
and thus avoiding hazardous impacts.
Given that the range of mitigation activities is broad and actually can
accomplish some reduction in risk of hazards and vulnerability of people, then
the important question is:
mitigation?

What is needed at the local level to implement

Here, our 1980 study and the recent FEMA guidance offer some

concrete examples of the necessary components of a local mitigation program.
Eleven types of activities were identified as clearly identifiable behavior
undertaken by one or more government or private sector mitigators.

These

eleven categories of mitigation activities are:

•
•
•
•
•

Rules
Economics
Influence
Monitoring
Management

•

•
•
•
•
•
Structural

Planning
public participation
Professional Training
Research
Assessment

Contained in each of these categories are several subcategories that
further define the actual tools and techniques employed by the local jurisdiction that has the capability to carry out mitigation activities.
If we were to graphically depict the implementation of mitigation at the
local level, i t would look something like the following illustration.

The

eleven categories of mitigation activities are employed by a jurisdiction to
implement mitigation which 1) reduces the hazard itself, 2) protects people, or
3)

alters the way people live to avoid the hazard.
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LOCAL MITIGATION IMPLEMENTATION

MITIGATION
ACTIVITIES
RULES_ _ _-l
ECONOMICS

ACT ON
HAZARD

INFLUENC~_-I

MONITORING
MANAGEMENT
PLANN ING,_ _-t
PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION
PROFESSIONAL
TRAINING
RESEARCH'_ _-I
ASSESSMENT
STRUCTURAL

PROTECT
PEOPLE &
PROPER1Y
AL TER
HOW
PEOPLE
LIVE

This illustration suggestions that a local jurisdiction can select from amo'1g a
variety of alternative mitigation activities to accomplish hazard reduction or
avoidance.

If we combine this idea with the earlier one that identified three

social processes in which mitigation seemed most appropriate, we begin to see a
growing framework for thinking about mitigation.

Recall that mitigation seemed

most promising when incorporated in the processes of a) new development, b)
existing risk recognition, and c) postdisaster actions.
Combining the local jurisdiction implement concept with the three
processes ripe for mitigation, we get a scheme like the one illustrated on the
following page.
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OPPORTUNITIES FOR MITIGATION AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION

PROGRAMS OR
PROCESSES
RIPE FOR
MITIGATION

NEW DEVELOPMENT

EXI STING RISK

POST-0 ISASTER

peop I e property

people property

peopl e property

MITIGATION
ACTIVITIES
RULES
ECONOMICS
INFLUENCE
MON ITORING
MANAGEMENT
PLANNING
PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION
PROFESSIONAL
TRAIN ING
RESEARCH
ASSESSMENT
STRUCTURAL

ACf ON
HAZARD

ACT ON
HAZARD

ACT ON
HAZARD

PROTECT
PEOPLE &
PROPERTY

PROTECT
PEOPLE &
PROPERTY

PROTECT
PEOPLE &
PROPERTY

AL TER
HOW
PEOPLE
LIVE

ALTER
HOW
PEOPLE
LIVE

ALTER
HOW
PEOPLE
LIVE

This suggests that the combination of mitigation activities, usually
implemented at the local level, can effectively intervene in the processes of
new development, existing risk conditions, and postdisaster recovery to produce
an effect that results in reduced hazards, ,Protected people, or avoided
hazards.
Now, it is possible that a state mitigation program could implement mitigation by selecting from among the mitigation activities.

This is the case,

for example, on state-owned lands where the state agencies have the authority,
economic allocations, etc. to carry out state mitigation.

Those instances,

however, represent only a minority of the opportunities that a state has to
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influence natural hazard mitigation.

The following section details how the

state can contribute to mitigation.
What Does It Take for the State
to Seize the Mitigation Opportunity?
In order to intervene with a mitigation activity in new development,
existing risk conditions, or postdisaster recovery, there must be certain
organizational capabilities resident at the state government level.

These

capabilities will combine to produce the state's contribution to mitigation.
We say "state's contribution" because, generally, only a small part of a state
mitigation effort is expended in actually carrying out mitigation projects.
Actual project implementation usually occurs elsewhere.
In order to be in a position to make contributions, the state must have in
place a set of mitigation capabilities.

There is tremendous variety in the way

these capabilities are acquired and maintained.

But, there is general agree-

ment that, in some form or other, a successful state contribution to mitigation
requires seven capabilities.

These are briefly described below.

Hazard Analysis
This term is a general label for the capability to examine the environment
in a systematic way and establish an estimate of the risk to people and property caused by natural hazards.

The term includes any type of review of hazard-

ous conditions and their potential impact on people or property, including a
postdisaster assessment of the consequences of redevelopment on future risk.
Legal Authority
Every mitigation effort must have a basis in law.
the state level, almost an "enabling"
can be achieved.

This capability is, at

capability, without which little else

Legal authority to mitigate, however, does not necessarily

have to be explicitly stated.

Many laws are available, for example, that speak

indirectly about the safety of people or the protection of the environment and
could be expanded in their interpretation to include the objectives of
mitigation.
Organization
Mitigation has an organizational component that must be consciously developed to be most effective.

The models for such organization range from the

formal designation of a lead agency or a hazard mitigation program or a mitigation task force to the informal recognition of mitigation as a problem that is
discussed as part of routine agency coordination.
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Economics
The economic aspects of hazard mitigation are, indeed, another of the
'enabling" conditions.

As in the case of laws, however, separate budget line

items for mitigation may be a bonus rather than a necessary element.

The use

of other program initiatives to reach the goals of mitigation is an effective
way to minimize costs, although there is no getting around the fact that obtaining funds will be essential at some point in every mitigation project.
Intergovernmental Relations
state governments must work with both federal governments and their own
local governments to see mitigation objectives achieved.

The state's capabili-

ty to carry out intergovernmental relations in order to assure the smoothest
possible implementation of mitigation is an important part of success.

Enter-

ing into this capability, as well, are intrastate regional organizations that
have a legal role (usually established by the state) in multijurisdictional
planning and operations.
Interest Group

Relation~

The public at large and various private sector business and industry
groups have a keen interest in the three processes (new development, existing
risks, and postdisaster redevelopment)

described above.

How the state deals

wi til these interest groups can influence the success of mi tigation implementation.
Miti't.~.tion

Planning

Finally, the state benefits from a capability to actually plan and prepare
for its mitigation contribution.

In some cases, this will be in the form of

formal planning for a mitigation project (on state lands, for example).

In

other cases, this capability might be called upon in the development of technical information or other products that are indirect contributors to mitigation
impL,men ta ti on.
Where Do These State Mitigation
Capabilities Fit into the Framework?
The state plays its role in mitigation as an intermediary between the
'societal processes" of new development, existing risk conditions, and postdisaster recovery and the actual implementation of mitigation activities to
carry out risk reduction.

Thus, the framework for thinking about mitigation

that we have been developing now looks like the illustration on the following
page, with the addition of state mitigation capabilities.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR THINKING ABOUT HAZARD MITIGATION

PROGRAMS OR
PROCESSES
RIPE FOR
MITIGATION

NEW DEVELOPMENT

EXISTING RISK

POST-DISASTER

people property

people property

peop Ie property
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ORGANIZATION
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MITIGATION
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PRODUCTS OF
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PROGRAMS

MITIGATION
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RULES
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MONITORING
MANAGEMENT
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PARTICIPATION
PROFESSIONAL
TRAINING
RESEARCH
ASSESSMENT
STRUCTURAL
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HAZARD
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PROTECT
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HOW
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The state needs the seven kinds of mitigation capabilities to fully take
advantage of the opportunities to reduce hazards.

These capabilities result in

what generally could be called the state natural hazard mitigation program.
This program will span agencies, ongoing programs, and authorities.
draw resources from many different areas.

It will

The result of this application of

mitigation capabilities are products of state mitigation.
As we have discussed before, these products could be mitigation, itself.
More likely, from the state level, these products are contributions to mitigation implementation at the local level.

Among the products you can think about

as examples are: needs assessments for mitigation; mitigation laws; monitoring
and enforcement programs; funding; technical assistance; planning assistance;
guidelines for local mitigation plans; public information and education
materials; information sharing; and coordination of mitigation efforts among
jurisdictions.

While these are only a few general and broad products of state

mitigation, the reviewer can readily see the important contributory role that
the state can play in mitigation.
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SECTION 406 OF P.L. 93-288:
AN OPPORTUNITY IF YOU KNOCK

Allan Williams
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection

When severe flooding hit Connecticut in June, 1982, I was in Wisconsin at
the annual Association of State Floodplain Managers Conference.

The term

"Section 406" had about as much meaning to me as marriage does among movie
stars; it was something you did in the future, you weren't quite sure why, and
it was over relatively quickly.

Months later, when the 180-day hazard mitigation report required by P.L.

93-288 was due, I still had never seen a copy of 406, nor had I heard any
scul:tlebut about a report due.
January of 1983 came and I was approached by a fellow worker.
"Allan," he said, "I'm really tied up in posthazard recovery processes,
and I need your help to write an administrative report."
"Sure," I said naively, "as long as it can be done in a few weeks."
He didn't respond, setting the wheels of doubt in motion.

I did not know

it y2t, but once a governor accepts disaster assistance, the state must prepare
a report delineating how i t will reduce flood problems.

Implied is the re-

quirement that if the plan is not implemented the state might not get disaster
assis tance the next time around.
"So when is it due?," I asked.
"Two weeks ago,
"Well • •

n

he said.

" I prompted.

"Don't worry," he said, "we've already asked for

an extension. II
"How come we are doing it?" I asked.
"Well, the Governor's Office asked the Office of policy and Management to
do it; and the Office of policy and Management asked the Office of Civil
Preparedness to do it; and the Office of Civil preparedness asked the Department of Environmental Protection to do it; and the Director of Water Resources
asked me to do it."

STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK

208

AR~

"And you're asking me to do it," I added, now realizing that this assignment required a bit more than copying two pages from an old report and adding a
cover.
I began to wonder if maybe I should pass the baton myself, but, alas, I
realized that I was the last runner in this race.

Besides, I'd feel guilty

giving it back to my friend in the other unit; after all, he had put in so much
overtime during the flood, while I had been at a meeting in Wisconsin.
So, like Tevyeh in Fiddler on the Roof, I said to myself, "if on the other
hand" writing this report could lead to some changes in our programs, "perhaps
it's a good thing."
As fortune would have it, in the very next month, February of 1983, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency held a special session on 406 at its
Emmitsburg training center.

At that session, the following major points were

made:
•

FEMA personnel stressed the unfortunate consequences likely to befall a
state not complying with Section 406.

•

Collectively we all rewrote the outline for reporting 406 to make it more
amenable to the states, while still reporting on the issues FEMA wanted
covered.

•

The session was particularly useful to me because I left it with many
ideas on what and what not to put in our report.

•

FEMA personnel stressed how stringent would be their reviews and how
seriously they considered the task of preparing and following through on
Section 406. It had to be done and done right.

In short, 406 got sized up, FEMA got huffed up, and we, the states, were
charged up.
Report Writing
The report writing began in March, 1983, and the report was signed by the
Governor in August, 1983, proving such a report could be done in 180 days, even
if it wasn't the correct 180 days.
To me and many state agency staff, the process gave us:
1)

An opportunity to look at flooding versus other natural disasters and
helped convince us of the importance of flood mitigation;
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2)

An opportunity to measure what we had already done;

3)

An opportunity to get attention from other state agencies;

4)

An opportunity to work together and directly with the Governor's Office;
and

5)

The background and the rationale for supporting our programs with the
Governor's Office, the state legislature, and with federal funding
sources.

i

can state categorically that the results of preparing the 406 plan have

been more successful than anyone would have thought possible.

The Section 406

Hazard Mitigation Implementation Measures report has been the catalyst for
numerous posi ti ve changes.
For example, during the writing phase, we were technically doing the job
for the Governor's Office, and that office carries a lot more weight than any
indiv:dual agency.

Having the attention of the state's executive staff helped

us de'Jelop a closer relationship wi th them and helped them understand our
issues.

This was not only helpful in getting cooperation from many state

agen~1es,

but it was invaluable when we had to go before the legislature, the

bonding commission, and the Office of policy and Management.
8ecause we were doing the job for the Governor's Office, I was able to
borro" good staff from other programs and able to get cooperation from the
highest levels.
~e

queried every state agency, asking each for a listing of unaddressed

problems in flood mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

The

results produced literally hundreds of program suggestions from dozens of state
programs.

Because we were taking the process seriously, they took the process

seriou.sly.

What we had at the end was a series of 18 first-priority actions

and 85 second-priority actions.

Each action was directly tied to problems

brought up by one or more programs.

Use of the input of others, instead of

just our own, would be useful in getting new legislation passed, for we had
made many converts to good flood management ideas.
Report Approved
At the end, we had the Governor's signature committing the state to
attempt each recommendation.

Equally important, the Governor's Office took

full responsibility to see that all 18 first-priority actions would be
addressed.

STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH

210

RIS~

By the end of the process, we had gained many state agency and executive
level supports.

What we lost was FEMA's attention.

thing we said; they just appeared to lose interest.

FEMA didn't oppose anyWe received no written

comments or corrections from FEMA on any of the drafts or on the final edition.
The only message we did get, repeatedly, was, "Is it done yet?"

While I did

enjoy and appreciate FEMA giving us a free hand, i t did seem a bit unusual that
the FEMA national office, which had shown so much interest at the February
Emmitsburg meeting, had so little interest in the substance of the report.
It became clear that flood hazard mitigation per se was not FEMA's issue.
FEMA's "issue" was only the procedures for which they were directly responsible, i.e., seeing to it that we report, not what we report.

state prob-

lems and needs were just not as relevant as their direct federal responsibilities.

I've realized now, that, like parents who vow to be different from their

own parents, we were, in a way, acting like FEMA when all was said and done,
realized that we had only been interested in solving problems for which the
state could do something directly.

The Section 406 report did not have much

municipal input, and that is a shortcoming of our report.
It must be noted that some comment had been received from FEMA on sections
in which we had put in work elements for FEMA actions.

They did let us knO'o<l

that some of the issues we brought up for them were being addressed, and I
think FEMA was really requesting we remove any work items involving them.
Nevertheless, by their silence after the document was signed, one must
assume approval of all the action items.

If FEMA doesn't do thei r work items,

it would be unreasonable to expect the state to complete all of its items.
A quick note on format.

We followed the FEMA suggested format throughout

the text and in the action items and found it to be a good outline.

I appreci-

ated, however, FEMA's flexibility in not requiring us to follow the format
exactly, for this led to a more usable and implementable document.

Whethe~

that, too, was an act of omission rather than commission, it was nonetheless
appreciated.
Implementation
The threat of loss of federal aid for future disasters is important,
especially since we had three such disasters in six years (snow, tornado, and
flood).

This threat is implicit in the 406 requirements.

It apparently is not

well-supported though, because FEMA is reluctant to state, categorically and in
writing, that such a loss of disaster assistance will occur if a state does not

Williams
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comply with the writing and implementation of a 406 report.

When going to a

major political figure, to the legislature, or to some important commission, it
would be useful for the sponsoring state agency to be able to say we must do
this because it is a federal requirement, not because i t might be a federal
requirement.

Mind you, I'm not asking for a sledge hammer, just a rubber

mallet to help prod others along.

It would be useful if the only handprints on

your back are not your own.
~t

one critical point during this legislative session, I asked a high

official in FEMA and several of his staff if they would write some testimony to
support our position.

The response:

to us requesting our testimony?"

"Why don't you put something in writing

That's all we needed, a letter from a state

agency asking a federal agency to intercede for us in the state legislature.
Hence, we asked for and received no help from FEMA in obtaining funds for 406
programs or in Obtaining necessary program changes.
out best that way.

Again, perhaps it worked

In the absence of FEMA comments, I explained to key legis-

lators and state officials how I thought FEMA could cut off disaster assistance
if we didn't comply wi th 406.
'l'he wri ting and acceptance of the Section 406 Hazard Mi tiga tion Implementations Measures report cannot be credited with having accomplished all the
gains that have happened since the June, 1982, floods, but it surely did help.
Actiun items in the

repoL~t

that hdve been accomplished include:

•

Funding a new statewide flood warning system to be initiated this summer
and fall;

•

Fassing new legislation regulating all state actions in the 100-, and in
some cases, 500-year flood zone; requiring all state agency regulatory
programs like the wetlands and encroachment line programs to require 100year protection for any application (private or public); and requiring the
state to build any flood control project to be at least at the 100-year
protection level;

•

Holding a commercial and industrial floodproofing conference;

•

Holding a dam safety conference for owners of private dams;

•

Implementing recommendations of a special dam safety report, including
obtaining six new staff members for the dam safety program and obtaining
Qoney to repair 15 state-owned dams;

•

Studying, designing, or completing about two dozen flood control
projects;
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•

Obtaining approval for a small 1362 project; and

•

Revising the Emergency Operations plans for several towns and state
agencies.

These items, and there are more, have all been done in about a year and a half,
that is, since we began working on the 406 report.
Making It Better
I am, as you might have guessed, a believer in 406.

There are a few

changes, however, which could benefit the process.
1)

It is not the intent of the present 406 process to mitigate the concerns
of municipal flood management issues. Perhaps the process could be reformatted and the requirements changed so we bring the towns into the
process and hence into the solutions.

2)

We didn't start 406 until one year after the floods. I would encourage
faster action, and this would result in an easier time with implementation. When it rains, make gains; when it's dry, they only ask why.

3)

FEMA is too sensitive about their own programs. Why not have FEMA programs reviewed by and with the states and localities as part of the 406
process? By agreeing to a few changes itself, FEMA can be seen as more of
a cooperating agency and less of a distant partner. To that end, it would
be useful if FEMA, as well as the governor of a particular state, signad
the document.

4)

I think it would be more helpful to the states if FEMA had an active Tnle
in reviewing the drafts and giving encouragement and assurance to states
trying to do a job well. A pat on the back and some positive publicity by
FEMA would help.

5)

It would be helpful if FEMA had some funds available after the 406 report
was signed. Funds are needed for the staff assistance required to
initiate and oversee implementation of recommendations.
Some Last Words
Approach the 406 process with a purpose and with seriousness.

Be slightly

evangelical--but not messianic--and willing to spend a lot of time and staff on
the report.

Don't be discouraged by setbacks.

After all, as serious and

difficult as we see the flooding issue, we must keep our perspective.

We are

fighting something easier than injustice, more controllable than the flu, and
less pervasive than promises in a political year.

Understand that 406 is a

chance to change things and a golden opportunity to build a new foundation for
state flood management programs for years to come.

HAZARD MITIGATION IN BROWNWOOD SUBDIVISION

Robert C. Freitag
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Seattle Regional Office

Background
On August 18, 1983, Hurricane Alicia made landfall over the western tip of
Galveston Island.

The next day, the President declared a federal disaster.

Brownwood, a subdivision in the City of Baytown, Texas, was hit by a 13-foot
storm surge.

Almost all of the 300 homes in Brownwood were either totally

destroyed or substantially damaged.

within ten days of the hurricane a buyout

program was presented to the residents of Brownwood and approved by the City of
Bayto>m.
This paper is an account of the events that occurred in the 15 days
between the hurricane and the completion of the Interagency Hazard Mitigation
Team Report.

These events culminated in a successful buyout program.

The

paper suggests ways to quickly identify future postdisaster mitigation projects
and r"di rf!ct our predi.saster emphasis.

Thi s event has led me to believe that

after any flood, even one as devastating as this one, there is resistance to
change.

This resistance can be overcome, but only when there is a realization

of the hazard, the damage is significant, a quick response is initiated, tools
are available, and the residents have discussed mitigation alternatives before
the dlsaster.
Reali:-:ation of a Hazard
In order to overcome the resistance to change, there needs to be an
acknowledgment of the hazard.
again.

Residents must believe that the event will occur

In the Brownwood subdivision, the residents knew and accepted the high

frequency of flooding.

The si te was only one to two feet above high tide.

When built, the subdivision was as much as 12 feet above high tide, but through
subsidence the land had become extremely flood-prone.

Some homes flooded

annually, and all homes had flooded within the past five years.
Burton, Michigan, offers a similar example of an area that has an extremely high frequency of flooding, but with only minimal damage.

Until these 15
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homes were purchased through the Section 1362 program, they experienced flooding two or three times a year but only to a depth of 16 inches.

Little perma-

nent damage occurred with anyone event, but the aggregate damage was great.
For these property owners, frequency of the event was the key factor in overcoming resistance to change.
The importance of frequency was also demonstrated by the Kauai disaster.
Hurricane Iwa hit poipu Beach on the island of Kauai with a force that completely destroyed at least 100 structures.

The local city government was

willing to undertake a wide range of mitigation efforts providing such a storm
would occur with significant frequency.

A board of scientists was assembled,

and no member was willing to state that the storm was anything but a freak
event--something greater in magnitude than a SOO-year storm.

Because of this,

no one was willing to initiate any mitigation efforts.
Significant Damage
It is almost axiomatic that the greater the damage, the larger the number
of mitigation opportunities.

We all know of major planning and rebuilding that

followed the Chicago fire, San Francisco earthquake, and needless to say,
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Extensive damage is not the only significant variable.

In the Brownwood subdivision, many homes were totally destroyed, and all but a
few had substantial damage.

Even so, the residents began to rebuild immediate-

ly, even when water covered much of the subdivision.

Even though the struc-

tures had been severely damaged, the infrastructure and land tenure pattern was
intact."

This reinforced a conservative attitude toward relocation after the

disaster.

Reconstruction was only stopped when the city placed a moratorium on

all rebuilding in the subdivision.
QUick Response
French Wetmore of the Illinois Water Resources Department has repeatedly
argued that unless real opportunities are presented before reconstruction
begins to occur, the chances for mitigation will disappear.
this period lasts about five days.

He has stated that

The Brownwood experience supports this

conclusion.
Reoccupation of the Brownwood subdivision began before the water had
disappeared.

I personally helped a mother and her six-year-old child leave

their reoccupied home seven days after the disaster.

Stagnant water was stand-

ing in the building, there was no sewer, no power, and the residents of the
area had been warned to watch out for snakes.

She had reoccupied the home in
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order to begin repairing the second story.

She left only after being evicted

by the police.

Available Tools
Incentives are needed to overcome resistance to change.
be in the form of money, legislation, or legal advice.

These tools may

The Brownwood sub-

division package of tools included:
•

The availability of loans under the SBA Involuntary Relocation package;

•

Assistance to the city to clear the damaged homes from the site;

•

Funds through the Section 1362 program that were dedicated and set aside
to purchase all insured properties;

•

Flood insurance claim assistance;

•

Individual Family Grant funds to qualified applicants; and

•

The possibility of HUD CPD&G and jobs bill funds to purchase uninsured
property.
Concurrently with and in support of the city's effort to discourage re-

occup~tion,

the city residents were told that if the package was not accepted,

the following would occur:
•

FEMA would deny all requests for permanent public assistance work tarqeted
for the subdivision under an Executive Order 11988 no-action alternative;

•

The city would inform all other federal funding sources of Executive Order
11988 and encourage a no-action alternative by other agencies;

•

FEMA would limit eligibility to debris removal only, and only to that
which was absolutely necessary to ensure health and safety;

•

FEMA would ensure that the minimum NFIP requirements were adhered to for
all substantially damaged structures; that is, structures would have to be
elevated on site up to 16 feet above existing grade, and FEMA would use
claim data as one index for substantial improvement;

•

Onsite demolition costs and debris removal, estimated to be about $5,000
per property, would be the responsibility of the property owner, and no
direct or indirect involvement by the federal government would be forthcoming; and

•

EPA and other agencies would demand that new and substantially improved
water and sewer lines located in the saturated soil zone be built to the
same specifications as water crossings; i.e., encasement water lines,
special joints, special bedding, etc. would be required.
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The NFIP was key to the ultimate success of the program but should not be
thought of as the only tool.

The NFIP claims may total $20 million and will

undoubtedly comprise the major source of funds used to purchase the homes.
This is because all but a few of the homes were insured, and their replacement
value was in excess of their fair market value.

Also, the amount of money

needed from the Section 1362 budget was minimal, approaching only $1,000 to
$2,000 per property.

However, without the other program, discussion of alter-

native mitigation tools before the disaster, and the speed with which these
tools were offered, it is doubtful that the subdivision would now be free from
flood damage.
Predisaster Planning
The success of any mitigation effort--whether it results in elevation,
abandonment, or relocation--depends upon the attention given to the problem
before the disaster occurred.

This does not have to be a formal plan of

action, but having an acceptable strategy in advance surely helped counter
resistance to change in Baytown.
new ideas.

The postdisaster period is no time to present

Residents need to return to normalcy after a disaster.

The residents of the Brownwood subdivision organized themselves into
Brownwood Civic Association many years before Hurricane Alicia.
tion actively lobbied for a buyout program.

~'ne

The Associa-

Several years earlier, the Associ-

a tion and the ci ty secured funds from the Corps of Engineers to purchase ho"es
within the subdivision.

The program failed only because the city was unwilling

to provide its local share of the expense, not because of the lack of SUppcKt
within the subdivision.
It is important to note that even though every resident had analyzed the
possibili ty of relocation and already had come to a conclusion about it, immediately after the hurricane the subdivision residents wanted to move back to
their homes.

When the city tried to prevent this, local politicians and a

large vocal group of residents threatened the city with a lawsuit.

This was at

a time when the subdivision did not have water, sewer, or power; and only the
shells of a majority of buildings were left standing.
apparently striving for normalcy.

The residents were

Only because the Interagency Hazard Mitiga-

tion Team could offer a realistic package quickly did the city capture the
support needed to prevent the reoccupation of the subdivision.
One of the most significant activities of the Brownwood Civic Association
was to promote the sale of flood insurance.

The almost total coverage of flood

217

Freitag

insurance provided the key tool used to purchase the homes and, indeed, to
remove the hazard.
Future Direction
Mitigation should be thought of as change.

Change is resisted unless a

set of conditions are met that provides the force to overcome the inertia.

If

we think of these conditions as frequency, significant damage, response time,
tools, and predisaster planning, we can come up with new directions in each of
these five areas, and increase our chances of future successful mitigation
efforts.
The frequency of a hazard, like resulting damage, is largely out of our
control.

However, we could expand our effort to identify and publicize dangers

in high risk areas.

For example, under the NFIP the majority of 100-year

floodplains in the country has been mapped.
requires lenders to give notice.

The enabling legislation also

However, all action is directed to the 100-

year floodplain, and this is a frequency many people are willing to live with.
Since the program has also identified those developed areas falling within a
ten or 20-year floodplain, ways to use this information and to explore and
identify mitigation opportunities should be explored.
Naturally, we cannot increase or decrease the amount of damage resulting
from any event.

On the other hand, we can make restoration easier.

We could

develop tools that would make i t easier to minimize potential damage to existing homes, elevate structures, reassemble land or build new infrastructures.
The interagency teams have been increasing their ability to respond quickly after a disaster.

Realistic opportunities are being identified earlier, and

we are starting to create a set of tools capable of supporting local mitigation
efforts.

Just a few years ago the use of debris clearance, temporary housing,

IFG grant money for minimization, SBA loans, and temporary housing assistance
would not have been so readily available as part of a complete mitigation
package as used in Baytown.

The set of tools used in Baytown should be ex-

panded and research into other possibilities encouraged.
As an agency, FEMA is beginning to devote attention to predisaster planning.

Much more could be done.

Herein lies a real opportunity.

The Inte-

grated Emergency Management System could provide a key tool in helping states
and communities identify mitigation opportunities before the disaster occurs.
Like Burton, Michigan, many regions have targeted future Section 1362 possibilities.

They have talked to the property owners, encouraged them to purchase
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flood insurance, and have begun the discussion of relocation within the community.

When a disaster occurs in these areas, the residents will not be so

apt to want to return to the predisaster conditions.

Similarly, through the

SAP program, states like Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin have worked with
communities to develop preparedness and predisaster mitigation plans, many
elements of which will be activated or will become opportunities after
disaster.
Conclusion
We can learn much from the Brownwood subdivision mitigation project.
is to be hoped that this will be only one of many analyses.
our evaluation efforts to failed projects.
success.

It

Often we devote

The Brownwood project was clearly a

Each of the five conditions presented in this paper contributed to

that success.

The sum of these created the force needed to counter the resi-

dents' natural, spontaneous response to reoccupy their homes in the floodplain.
In analyzing the Brownwood experience in light of other mitigation
efforts, I have concluded that each condition is needed if postdisaster mitigation opportunities are to be achieved.

The relative importance of each

condition may vary but all five conditions must be addressed to some degree.
Not only must each condition be present, but as the importance of one decreases, others must increase.

In the Burton, Michigan, example, the amount of

damage for any single event was extremely small.

Yet on balance, the high

frequency of occurrence provided the force needed for mitigation.

Understand-

ing the issues involved in flood mitigation can help us identify realistic
postdisaster mitigation opportunities early enough to take advantage of them.
This understanding can also help us redirect our predisaster planning effocts.

THE BAYTOWN, TEXAS EXPERIENCE
HAZARDS MITIGATION LESSONS FROM HURRICANE ALICIA

Randall B. Strong
City Attorney
City of Baytown, Texas

Baytown, Texas and the Brownwood Subdivision
Baytown is located on the north end of Galveston Bay, adjacent to the
mouth of the San Jacinto River.

The Brownwood Subdivision is located on the

west side of the city on a peninsula of land jutting into small bays off the
San Jacinto River.

It contained some 300 homes, all of which were built in the

19508 before a hazard was recognized.

Recognition came with Hurricane Carla in

1981, during which rising water covered the entire peninsula and put at least
eight feet of water in every home.
since then, Brownwood and in fact the entire Baytown/East Harris County
area, have suffered from another hazard--subsidence.

The Brownwood Subdivision

has subsided approximately five feet since 1963, and an estimated nine feet
since 1915.

Although the subsidence has been halted by the conversion to use

of surface water rather than groundwater, the effects are permanent, and have
resulted in the Brownwood area being just above sea level and subject to
periodic tidal flooding.

In the last six years the city has had to deal wi th

numerous flood alerts in Brownwood due to high tides, and has supervised the
evacuation of homes in the area numerous times.

In 1979, for instance, there

were five flood alerts in Brownwood and four evacuations.

The Brownwood resi-

dents formed an active civic association, the main function of which was to
maintain their high tide alert system.

When high tides threatened, they noti-

fied all residents in order to speed evacuation.

The residents of the worst

areas would evacuate; others would merely elevate their furniture, pullout
their carpets, and ride out the flooding.

The city had installed several high

speed pumps to help drain the low interior bowl of Brownwood in an effort to
minimize flooding.
Although most of the residents had experienced tidal flooding, 23 years
without a hurricane had encouraged most of them to view hurricanes as remote
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threats, although the city continually warned its residents that the average
occurrence frequency for the area is one hurricane every ten years, and that
they were therefore 13 years "overdue."
A Corps of Engineers project to purchase the entire peninsula fell through
in 1979 when the citizens of Baytown failed to approve a $7 million bond program to finance the city's share of the proposed $35 million buyout.

This

would have been, of course, the best possible predisaster mitigation strategy.
This program was significant, however, in that the residents had been exposed
to, and preconditioned to think in terms of relocation.
Hurricane Alicia
with the arrival of Hurricane Alicia, Baytown was no longer overdue.
Twelve to 13-foot tides and 125 mph winds caused city-wide damage.

Over 600

housing units within the city were destroyed and many more than that damaged.
Approximately 300 of the destroyed housing units were in Brownwood.

Although

the high tide from Alicia was lower than than that from Carla, the subsidence
during the intervening years resulted in a much higher water level in
Brownwood.

Most homes had 10 feet of water or more in them.

the wave action, which had not been a factor in Carla.

pletely swept away by ,,raves, leaving only a concrete slab.
of hurricanes for which most people were unprepared.

More damaging was

Many homes were

C01,,-

This was an aspect

Residents who had been

through Carla, or had stayed in their homes during numerous tidal floodinyb,
thought they could ride out Alicia only to find their homes being battered and
destroyed around them.

Rescue crews picked numerous people out of trees or

from the roofs of remaining structures.
One failure of past flood hazard regulations has been their failure to
address wave action and other storm results besides those from rising water.
Simply providing for flood protection to the 100-year flood level is not
enough.

I doubt that structures elevated to heights above the floodplain in

Brownwood would have survived the wave action.

Any flood hazard planning

should take wave action into account.
Lessons from Brownwood
Predisaster Thinking
Some predisaster thinking or planning aids any mitigation effort.

Many of

the residents of Brownwood were already predisposed towards a buyout, and
welcomed the Section 1362 program FEMA offered.

In retrospect, some additional
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predisaster planning by the city might have been useful.

The city had not con-

sidered the section 1362 program as a vehicle for a large-scale buyout, and we
had not familiarized ourselves with the program.

Other communities want to

look at their flood hazard problems to see if section 1362 can aid them in the
event of a disaster.

Some thought should be given to problems that may arise.

Advance planning could assist in dealing with some of the problems Baytown encountered:
Opportunists--Some people saw the disaster in Brownwood as an opportunity
to make a few dollars. Numerous rumors were started concerning what FEMA
would or would not do under Section 1362 and what the city was going to do
with the area. These rumors were of course untrue and used to encourage
property owners to sell to the opportunists rather than to FEMA. Some
people were convinced the city was going to take the lots we received and
sell them to Exxon for a huge profit. No one could tell me, however, what
Exxon planned to do with the flood-prone property that would be restricted
to open space use. A clear understanding of the Section 1362 program and
publicity concerning the program aided in dealing with opportunists, but
new rumors still surfaced occasionally.

Die-hards--A few Brownwood residents wished to return and rebuild regardless of the risk or cost, stating that the area was their home and they
did not want to give it up for any reason. While some of the die-hards
had other motives, and some spoke from emotion created by their forced
removal, a small minority sincerely wanted to move back. while Baytown
has not found a method to convince these people that the best thing to do
is relocate, other mitigation planners should recognize that there will
always be people who want to remain in a hazard area, regardless of the
risk.
Profiteers--Some Brownwood property owners resisted mitigation efforts
because they had learned to make a profit from flood insurance. These
property owners recovered flood insurance numerous times, made minor
repairs and pocketed the insurance benefits. Some of these owners no
longer lived in the homes, but rented them to unfortunates who suffered
through the various floods while receiving no aid. One property owner
reportedly stated that he counted on at least one good flood a year in
order to improve his cash flow (through flood insurance claims).
Another aspect of predisaster thinking is the publicizing of hazard areas.
Despite Brownwood's long history of flooding, some residents stated after
Alicia that they had bought their houses only within the last year or two and
had not realized i t was in a flood-prone area.

Although a common sense look at

the subdivision height in relation to the surrounding bays should have forewarned anyone, a few residents were genuinely shocked that they got flooded.
Many of these surprised residents were newcomers to the community and may have
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been unaware of Brownwood's problems.

I would advise communities with similar

known hazard areas to continue to publicize the hazards and not to assume that
"everyone knows about Brownwood."
Quick Response
A quick response to disaster is necessary for effective mitigation.

The

residents of Brownwood lost everything they owned in Alicia, and had no place
to stay except for emergency shelters.
you going to do to help me?"

Their immediate concern was "what are

The quicker answers can be given to victims to

allay their fears about the future, the more likely they will agree to mitigation efforts.

Although FEMA was at the disaster immediately afterwards and

presented its plans within a matter of days, the victims' primary concern was
when implementation would begin.

Many owners were prepared to sell their

property the minute the program was announced.

The several months it took to

get the Section 1362 program to the purchase stage allowed some to change their
minds.

The delay also allowed the spread of rumors and misconceptions about

the program.

It is obvious that it takes time to implement any program, parti-

cularly for a large area such as that involved in Baytown, but anything that
can shorten the implementation time will aid the mitigation effort.
After FEMA decided to implement a section 1362 program for Brownwood, the
city convinced FEMA to open a local office in Baytown, since FEMA's main office
was in Houston, some 25 miles away.

It was difficult for victims to travel

into Houston; they also had trouble telephoning, due to the large volume of
calls the Houston office received.

By opening an office in Baytown, FEMA was

able t.o deal more quickly with disaster victims.

I believe the opening of the

local office helped facilitate the mitigation efforts more than any other
single act.

Victims were able to go to that office and have their questions

answered--questions about the program which, if not answered, might have caused
them not to participate.

The local office also made i t easier for city offi-

cials to work with FEMA on the buyout.
Judging by the questions asked at the public sessions, any mitigation
effort should include a means to clearly describe how the mitigation program
works, with examples of how it will affect individual situations.
ized description of a program will not suffice.

A general-

The victims need to have a

clear enough understanding of the mitigation program to determine how it will
affect them.

While the mitigation workers cannot address every variable, an
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attempt should be made to provide several examples of how the mitigation program will operate.

The victims are anxious for definite answers to their

problems, not vague possibilities.
city Regulation of Brownwood
As part of the mitigation effort, the City of Baytown took special action
after the hurricane.

Alicia destroyed the numerous lift stations in the sub-

division, making it impossible to pump sewage from the area.
evident in the water left in the subdivision.
the area.

Raw sewage was

Power lines were down throughout

The water system was out, making it impossible to provide fire

protection.

Debris and fallen trees were everywhere.

The fact that the sub-

division was obviously unsafe and a health hazard prompted the City Council to
pass an ordinance banning the occupancy or repair of any structure within the
Bro;;nwood Subdivision.

property owners with proper identification were allowed

in the area only during daylight hours in order to retrieve what few valuables
might remain.

This ordinance was intended to prevent anyone from being injured

and to prevent the possible spread of disease, and had the added benefit of
keeping homeowners from going back and secretly doing repair work that might be
prohibited by the floodplain building provisions.
This action carried some risk, however.

A few property owners filed suit

against the city alleging a taking of their property without just compensation.
The C1. ty asserted that such action was wi thin its police powers to protect the

health, safety, and welfare of its citizens, and that it is simply a limitation
in tne use of the property, not a taking of it.

As of this date, the lawsui t

is still pending, the court having rejected plaintiff's request for a temporary
injunction to stop enforcement of the ordinance.

While the final outcome of

this lawsuit cannot be predicted, even if the city loses, the loss will not be
catastrophic.

The city can simply rescind the ordinance and pay damages, which

shadd be limited to the rental value of the properties during the period the
ordinance was in effect.

As the rental value of the property is minimal, the

exposure in dollars is small.

Meanwhile, FEMA will have completed its Section

1362 program, allowing those who wish to leave to do so.

City Council was made

aware of the risk at the time the ordinance was passed, but considered it
acceptable in view of the need to protect and help the citizens of Baytown.
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Frequency of Events
While I agree that the frequency of the event is a key factor in overcoming resistance to change, I believe this issue should be refocused by floodplain managers.

Brownwood's major disaster was a slow moving one--Subsidence.

It was Brownwood's elevation and location that were hazardous, and these were
the issues that needed to be addressed by mitigation.

Residents of such an

area should be shown and reminded that the hazard lies with the property they
own, not the hurricane that may corne.

Stressing this may help overcome resist-

ance to change.
Conclusion
Some of the problems encountered in Baytown may be instructive to those
involved in mitigation planning.
mitigation plan.

Quick response is essential to an effective

In known hazard areas, mitigation efforts should actually

start before the disaster with attempts to predispose the residents towards a
mitigation plan.

Alicia demonstrated that planning based on simple flood

levels, without recognizing wave action, will not anticipate total possible
damage.

Finally, communities should be imaginative in developing plans for

assisting mitigation efforts.

Baytown's declaration of Brownwood as a hazard

area carried with it some risk, but so far the benefits have outweighed the
risks.

While a city's powers are not without limit, the law does recognize a

governmental entity's right to take action that may be detrimental to the few,
if such action benefits the public as a whole.

Although our mitigation efforts

have been opposed by a few, the majority support our efforts.

On that basis we

stand by our actions and would repeat them in a similar situation.

PART THREE
STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS:
Protecting Existing Buildings
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A PROPOSAL TO REDUCE FEDERAL FLOOD DISASTERS

Neil R. Fulton
Illinois Department of Transportation
Division of Water Resources

Background
In the United States there are 6.8 million buildings subject to flooding
with average annual damages of $1-1/2 to $2 billion.

In Illinois, which can be

considered to have a representative sample of the nation's riverine flood
problems, there are approximately 140,000 buildings currently exposed to
flooding in the 100-year floodplain.

Of these, approximately 21,500, or only

15%, will be protected over the next ten years by structural flood control
projects.
We cannot expect structural flood control measures to take a substantial
bitR out of the remaining 120,000 flood-prone buildings.

Given the requirement

that structural projects be cost effective, such projects can only be justified
where large numbers of flood-prone buildings are concentrated.

In addition to

the environmental problems and the tremendous costs for structural projects,
the

~reas

left to be protected are dispersed in rural areas or in long, narrow

floodplains.

Therefore, it will be increasingly difficult to justify struc-

tural projects to protect the remaining flood-prone buildings.
Nor can we expect the floodplain management requirements of the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) to effectively reduce the number of flood-prone
buildings.

The NFIP's regulations say that if a building is damaged to 50% of

its value, it must be rebuilt protected from the 100-year flood.

This 50%

threshold is based on an examination of court experience with similar zoning
requirements.

It is likely that a tougher national standard would be over-

turned as a "taking" of property without adequate justification.
In Illinois, slow moving and shallow riverine flooding does not create
substantial damage to a building.
Illinois has been less than $4,000.

The average flood insurance claim in
This confirms our field experience that

~e vast majority of flood damages will never be enough to result in mandatory

flood protection measures being taken.
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Therefore, we must realize that the vast majority of the 120,000 floodprone buildings in Illinois will continue to be exposed to flood damage.
Assuming that there are 6 to 8 million flood-prone buildings in the nation and
that only 15% of them will be protected by structural projects, there will be
5.1 to 6.8 million buildings that will continue to be exposed to flood damage
throughout the country.
The Subsidy
The federal government has assumed a role of assisting flood victims.
Some of this assistance is in the form of repayable low interest loans and is
therefore not counted as a "subsidy".

Neither are structural flood control

projects, because they are only built where they are shown to have a net economic benefit.

Therefore the cost figures in this proposal actually estimate

flooding's drain on the federal treasury.
The federal government's subsidy comes in the form of two programs for
flood victims--disaster assistance and flood insurance--both of which are
administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

Over the last

10 years, disaster assistance payments for flood damages have averaged $225
million annually.
Over the last five years the National Flood Insurance Program has spent an
average of $300 million annually for claims and administrative expenses.
insurance premiums are subtracted, the net cost to the Treasury has
$135 million.

When

"v"ragp~

These figures add up to $525 million in average annual payments

to flood victims, of which $360 million is a direct federal subsidy.
Since 1979, Illinois has received over $85 million in disaster assistance
and flood insurance claims from FEMA.

In return for these payments, floodplain

residents paid approximately $25 million in flood insurance premiums.

In oilier

words, for every dollar that is paid by Illinois floodplain residents, approximately $3.40 is returned to pay for flood damages.

The federal government is

therefore subsidizing 70% of the cost of rebuilding after a flood.

This per-

centage holds true for the nation as a whole.
This tremendous subsidy would make sense if there were reason to believe
that the payments are used to reduce flood damages.

This is not happening.

Not only are there no strings attached to flood insurance claims payments or
disaster assistance to require recipients to protect themselves from future
floods, but also most of the disaster assistance programs prohibit use of the
funds to improve or otherwise protect the property.
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One solution: Emergency Preparedness
What can be done to protect existing buildings and thereby reduce this
federal subsidy?

There are two types of programs that will have an effect on

these buildings: local emergency preparedness programs and protection of individual buildings.

Local emergency preparedness programs have two facets to

reduce property damage: flood warning and flood fighting.

Simply warning

property owners in advance of a flood has been shown to reduce flood damages by
10-30%.

When a warning is coupled with a flood response such as sandbagging,

emergency protective measures, and other flood fighting efforts, damages can be
decreased even more.
The Other Solution: Protecting Buildings
There are two ways to protect individual buildings from flood damage:
removing the building entirely and retrofitting.

Removing the building through

demolition or relocation to a flood-free site has been tried successfully by
various local, state, and federal agencies.

Its use by state and federal flood

control agencies, however, has been limited to areas subject to very destructive or very frequent flooding, where it is obviously cost effective to eliminate damages.

The only federal program specifically authorized for acquisition

of flood-prone properties, FEMA's Section 1362, now has requests for funding
equal to three times the amount available.

There are four ways to retrofit a

huilding so that it stays on the flood-prone site but will not be damaged by
floodwaters.
o

These are listed in order of increasing cost:

Wet floodproofing the building by relocating utilities and other hard-tomove items permanently and moving damageable contents after a flood

warning;
•

Dry floodproofing the building by waterproofing the walls and floor and
closing openings so that shallow floodwaters will not enter the building;

•

Constructing a small levee or floodwall around one or more buildings; and

•

Elevating the building on fill, stilts, or walls above the flood level.
To the federal government, retrofitting is the newest and most untried

solution.

However, these measures have been used in many instances by property

owners, and they have been proven to reduce or eliminate damages.

Furthermore,

FEMA and the Corps of Engineers are funding additional research to refine the
technology so that it can be viewed with the same trust as flood control struc-
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tures.

However, other than Section 1362, there is presently no federal program

to assist property owners to protect their buildings.
The Cost of protecting Buildings
According to FEMA's recent assessment of Section 1362, it costs approximately $40,000 per building to remove a structure from the path of flooding.
This number is consistent with the findings of recent research and work done by
the Illinois Division of water Resources reviewing actual retrofitting projects
with local contractors.

We calculated the approximate cost of each of the six

nonstructural building protection methods and estimated how many could be
protected by these methods:

Number of Buildings

Average Cost

Technique
Demolition
Relocation
Elevation
Levee or Wall
Dry Floodproofing
Wet Floodproofing

$50,000
$25,000
$15,000
$10,000
$ 5,000
$ 2,000

7.4
11.4

17.0
11.4

52.8
(not considered)
100%

Based on the number of buildings to be protected, we calculated that the
average cost of protecting the remaining flood-prone buildings with the first
five nonstructural measures is $10,700 per building.
If the cost of protecting individual buildings is so low, why hasn't it
been done more?

It has not been done by individual property owners to any

great extent because people are people.

They may not be aware of these prctec-

tion measures, but, more likely, they do not make their decisions based on p'Jre
economic calculations of benefits versus costs.

Many of them do not expect to

be flooded, and those that have been flooded often cannot afford any more
expenses.
probably the greatest reason is that for the last 50 years floodplain
property owners have expected the federal government to protect them.

Many

residertts hold out hope for a structural flood control project, and, because it
takes many years to decide whether one will be built, they defer taking any
measures on their own.

More recently, floodplain residents have come to expect

disaster assistance and federally subsidized flood insurance to bail them out.
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As a result, private individuals' actual out-of-pocket costs to protect themselves are much larger than the cost of rebuilding after a flood.
Flood insurance and disaster assistance neither eliminate the aggravation
nor pay for all flood expenses.

For example, Illinois River residents have

been subjected to three severe floods within the last five years.

As stated by

one resident, "We were married to the river, but after it entered our living
room three times, we decided it was time for a divorce."
Implementing These Solutions
To effectively reduce the $360 million flood subsidy, the federal government must support flood emergency preparedness and building protection measures
on a scale approaching its support for flood control, insurance, and disaster
assistance.

While this may sound like a tall order, we have four recommenda-

tions that could be implemented relatively easily:
1)

Change some of the existing rules for federal assistance programs to
permit and promote building protection.

2)

Change the NFIP insurance rating system to recognize and encourage local
emergency preparedness and building protection programs.

3)

Create a flood hazard mitigation fund to support state and local emergency
preparedness and building protection programs.

4)

Continue the research and public information programs on floodproofing and
other protection measures.

The first three recommendations deserve more discussion:
Recommended Changes to the Federal Assistance Programs
A detailed review of seven major federal assistance programs was recently
conducted for and is available from the Division of Water Resources.

The

report reviews three types of federal assistance programs: community development assistance, disaster assistance, and structural flood protection.
Community development programs such as HUD's block grants do permit relocation and retrofitting of flood-prone buildings.

The CDBG has had a signifi-

cant impact on mitigation work in some hard hit communities.

However, recent

program changes mean that flood victims must compete with economic development
and low-income housing criteria.

Because of this, not many nonentitlement

communi ties have been able to obtain funding.
The disaster assistance programs of FEMA, the Small Business Administration and Farmers Home Administration have the advantages of moving quickly and
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being able to assist floodplain property owners when they are most open to
thinking about reducing future damages.

However these programs suffer from a

common problem in that they do not allow funding of improvements to the properties unless required by local law.

Because most flood damages in Illinois are

not severe enough to warrant mandated retrofitting, most flood victims are not
eligible for extra funding.

These programs should be amended to permit funding

of mitigation activities.
The beginnings of such an amendment have been proposed in Senate Bill
2517, Amendments to the Disaster Relief Act of 1974.

This bill proposes that

an amount equal to 2.5% of the total disaster assistance for public facilities
be made available at a 50/50 cost share for local mitigation projects.

While

we support this arrangement, the formula only provides a limited amount of
funding, and the funds would only be available to areas after a disastrous
flood.
The flood control programs of the Corps of Engineers and the Soil Conservation Service suffer from a different common ailment.
justified with a favorable benefit/cost ratio.

Each project must be

This is difficult to do for

relocation because there is little benefit gained by vacating land.

It is

difficult to do for retrofitting buildings, because the techniques have not
been generally accepted by the funding agencies and because calculating bene-fits and costs on individual buildings is time consuming and problematic.
We therefore recommend that FEMA or the Corps of Engineers continue their
floodproofing research to identify where individual retrofitting techniques are
shown to be generally cost effective on certain categories of buildings.

For

example, research has shown that most masonry buildings on slabs can be economically dry floodproofed if flood depths are less than two feet.

As part of the

project planning, the Corps and the SCS should review nonstructural alternatives by checking these building categories and flood hazard parameters rather
than conducting house-by-house detail benefit/cost analyses.
Recommended Changes in the NFIP Rating System
The NFIP can encourage flood protection measures by recognizing them iE
its rating system.

This is a common practice in the private insurance industry

as shown by these examples:
•

Fire insurance rates are lower in communities with better fire departments
and water systems and in buildings with smoke alarms;
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•

Jewelry stores have reduced rates for a variety of strategies such as
alarms, extra locks, and removing valuable items from show windows; and

•

Safe drivers and nondrinkers can receive reduced automobile insurance cost
premiums.
A community rating system has been proposed by FEMA.

This system would

provide lower rates for all policies in those communities that implement flood
damage reduction activities such as a flood warning system.

We strongly

support creation of such a community rating system.
The NFIP rating system should also provide reduced rates for individual
buildings that are protected from flood damage.

Currently, the system does

recognize relocation and elevation by providing lower rates.

However, it

discourages small levees, floodwalls, and floodproofing of residences by not
recognizing these techniques.

We therefore recommend that the NFIP follow the

lead of the private insurance industry and offer reduced rates for these other
loss reduction measures.

A detailed report on this recommendation is available

from the Divison of Water Resources.
A

Flood Hazard Mitigation Fund
The Illinois Division of Water Resources proposes that a new program be

created to establish a flood hazard mitigation fund.

The program would be a

joinr. federal, state, local, and private effort similar to and built on the
NFIP.

The federal government would provide the basic funding, the states would

provide guidance and technical assistance, and local governments would work
with private property owners and lending institutions to protect buildings.
In return for mitigation funds a state would establish a new mitigation
assi,tance program, seek statutory authority if needed, conduct training, and
provi.de technical assistance to local programs.

The state's program would set

minimum standards for building protection measures, identify where they should
or

s~,ould

not be used, and train building officials and engineers in these

techniques.

The state would also promote mi tiga tion and the sale of flood

insurance.

The state would pass the funds through to local governments willing to
initiate flood hazard mitigation programs that would include the following
elements:
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•

participation in the National Flood Insurance program

•

Development of a flood warning and flood fighting program meeting minimum
criteria set by the state emergency management agency

•

Development of a floodplain redevelopment plan that identifies the most
appropriate protection measures for existing buildings and plans for reuse
of any vacated sites

•

Administration of the mitigation fund for low interest loans or other cost
sharing to property owners willing to retrofit or relocate their
properties.
The staff needed for planning and financial management is already avail.-

able in many community development departments.

Small communities without such

staffing could obtain help through intergovernmental cooperative agreements, or
the program could be run at the county or multicounty level.
Property owners could be required to protect their property to higher than
the base flood elevation where feasible.

For example, if a building is appro-

priate for elevation and the 500-year flood is only one or two feet above

t~e

100-year flood (a common occurrence in Illinois), then the building could be
elevated above the 500-year flood.

The property owner would also be

requir~d

to buy a flood insurance policy to cover the property for damages higher than
the protection level.
Operation of the Hazard Mitigation Fund
The most appropriate source of the federal share of the fund would be a
percentage of the NFIP premiums paid from a state.

This arrangement autoIDil

cally allocates the money where the federal subsidy is greatest.

Cl-

It also

provides an incentive for states to promote the sale of insurance, one of
FEMA's goals.
We recommend that 20% of the flood insurance premiums be returned to
state for a flood hazard mitigation fund.

~ach

While 20% of the premiums may so>md

like a large contribution, in fact it represents only 5% of FEMA's flood re.lief
expenses.

This percentage is also below similar percentages used by the pri-

vate insurance industry.

Specialty companies such as Factory Mutual or Fa('tory

Insurance Association spend 7% to 8% on engineering services.

Boiler and

machinery specialty writers allocate a substantially higher percentage of their
premiums to safety inspections.
In comparison with this effort in private industry, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency spends an average of $525 million for flood insurance and
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disaster assistance.

In addition to these payments, FEMA spends 10% of this

amount for technical studies and assistance to prevent future development from
increasing the loss potential.

However it spends only 1% for loss reduction to

existing buildings (the $5 million for section 1362).

Given the predictable

nature of flooding and the technology available to prevent and reduce damages,
this percentage is surprisingly low.
FEMA is also the logical agency to implement a flood hazard mitigation
fund for other reasons.

First, the flood subsidy is being paid by its National

Flood Insurance and disaster assistance programs.

Second, FEMA has the organi-

zation and the experienced staff to administer a program that would pay for
flood protection in those communities that adopt a mitigation program.
Finally, the fund would complement one of FEMA's major efforts:
the NFIP's subsidy by making the program self-sufficient.

to reduce

The current

approach, to raise rates and cut coverage, has reached the point of no return.
As a result of this approach, Congress has told FEMA to temporarily stop rate
increases, and many policy holders have dropped their policies.
The real problem with FEMA's approach to date is that it does little to
eliminate the cause of the subsidy--raising rates and cutting coverage do not
prctect existing buildings that are and will continue to be flooded and
damaged.

The proposal for a mitigation fund and local mitigation programs will

do that.
The exact mix of loans and grants from the fund would depend on criteria
such as owner's income and cos t of the proj ect.

The low interes t loan is the

preferred approach for two reasons: the mitigation fund would be reimbursed by
the borrowers, and fund money can be augmented with local funds.

For example,

with an assumed average project cost of $10,700 and 5% as the low interest
rat~,

total interest payments over a 10-year loan would be $3,300.

At an

assumed local mortgage revenue bond interest rate of 11 %, $3,300 would be the
interest accrued by a 10-year loan of $4,300.
The fund could provide $6,400, and the community could loan the $4,300
balance needed for a $10,700 loan.

Both the fund and the community would be

paid their share of the principal, but the community would receive all the
interest payments to retire its bonds.

This arrangement results in $150 in

financial assistance for every $100 from the mitigation fund.
Illinois residents are currently paying $5 million in annual flood insurance premiums.

If 20% of this amount, $1 million, were put into a low interest

236

STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS

loan program according to the above-described federal 2/3 local 1/3 cost share,
$1,500,000 would be available for mitigation projects.

At an average cost of

$10,700 per project, this fund would be able to assist 156 properties in the
first year.
The amount of money available would increase each year as borrowers from
the previous years repay the principal and as flood insurance coverage increases.

If the number of policies doubles in five years (FEMA's target),

after ten years a total of 4,300 projects would be funded for a total federal
cost of $19 million.
1362.

This arrangement compares very favorably with Section

At its current funding level, 1362 will cost $46 million over the next

ten years and will protect 1,150 properties at $40,000 each.
Such an expense is appropriate because Section 1362 will assist the worst
flood problems, and it has been shown to have an early impact on the flood
insurance fund.

On the other hand, the federal funds under this proposal can

help nine families for everyone protected by Section 1362.

If the federal

government is willing to fund 1362 to the tune of $40,000 per property, it
should be willing to complement its current financial assistance arrangement,
help more property owners, and reduce the drain on the flood insurance fund.
Summary
We must recognize that the federal government's $360 million flood subsidy
will not- be substantially reduced by current approaches.

The existing fedcrCll

programs to reduce flood damages, structural flood control projects, disaster
assistance and subsidized insurance, and local regulations, cannot be expected
to remove more than 15-20% of the buildings exposed to flood damage.
What is needed are new federal incentives for local emergency preparedness
programs and nonstructural building protection.

We have recommended four ways

to do this:
1)

Change some of the existing rules for federal assistance programs to
permit and promote building protection. without such changes federal
funds will continue to be poured into existing buildings--to repair them
in order to be flooded again--and continue to drain the National Flood
Insurance Fund.

2)

Change the NFIP insurance rating system to recognize and encourage local
emergency preparedness and building protection programs. A rating system
that reflects flood protection measures taken by the community and by each
property owner will make the NFIP more consistent with private industry.
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3)

Create a flood hazard mitigation fund to support state and local emergency
preparedness and building protection programs. By using the fund for low
interest loans, federal dollars can be matched and the fund can be replenished, bringing much greater returns than section 1362.

4)

Continue the research and public information programs on floodproofing and
other protection measures.
In its enabling statutes, the NFIP was designed to be re-examined as ex-

perience was gained in this new federal initiative.

At first, the NFIP focused

on obtaining data on flood hazards and having local governments enact minimum
regulations to ensure that future development would not be subject to flood
damages.

By having the majority of the flood-prone communities studied and

converted to the regular program, FEMA has successfully accomplished this first
step.
The second effort of the NFIP was to ensure effective local floodplain
management programs.

This, too, has been successfully addressed through the

CAPE process and the state Assistance Program.
FEMA's current effort is to make the program self-sufficient by 1988.

Its

approach to this has gone about as far as it can, and it still does little to
address the cause of the federal subsidy or the concerns of most flood victims:
damages to existing flood-prone buildings.

This proposal will do that, and it

can be implemented with the existing organization at only a slight cost to the
insurance fund.

The benefits gained will be well worth the cost.
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FORT WAYNE/ALLEN COUNTY FLOOD PROTECTION PLAN

Norman A. Abbott
Community Development and Planning
Fort Wayne, Indiana

Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to present and explain the local perspective
of what happens after a presidentially declared flood disaster.

I will try to

provide the local perspective through 1) a brief description of the flood; 2)
a discussion of the Fort Wayne/Allen County Flood Protection Plan--its content,
citizen and agency input, and implementation; and 3) lessons learned.
What I hope to leave you with is an understanding of 1) the importance of
the development of a local plan; 2) the idea that the plan should be completed
rapidly; 3) the need for much citizen and agency input; 4) the need (when
complete) to carve off a first-phase implementation work program; 5) the need
to tap mUltiple funding sources; and 6) the need to have an undying commitment
to the plan and to the cause of flood protection.

(The work takes an in-

credible amount of time and tenaci ty) •
The Flood
Fort Wayne, Indiana, experienced a severe flood in March, 1982, and was
declared a Presidential Disaster Area.

The flood crested near the 100-year

elevation and remained over flood stage for approximately one week.

Although

the city initiated a flood fight with 35,000 volunteers, filled a million
sandbags, and saved 1,860 properties, the flood water damaged 1,760 residential
structures and approximately 260 businesses.
was over $53 million.

The total cost of the 1982 flood

The cost would have been over $80 million if the areas

saved had been lost.
After the crest, Fort Wayne established three task forces to deal with the
flood and to plan for the future.

The task forces reported to a policy

committee so that they could be directed along a similar path.

One task force

dealt with evaluating the flood fighting effort and the Emergency Operation
Center.

The second dealt with recovery from the disaster.

This involved

examining all aspects of getting people back into their homes after the flood-including cleanup, temporary housing, assistance programs, housing inspections,
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and security against looting.

The third task force was given the responsibili-

ty of developing a flood protection plan.

The plan, put together after 30 days

of city/county effort, is published in its entirety in a document called the
Fort Wayne/Allen County Flood Protection Plan, and is also published in
abstract form.
Fort wayne/Allen County Flood Protection Plan
Documentation of Flooding History and Cost
The plan spends considerable time documenting the history of flooding and
the cost of flooding in Fort Wayne.

This is important in order to establish

the record and thereby insure that people do not forget the events of the past.
It was found that Fort wayne is often flooded.

In fact, one damaging flood has

occurred, on the average, every five years throughout the 1800s and 1900s.

In

addition, i t was found that Fort Wayne was declared a Presidential Flood
Disaster Area in 1959, 1978, and 1982.

The plan documented that there had been

a series of studies drafted after the major floods--in 1913, 1943, 1959, and
1976.

It was determined that very little comprehensive implementation of those

studies had taken place, although incremental dike improvement and other
miscellaneous flood protection activities had been carried out.
documented the 'extent of flooding in 1982.

The plan also

This was done with slides as well

as graphics, and identified the residential, institutional, industrial, and
commercial areas that were inundated by flood waters in 1982.
Finally, the plan documented the cost of the flood of 1982.

It is very

important that this cost data be based upon a sound methodology because it must
stand the scrutiny of FEMA, which is also putting together cost data.

It also

has to stand the ongoing test of the Corps of Engineers, because they use cost
data in their cost/benefit analysis.
The plan based the cost data upon private, as well as, public costs in
terms of the emergency itself, the primary impact area, the secondary impact
area (not flooded but affected by truck traffic and other associated problems),
and the costs for the potential impact area (that area saved).

It is important

to have "worst case" data to explain what could have happened.

(It was close

to a miracle that Fort wayne was able to get the volunteers, sandbags, and
weather conditions necessary to avoid suffering additional damages).
Alternative Solutions
The plan studied nine solutions to the flooding problem in Fort
Wayne/Allen County based upon six alternative concepts.

The

concept~

included
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diversion channels, evacuation of the floodplain, floodproofing, dams and
reservoirs, river channel improvements, and massive dike building.
for these alternatives ranged from $10S million to $232 million.

The cost
The alterna-

tives were evaluated on social, economic, and natural environment characteristics as well as effectiveness, reliability, and public acceptance.

A solu-

tion containing both short-range and long-range plans was selected.

The short-

range plan consisted of many improvements including diking, channel improvements, tide gates, acquisition, pumping stations, etc., that could be started
immediately.

The long-range project called for a major diversion channel to be

constructed that would not be possible to implement without Corps of Engineers
involvement.
Citizen and Agency Input
During the development of the plan (as well as after it was drafted) our
staff worked hand in hand with the Indiana Department of Natural Resources,
Corps of Engineers, and FEMA to assure that our plans and efforts were well
coordinated.

We traveled to Washington, D.C., twice, once immediately after

the flood, and once after the plan was completed.

In these sessions we dis-

cussed with our senators, representatives, and the Corps of Engineers the
aspects of the flood in Fort Wayne.
ings and involved over 3,000 people.

At home we conducted some 45 public meetIn addition, the staff testified in front

of the State Natural Resources Commission and provided testimony to the State
legislature.

In the final analysis, the plan was adopted by the Fort Wayne

Common Council.
Implementing the plan
The 1S-Month Work Program
The entire plan outlined in the document would cost somewhere in the
neighborhood of $120 million to implement.

Therefore, it was essential to

divide that plan into some manageable increments that could be funded.
was accomplished through the development of an 18-Month Work Program.

This
I am

pleased to report that the 1S-Month Work Program, which included $11 million
;,orth of work, is nearly completely accomplished.
eight different funding sources.

The Work Program involved

They were the u.S. Geological Survey, the

State Department of Natural Resources, Community Development Block Grant funds,
FEMA, the City budget, the Corps of Engineers (Public Law 84-99), a Park Bond,
and finally the Fort wayne City Utilities.

I would also like to point out that
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i t is important to make maximum use of the funds available through the Damage
Survey Reports.
A diversity of projects were undertaken in the 18-Month Work Program.
River gauges, a flood hazard early warning system, and a floodproofing program
were funded.

Minor repairs were made to dikes, major dike repair using Public

Law 84-99 was accomplished, the height of certain dikes was increased, and new
dikes were installed to protect certain public improvements.

In addition,

backwater gates have been installed, certain channel improvements were implemented, and the City has acquired 24 houses and removed them from the floodplain.

Finally, the Work Program calls for the restoration of two major pump-

ing stations.
It should be pointed out that local government is required to come up

wi~h

25% of the costs associated with projects covered by the Damage Survey Reports.
In Fort Wayne's case that was nearly $1.7 million.

All DSR work was included

in the IS-Month Work Program.
Other Implementation Measures
Four additional elements outside the Work Program are important to imple!IIlentation.

One is the development of an Emergency Action plan.

The Emergency

,,"etian Plan is designed to clearly identify the items that need to be done
before and during the flood.

It identifies a time frame to be repeated each

year to prepare neighborhoods that are subject to flooding and to prepare the
city through internal meetings.

It addresses sandbag storage and various other

ite!lllsassociated with being prepared for the possibility of a flood.

The

ED'er''lIency Action plan outlines all of the processes that are necessary for
_na'lling a flood, including dike building, dike patrol, media involvement,
solicitation and maximum use of volunteers, and the management of food and
transportation problems.
Secondly, it is absolutely essential that some entity be established
outside local government to implement flood protection.

This entity needs to

have the foll,owing characteristics: the power to work across jurisdictional
boundaries, the primary responsibility for flood control, the ability to be
isolated from political change, and the ability to raise funds.

we are still working to accomplish this objective.

In Fort Wayne

We are pursuing a law that

is on the Indiana books that allows for the creation of a Conservancy District.
The process is very long and frustrating, but we are pursuing it with vigor.
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In addition, implementation is assisted by making necessary revisions in
the floodplain zoning ordinance.

We are making improvements to the zoning

ordinance to bring i t in compliance with the National Flood Insurance Program.
Among other changes, we are taking steps necessary to insure that floodway
develop.ent is prohibi tea in the future.
Finally, the success of any major flood protection program is dependent
upon the involvement of the Corps of Engineers.

Fort Wayne recognized that

fact froll the start and worked closely with the Corps of Engineers in t.he
development of the Fort wayne/Allen County Flood Protection Plan.

The Corps is

currently finishing a reconnaissance study that may lead to the next step--a
feasibili ty study of Fort Wayne/Allen County watershed--and ultimately to the
involvement of the Corps of Engineers in constructing the improvements that are
necessary in Fort Wayne.
Conclusion
There are several lessons to be learned by floodplain managers from Fort

Wayne's experience:
1)

Target planning efforts before the flood occurs. Promote flood insurance,
floodproofing, and wise land use planning through floodplain zoning. In
extremely hazardous areas, consider relocation as early as possible.

2)

Create a mitigation planning team immediately. Because of the pressing
recovery work that needs attention, there is a temptation to defer planning until later and thereby miss opportunities.

3)

Develop a local plan quickly.
In order to be in control of your own
destiny, i t is necessary to develop a local plan. The local planning
process must spawn an understanding of the problem, a thorough examination
of alternative solutions, and a commitment to implementation. The plan
must be used to communicate locally, to the state, as well as to the
federal government.

4)

Coordinate state and federal plans. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency and the state natural resources department are mandated to develop
hazard mitigation plans. These plans must be coordinated with local
planners.

5)

Seek assistance. You are not alone in dealing with the disaster. A
number of organizations, reading materials, and private consultants can
help--including, of course, the Association of State Floodplain Managers.

6)

Coordinate and organize. The need for coordination and organization
cannot be overemphasized. support from local citizens, FEMA, the state,
the Corps, your senators and representatives, and leadership from your
local executive branch are absolutely necessary to success of a plan.
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7) Develop an undying commitment to the cause. In Fort Wayne, the 1982 flood
is still a large consumer of staff resources. within the past three
months the staff has participated in two conservancy district hearings-one convened by a district court judge and one conducted by the Department
of Natural Resources. In both of those cases, the staff had to come fully
prepared to discuss the flood and all the associated data that had been
gathered as part of the Flood Protection Plan. In addition, the Corps of
Engineers has just left Fort Wayne with the cost data that they needed for
the reconnaissance study. Finally, the ongoing request for funding, the
ongoing public presentations, and in some cases lawsuits, require a continued commitment. It can be somewhat frustrating to present (again and
again) information that was developed some time ago, but it is necessary
to have the fortitude and the professionalism to keep the project moving.

PART THREE
STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS:
Evacuation
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CRITICAL HURRICANE EVACUATION PROBLEMS:
THE NEED FOR INNOVATIVE EVACUATION PLANNING

David A. Griffith
Tampa Bay Regional Planning Council
Introduction
-----In the last five years, the availability of new quantitative hurricane
hazard analysis tools and a planning method linking transportation, demographic, and behavioral evacuation analysis has allowed comprehensive studies
to answer critical questions on a given area's hurricane vulnerability.

The

two major, previously unanswered, questions were 1) what specific geographic
areas must be evacuated in advance of the approaching hurricane? and 2) how
long would such a prestorm relocation of vulnerable residents take (evacuation
time)?
In 1978, a hurricane evacuation planning effort for Lee County, Florida,
yielded an analytical method, combining all quantifiable factors of local
hurricane vulnerability, to calculate county evacuation times.

The limited

geographical scope of the study (it only addressed Lee County) did not allow
the examination of how cuncurrent adjacent county evacuation would affect Lee
County's evacuation time.

Since a hurricane will demand the evacuation of

several contiguous counties, merging evacuees from neighboring counties will
increase a given county's evacuation time.

Hence, a conclusion of the Lee

County effort was that quantitative evacuation planning must be multicounty or
regional in scope, yet the resulting plan must be able to be implemented at the
local level.
In 1980, the Lee County Evacuation plan methodology was utilized to formulate a four-county evacuation plan for the Tampa Bay region.

The Tampa Bay

Plan not only was the nation's first regional comprehensive hurricane evacuation study, but also was the first effort to utilize the newly-developed SLOSH
numerical storm surge model as its primary hazard analysis tool.

For the first

time, the computerized SLOSH (sea, lake, and overland surges from hurricanes)
model made it possible for planners to identify land areas predicted to be
inundated by overland hurricane storm surge based on several factors beyond
simple land elevation (offshore bathymetry, track of storm, hydrologic
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friction, etc.)

The use of the SLOSH model resulted in answers to the ques-

tions of which specific geographic areas would have to be evacuated due to
various intensities of hurricanes.

In addition, the SLOSH results were com-

bined with population/vehicle data, a behavioral survey, and computerized
transportation modeling to calculate the time necessary to evacuate those areas
before the hurricane made landfall (evacuation time).

Indeed, the findings of

the Tampa Bay Region Hurricane Evacuation plan Technical Data Report quantitatively answered the two major questions of local hurricane vulnerability.
The report was also adopted by the four counties of the region as the basis for
their individual hurricane evacuation operations plans.

However, the answers

to those two questions presented a sobering picture of potential loss of life
given the traditional response to an approaching hurricane.

1) The geographic

areas of the region that would have to be evacuated from the direct strike of a
hurricane would mean the relocation of bebleen 200,000 and 800,000 coastal
residents from the four counties, depending upon the intensity and track of the
hurricane.

2) The amount of time necessary to evacuate those residents to safe

shelter before hurricane landfall ranged between 12 and 18 hours, again depending upon the intensity and track of the hurricane.
The magnitude of these population figures and evacuation times now makes
one thing evident:

the traditional response to an approaching hurricane will

not prevent large-scale loss of life.

The reasons for this are evidenced by

the critical hurricane evacuation problems defined and discussed below.
Evacuation Time vs. Warning Time
The paramount problem in hurricane evacuation recently confirmed by the
above quantitative studies is that there are indeed some coastal regions of
Florida that need more evacuation time than the National Hurricane Center can
currently provide in the form of confident warning time.

For example, as noted

above, the Tampa Bay Region requires from 12 to 18 hours prior to hurricane
landfall to successfully evacuate all vulnerable residents; the National Hurri··
cane Center currently strives to provide confident predictions that a hurricane
can actually be expected to strike a particular area 12 hours in advance.

The

problem is quite clear, especially when other regions (Southwest Florida and
the Florida Keys) have been found to have even higher evacuation times.
Does this mean that it is impossible to conduct successful evacuations
from these areas?

Does it mean that evacuation plans that have quantified

evacuation times longer than 12 hours are unworkable?

The answer to both of
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these questions is no.

To explain this answer, one must first go back and

examine why we are "all of a sudden" confronted with this problem and who is
responsible for preventing loss of life from hurricanes.
First, although we have, just in the past couple of years, confirmed the
problem through quantification of evacuation times, the evacuation time/warning
time differential has probably existed for over a decade in some urban coastal
areas.

Its evolution is simple: coastal residential development has gradually

increased to such density that the roadway systems can no longer accommodate an
emergency mass exodus inland in under 12 hours.

Fortunately, a major hurricane

has not struck one of these areas in Florida since the coastal population
explosion.

If one had, a disaster more catastrophic than the 6,000 deaths in

the 1900 Galveston hurricane would probably have occurred.

If state-of-the-art

hurricane forecasting could keep pace with the increase in coastal population,
the problem could be mitigated.

Unfortunately, that is not the case.

A major

breakthrough in hurricane forecasting and prediction, based on a new technological advance, is not expected in the near future, yet the coastal population
continues to grow, pushing evacuation times even higher.
Legally, the responsibility for protecting people from an approaching
hurricane rests with the state and local elected officials of the jurisdiction
in which they reside.

The responsibility to advise those officials of such an

impending meteorological threat ultimately rests with NOAA's National Hurricane
Center.

This distinction in responsibility is a key to the immediate remedy of

the evacuation time vs. warning time problem.

So what is the immediate remedy?

First, some ancillary problems uncovered by the quantitative evacuation studies
are examined below.
Shelter capacity
Another alarming problem identified by analyzing the amount of population
shown by the SLOSH model to be hurricane-vulnerable is that most coastal areas
are greatly lacking in the amount of public shelter capacity they can provide
for an evacuation.

Traditionally, in various parts of the U.S., only a small

percentage (10-20%) of hurricane evacuees have sought public (usually Red Cross
managed) shelters as their evacuation destination before a hurricane.

However,

recent behavioral surveys of the Tampa Bay study and other studies in Florida
indicate that as many as 40% could seek such public shelter in a future hurricane.

Florida's high percentage may be explained by the large elderly popula-

tion often detached from northern relatives (homes of relatives are a local
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alternative to a public shelter) and thus more dependent on public facilities.
Comparative analyses of public shelter demand vs. actual existing capacity have
revealed substantial shortfalls for evacuation planning.

Such analyses have

spurred increased efforts for new public shelter searches, designation, and
staffing.

However, these efforts may not be taking place fast enough.
Maintaining Florida's Comprehensive
Regional Hurricane Evacuation plans

Identifying and taking the first step in solving the "evacuation time vs.
warning time" problem occurred when a pilot regional evacuation plan for the
Tampa Bay region quantified the evacuation time for those four urban coastal
counties.

For how can a local emergency official successfully order a hurri-

cane evacuation when he/she does not know how long it will take?

Comprehensive

and quantitative hurricane evacuation studies have been conducted for the Tampa
Bay Region and the Southwest Florida Region.
underway along the Southeast coast.

A similar effort is currently

It is hoped that funding will also be made

available to develop a comprehensive evacuation plan for Florida's hurricanevulnerable panhandle coastline.

Fortunately, the SLOSH model, almost a pre-

requisite for conducting a comprehensive/quantitative evacuation study, is
being developed for the remainder of the urban coastal regions of the state.
Although Florida has taken a giant step forward in hurricane preparedness
as a result of the comprehensive/quantitative regional evacuation plans, the
fact that those efforts were "pilot" studies has left us with the huge problem
of how to keep those plans up-to-date and accurate enough to save lives.
Because so many elements of the plans are quantitative, Florida's rapid coastal
population growth renders critical factors, such as evacuation time, inaccurate
in one to two years.

No one can question the cost-effectiveness of these

efforts given the constant threat to Florida from hurricanes.

But the question

becomes, "Who will provide the resources necessary to maintain comprehensive
regional plans all along Florida's vulnerable coast?"
Alternative Solutions to
Florida's Hurricane Evacuation Problems
The evacuation time vs. warning time problem has two basic alternative
solutions.

Unfortunately, neither is attainable without substantial costs in

the form of money, inconvenience, and/or political credibility.
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Early Evacuation Orders
The first solution, probably better defined as an immediate remedy, is the
issuing of early evacuation orders by local and/or state elected officials.
Rather than wait for a confident warning from hurricane forecasters with as
little as 12 hours lead time, local officials must be guided by the prequantified evacuation times of their comprehensive evacuation plans.

Such

times might demand that the local officials order evacuation as early as 24
hours in advance of potential landfall--a point at which the state-of-the-art
of hurricane forecasting cannot provide a confident prediction that the storm
will actually strike that locality.

In fact, such early evacuation orders

will, in most instances, evacuate thousands of coastal residents unnecessarily,
as the hurricane eventually does not strike that local area.
What has been created by this situation is what can be called a "cry wolf"
dilemma.

It is a dilemma of emergency decision making caused by the potential

for causing inconvenience, financial losses, and loss of governmental/political
credibility by issuing an early but ultimately.unnecessary evacuation order.
But the cost of not issuing such an early evacuation order upon the approach of
a large hurricane are much, much higher:

the loss of thousands of lives.

The immediate remedy to the evacuation time/warning time differential
problem through early evacuation orders described above requires three major
"lements.

The first is a very close and mutually understanding relationship

between hurricane forecasters and local/state emergency officials.

This rela-

tionship must itself be based on a constantly accessible communication system
between both entities.

Each entity must realize that all evacuation concerns

dre not necessarily meteorological concerns, and vice versa.

Again, the local

coastal areas must be able to secure all the emergency meteorological informa·... ion they need to implement their quanti tati ve evacuation plans.
The second element is a clear integration of the evacuation-ordering
iluthori ty that is delegated to both county and municipal senior elected officials by state law.

This is critical to the coordination necessary between

counties and municipalities as they implement regional hurricane evacuation
plans.

For example, a municipal evacuation order, if not coordinated with the

county or surrounding cities, could compound an already congested emergency
situation.

Similarly, any county should order evacuation only in coordination

with its constituent cities.

unfortunately, the current state statute is very

vague on county vs. municipal evacuation ordering authority.
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The third needed element is an understanding by the public that there is a
high probability of an ultimately unnecessary evacuation based on an early
evacuation order.

The "cry wolf" situation must be viewed by the public not as

a mistake in judgment by emergency officials, but as the safest way that
officials can guard against large-scale loss of life from a relatively unpredictable natural phenomenon.

Hurricane-vulnerable coastal residents must begin

to accept the fact that for every three, four, or even five times they might be
ordered to evacuate their home due to a hurricane over the next 20 years, that
only one of those trips may ultimately be necessary.

But the price of not

evacuating everyone of those times could be much, much higher than the cost of
a trip inland to a public shelter or the home of a friend or relative on high
ground.
So the immediate remedy to the evacuation time vs. warning time problem in
a given area is the acceptance by state/local officials of the responsibility
for issuing an early evacuation order without a confident warning from the
nationa'l Hurricane Center that the hurricane will actually strike their area.
For this immediate remedy to be effective, the hurricane forecaster must recognize and be sensitive to the prequantified evacuation times of a local area's
comprehensive evacuation plan.

In addition, evacuation orders must be careful-

ly and completely coordinated between county and municipal decision makers.
And finally, the vulnerable resident must respond and evacuate immediately,
even with full knowledge that the trip may ultimately be unnecessary.
Lowering Evacuation Times: Vertical Evacuation
The second alternative solution to the evacuation time vs. warning time
problem is to lower evacuation times by planning and implementing the vertical
evacuation of vulnerable coastal residents.

Vertical evacuation is the reloca-

tion of residents into the higher floors of multistory structures--either their
structure of residence or a nearby structure.

The ultimate advantage of this

type of evacuation movement is that i t should take less time for such relocation to be carried out since those "upward" evacuation trips would be much
shorter in distance than a horizontal trip inland.

In addition, many vertical

evacuation trips might not require the use of an automobile, somewhat mitigating time-consuming traffic congestion and backups and thus lowering evacuation time.

This type of evacuation could also substantially aid in solving the

problem of limited public shelter capacity.
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The concept of vertical evacuation appears to be a local solution to the
evacuation time vs. warning time problem if it indeed can lower evacuation
times.

However, the reality of implementing this type of evacuation is bur-

dened with many unknown factors, many of which could be life threatening in
themselves.

For example, how can an existing coastal high-rise structure be

determined to be suitably constructed to withstand hurricane conditions?

Even

if building design specifications point toward such structural worthiness,
poststorm examinations of structures after Hurricane Eloise on the Florida
panhandle have shown that design specifications are not always incorporated
into the actual construction of a building.

An even bigger question is who

will "certify" a structure as hurricane-resistant, to be used as a vertical
evacuation shelter?
certification?

Who will accept the potential liability accompanying such

Who should accept such liability?

Another unknown factor is

which geographic areas are appropriate for vertical evacuation.

Is it prudent

to direct residents of barrier islands (even the inland sides of barrier
islands) to vertically evacuate from an approaching Category 4 or 5 hurricane?
Is it prudent to direct thousands of residents upward on a barrier island that,
even if it survived the hurricane, would be isolated from life sustaining
resources such as food, water, and electricity?

Neither a consensus of the

structural/hydrologic engineering community nor the actual experience of that
situation exists to answer these questions.
The key to any hurricane evacuation plan is a sound and understandable
system of public information.

Incorporating vertical evacuation into local

plans will raise a whole new set of questions in the minds of coastal residents: Should I evacuate vertically or inland?
building?

How high must I go in the

If I escape from the surge, will I also be safe from the high

'~linds?

Although the concept of vertical evacuation is rapidly becoming one of the
only alternatives to high evacuation times, it is becoming quite evident that
the incorporation of a vertical element into local evacuation plans cannot
safely be done unless local preparedness authorities obtain answers to the
above questions.

Many of these questions are so complex that they would

require legislation to address potential liability and structural certification
issues.

vertical evacuation is a concept whose time has come as a potential

solution to the evacuation time vs. warning time problem.

Unfortunately, the

local emergency management community is neither equipped nor ready to implement
it.
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Long-Range Solutions
There will probably come a time when even an early evacuation order of 30
hours before hurricane landfall will not be sufficient to permit the successful horizontal evacuation of the dense coastal population.

Also, there will

probably come a time when there will not even be enough multistory structures
to serve as vertical evacuation shelters for the dense coastal populations of
the future.

Unfortunately, there will probably never come a time when hurri-

canes will cease to threaten the Gulf and Atlantic coasts of the U.S.

In the

future, the pressure to develop our coastline residentially will continue for
the same aesthetic, recreational, and economic reasons that it now exists.

The

only real long-range solution to ever-increasing evacuation times is hurricaneconscious land use decisions in our remaining undeveloped hurricane-prone
coastal areas.

How high will the evacuation times rise?

That question can

only be answered by the same entity that is faced with issuing an early evacuation order, directing vertical evacuation, and making the day-to-day land use
decisions that make the former two decisions so difficult--the local government
official.
Conclusion
It is possible to evacuate people of any U.S. coastal area from an
approaching hurricane.

Any number of people can be successfully evacuated--if

the process is initiated early enough.

The basic problem is that "early

enough" in many coastal areas is too early for a confident warning from the
hurricane forecaster, too early for a doubt-free evacuation order from a local
elected official, and too early for every evacuation trip by the public to be
an ultimately necessary one.

The problem demands that each of these three

entities--the hurricane forecaster, the local elected official, and the
public--do their part to avoid loss of life.
The hurricane forecaster must recognize and be sensitive to the fact that
local areas with evacuation times higher than 12 hours need a "somewhat less
than confident" warning of actual hurricane landfall.
hours do not render an evacuation plan unworkable.

Evacuation times over 12

But a workable plan demands

work from the hurricane forecaster as well as the local emergency officials and
general public.

Until vertical evacuation can be safely implemented, we must

deal with the reality of high evacuation times.
The local (or state) elected officials must be willing to accept a potential loss of credibility if they "cry wolf" by issuing an unneeded early evacu-
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They must recognize that the first and foremost responsibility of

their position is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of
their jurisdiction.
Finally, the general public must realize and understand that the evacuation order they receive is based on the best possible information and judgment
by meteorologists and emergency management experts.

The public must also

recognize that, when dealing with a force of nature such as a hurricane, its
relative unpredictability will cause evacuation "false alarms" in areas of
dense coastal population.

It must be realized that the best way of surviving a

hurricane is to listen to and follow the instructions of local emergency
authorities.

However, unless those local emergency authorities are assisted in

solving the evacuation problems described in this paper--through both the
provision of resources and the establishment of a firm legislative base--the
potential for large-scale loss of life will continue to increase.
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THE LEACHATE OF POOR FLOOD CONTROL

Allan N. Williams
principal Environmental Analyst
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection

Filling in banks
So perceptively slow
paving Forests
Flood Heights grow
Cartons, cars, scraps
of us all
Bonded by bricks
In back of the
mall
Nobody's happy
An eyesore
It's Fate
The Seasonal Floods
The object of hate
Come boxed and
walled channels
Those Coffins of
Streams
All sit by
The discarding of
dreams
The sidewalls will
stabilize
And conduit will
Rule
While abutments replace
The meandering pool
This floodplain is broken
How sad is the soul
Witness this leachate
of Poor Flood Control.
As I travel throughout this nation by air, train, raft, foot, and horseback, I see large, undeveloped floodplains like those of the Missouri and
Mississippi, Columbia and Colorado whose need for protection is not only obvious but imperative.

I also notice a constituency of professionals and private

citizens who seek to protect such areas.
In sharp contrast, I see thousands of small streams badly bruised by the
construction of boxed or walled channels.

For these streams, the needs of
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individual property owners, the ambivalence of government, and the pressing
political demands for flood control seem to set floodplain protection into the
unenviable position of being a minority without representation in the decisionmaking process.
I focus this presentation on the issue of incremental loss of stream
habitat due to the construction of boxed or walled channels for flood control.
As flood control or drainage projects, these are the smaller, less noticed
projects that generally involve only a few thousand feet of stream at a time.
The channel work occurs in areas often considered high hazard--not in terms of
floods over large areas, but in terms of concentrated damage potential in very
small areas.

It is often the case that, over time, many such small projects

spell the demise of larger areas of streams.

Mind you, I am not talking about

the larger federal projects but those done by state and local governments.
In the case of one watershed near my home, I see the results of such
incremental damage.

The 79-square mile Park River drainage basin is replete

with sterile trapezoidal channels, 900 walled channels with flat bottoms,
dozens of small tributaries that do not appear above ground, and finally a main
stem, itself enclosed in twin pressure conduits.

Why did this happen and who

was responsible?
Was it the famous Samuel Colt, who in 1851 constructed the first dikes on
the river's banks to protect his munitions factory?
1880s who dumped slaughterhouse wastes into it?
who literally built to the water's edge?
the basin from 1868 to 1978?

Was it the farmers of the

Was it the 1910 tenement owner

Was it the tripling of population in

Was it the first government flood control project

in 1940 that cut off this stream from its natural outlet to the Connecticut
River?

Was it the trapezoidal, flat-bottomed, shadeless channels constructed

in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s to minimize channel width during highway construction?
The fact is that there never was any particular development, anyone
factor, any single road crossing about which one could say, "This destroyed our

river. 11
What role did the flood managers have in the process?

Were they just

doing their job when they designed and built the various conduits and channels?
Or were they, in fact, making some societal assumptions that their job was more
than flood control; that i t also included helping property owners to develop

Williams

261

these "useless swamps and debris laden streams," and to put the land to some
"productive use?"
It is ironic that many of the problems that so severely degraded the Park
River--water pollution, aesthetic nuisances, etc.--have now been corrected, but
that the flood control projects pre-empt recovery of the stream habitat.
We have come a long way these past ten years or so in integrating environmental concerns into our flood projects.

But how many of our agencies and how

many of our towns are still putting streams in boxed or walled channels or
putting them underground altogether?
One might say i t is not our job to consider the environmental consequences
of a flood project.

Other people, other programs are supposed to do that.

Despite having passed through the "environmental decade," we are still depending on the regulatory or review process to make our projects "fit"

environ-

mentally.
I believe we are attempting to protect stream habitat from the effects of
a flood control project by using regulatory measures.

I also believe this is a

superficial and inadequate treatment of the problem.
The problem with this process is similar to the problem of retrofitting a
house for solar heating.

You add insulation, upgrade heat transfer materials,

and seal doors and windows; but in the end, if the house is in a shadowy ravine
and its roof not facing south, then all the changes just cannot bring more of
the sun's energy into the home.

We cannot make an intrinsically environmental-

ly unfit channel design acceptable just by addressing the peripherals:

erosion

control, a few plantings, or a stone wall here or there.
Why are environmental concerns still peripheral and retrofitted to small
projects instead of being designed into the projects from the beginning?
What are some of the constraints making it difficult to integrate flood
management and natural resource protection into small projects?
1)

In designing a flood control structure, it is almost always more costly to

do it environmentally correctly.

The tendency is always to try to keep finan-

cial costs down and development opportunities up.

Compounding the problem is

the fact that environmental values are difficult to estimate in dollars, so
they often are not considered at all.

In some ways, environmental values are

often measured in PFD--"people Flak Dollars," i.e., the more people watching
and concerned, the more important the environmental values become.
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By the time a flood control project is needed, the outcry--usually made by

a specific group lobbying for a solution to their immediate needs for waterfree property--often overshadows other issues.

There arises a political force

lobbying for a flood control project, and it is only concerned with getting
something done fast.

From the beginning, then, the designers of a flood

control project are under the gun to do something quickly, to solve a singlepurpose problem with a single-purpose project.

The project is designed and

submitted for regulatory review, leaving the environmental concerns limited to
output controls, instead of input controls.
By this time in the process, there is considerable time, money, and staff
interest involved.

Add existing political and economic forces to this, along

with the professional pride of the design engineers, and those involved in the
regulatory process may feel that they have no constituency--that there is
little they can do, or that i t would be too costly to change anything.

In this

position, the regulators often see themselves as "roadblocks."

By now, they

are not willing to go out on a limb to protect stream habitat.

Another reach

of river is discarded.
What can be done to prevent this, to prevent the constant loss of small
stream habitat due to small flood control projects?
Among the first choices for relief must be the development of basin-wide
stormwater management standards and, in turn, stormwater management plans
intended not merely to improve the efficiency of flows but also to guarantee
the existence of viable stream corridors.

It has taken so long to get flood-

plain regulations adopted in this nation, to implement controls outside the
floodplain may seem like too much for municipalities to bear, but it must be
done.
Second, those responsible for flood control projects must have written
policy to promote interdisciplinary predesign studies of alternatives.

Before

the first calculations or the first lines on a blue print are made, it is
critical that the ecological professionals visit the site with the design
engineers, that they discuss and develop alternatives together.
Third, there is a need to increase cross-professional training of engineers, ecologists, soil scientists, and others for the purpose of increasing
their understanding about each other's duties and constraints.
Fourth, there is a need to develop written guidelines for approval of
state or local flood control projects.

These guidelines should delineate a
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process that requires environmental concerns to be built into a project, not
tacked on after design.
I would like to close with the following words about the Park River.
Mark Twain wrote most of his famous novels, including Tom ?awyer and
Huckleberry Finn at his Hartford home, called Nook Farm, which was on a hill
overlooking the Park River.

There is now no evidence that a river ever existed

on the property, as in the past two years the last stage of a flood control
project put the last pieces of the river underground.
Perhaps we all owe an apology to Mark Twain, Samuel Clemens, and his
daughter, Clara.
An Apology to Mark Twain
Her banks
When Huck,
But that
Deep in the

willow, maple, and grass
Tom, and that Becky Lass
was then; now it's dark
bowels of the River Park.

In soaking springs, most usual years
Water on yards, yet very few tears
Sediments and stone hardly perturbed
They alone, to be annually disturbed.
Public officials, lacking reproach
Did not comprehend, to encroach
Bank to bank, row by row
We slowly watch, the buildings grow.
Came '55, a flood of wrath
Sweeping over the now-occupied path
Voices rose that triggered the end-"Eliminate it, eliminate every last bend!"
Twin pressure conduits soon replaced
The peaceful view Nook Farm had faced.
Where Clara and father skated to shore
parking and steel mechanically roar.
So substitute for clam shells and trout
By counting the miles of masonry grout;
In greying water cast your concern
Lest from river to sewer all must learn.
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WETLAND AND FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT:
A SUMMARY

Alexandra D. Dawson
Director, Resources Management and Administration Program
Antioch New England

Wetlands Protection and Floodplain Management: A

Co~rison

Land Use Controls
Wetlands protection and floodplain management are aspects of land use
planning.

This is still principally a legal power of the states, exercised at

the local level through zoning, SUbdivision, and health controls and at the
state level through state wetlands laws, scenic rivers programs, and coastal
zone management strategies.
General Legal

principle~

Courts have been supportive of the right of states and localities to ban
the use of high-hazard floodplains.

The leading case is Turnpike Realty Co.

vs. Town of Dedham, 362 Mass. 221 (1972).

The principle involved is that

prevention of public hazard outweighs the right of private landowners to develop their land.

The hazard can include danger to persons occupying the

floodplain, danger to upstream and downstream owners, and even (according to
two Massachusetts cases) the "hazard" of increased public expenditure due to
unwise choices in land development.
Courts have been more conservative in upholding bans on the use of privately owned wetlands, probably because the hazards of their destruction are
more remote and speculative.

In one Massachusetts case, however, a ban on

filling of wetlands was upheld because there was some evidence that the fill
might damage the quality of groundwater which was a potential (but not current)
drinking water supply (Lovequist vs. Conservation Commission of Dennis, 1979
Mass. Ad. Sh. 2210).
Because of the "public trust" and special public interest in coastal
wetlands, a ban on destruction of productive saltmarshes may be upheld (see
Sibson vs. NH, 115 N.H. 124).

Thus, on common law (decisional) grounds, it may
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be legally feasible to ban development in a wetland or a floodplain, especially
the latter.
A contrary result may be reached by statutory regulation, however.

In

Massachusetts, under the new Wetland Protection Act regulations effective in
1983 (310 Code of Mass. Regulation 10.00, interpreting Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 131,
s. 40), floodplains may be given less protection than vegetated wetlands bordering surface waters.

For these "BVWs", a special waiver from the Commission-

er of DEQE is now required for more than minimal fill.

These wetlands are

presumed valuable for public or private water supply, groundwater supply, flood
control, storm damage prevention, prevention of pollution, and protection of
fisheries/shellfish; whereas floodplains are presumed valuable only to flood
control, storm damage prevention, and, sometimes, groundwater and may often be
filled if compensatory storage is provided.
Engineering solutions of this sort for development of floodplains provide
interesting legal questions.

If state or local regulations provide that a

developer may come forward with plans for compensatory storage, fill, pilings,
breakaway fronts, or floodproofing, and the reviewing authority nevertheless
rejects an application to develop, the burden of proof will shift to the regulating body to prove why it rejected these solutions.

Nevertheless, the state

of the art is not such that a court is likely to require a regulatory body to
accept such solutions if the regulation is properly drafted.

The regulations

should thus begin with a presumption that development of high risk floodplains
is undesirable because such development is presumed to result in serious public
hazards.

It may then allow the developer to submit technical solutions for

such development with the understanding that the solution will be rejected
unless the developer convinces the regulating body of the proven workability of
the solution.

This approach will help keep the burden of proof on the

applicant.
l'ihen regulating wetlands, on the other hand, the regulating body's
language should emphasize the proven values of wetlands and any hazards concurrent with their destruction.

Mitigation efforts such as creation of sub-

stitute new wetlands should be given low priority.
Regulations for both kinds of development should emphasize the residual
economic uses of the land which may benefit the landowner:

farming, forestry,

recreation, plus the accessory value of the land in making up lot sizes, providing value to adjacent uplands, etc., which has been recognized in one
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Massachusetts appeal court case (S. Kemble Fischer Realty Trust vs. Board of
Appeals of Concord, 1980 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 637).

Mere diminution of value

will not generally invalidate a restriction on the use of land validly adopted
under the state or local "police power," provided the landowner is left with
some kind of economic use of the property.

One should avoid references to uses

that are really public uses of public lands (e.g., flood storage areas, water
supply, public recreation), as this suggests to courts that, by regulation,
public benefits are being sought which should be accomplished by purchase of
the property.
Coordinating Protective Efforts at the Local Level
Municipalities and counties are still the main controllers of land use
outside LURC areas of Maine.

Many different local bodies can be made interest-

ed in protecting floodplains and wetlands, e.g.,
•

Birders, schools, and people who like outdoor recreation

•

Farmers, foresters, hunters, and fisherpeople

•

Fiscal conservatives who fear need of future public expenditures for
sewers, schools, dikes, dams

•

People who just think the community is growing too fast
The coalition aim should be to review the present picture of local control

of land use with a view towards removing the "magnet effect," and encouraging
compatible uses of floodplains.
The magnet effect is achieved when the community actually, although often
unintentionally, points development into the floodplain by inappropriate zoning
and/or development of public infrastructure.

Many New England towns were built

around mills in floodplains and have continued this pattern by industrial/
commercial zoning and the building of roads, sewage treatment plants, parking
areas, and airports, not to mention trailer parks.

Sewage treatment plants are

particularly problematic since engineering practice tends towards building them
on the floodplain; i t is then legally difficult to prevent access to the pipe.
Road building has similar effects, although few think beyond the immediate
impact of road building (the flood insurance program attempts no ban on road
building in floodplains).
Communities should therefore adopt public infrastructure policies, review
zoning codes, and also review local health laws:

both floodplains and wetlands

~2~6~8~
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are generally poor places for either individual septic systems or public sewer
lines.
The community should eschew the one-foot rise permitted, but not encouraged, by FEMA regulations in setting the floodway; this will effectively make
the 100-year floodplain the regulatory floodway, and the flood insurance prohibitions against fill will give force to local bans.
Compatible uses for wetlands and floodplains include:
•

Public ownership as parks.

•

Public restrictions purchased from landowners preventing development and
allowing at least educational access. Consequent reduction in real estate
taxes on undeveloped land will generally be minimal.

•

Farming and forestry--compatible in floodplains, but not always in
wetlands.

•

Modest recreational facilities. One should avoid a general "use as of
right" for "water dependent activities" such as boating, but rather
require a special permit for control of size and placement.

•

Accessory uses such as the "toes" of large lots.
In downzoning areas for protection one should emphasize good mapping,

public hazards, residual uses and avoid the implication that regulation is
being used as a cheap substitute for purchase by the public.
Coordinating Protective

Eff~rts

at the State Level

Efforts that may be mounted by state officials with local support
include:
•

States should adopt executive orders similar to federal EO 11988 and EO
11990 banning use of public funds for floodplain/wetland destruction
unless specially justified. These executive orders should include all
federal funds and all high risk floodplains, whether privately or
publicly owned.

•

CZM plans should be reviewed to make sure protection is maximized and
impact funds are not available for counterproductive activity, and
controls on roads, sewers, airports, and utilities should be checked.
Officials should emphasize use of CZM public access funds for access to
beaches and rivers.

•

States may give preference to floodplains/wetlands in grants for groundwater protection, agricultural preservation restriction purchase--depending on the regulations.
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•

State scenic rivers programs should be reviewed.
adequate?

Is the setback

•

State health codes for septic systems, sewer construction and dumps should
be reviewed for adequacy--many are outdated.

•

States should resist delegation of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
section 404 wetlands program, as well as the Corps' "nationwide permits."

•

States could do more in pushing for more funding of FEMA's Section 1362
acquisition program for frequently flooded areas.
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PART THREE
STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS:
Training and Education
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TRAINING AND EDUCATION NEEDS FOR THE PRACTITIONER

William L. Trakimas
Indiana Department of Natural Resources

Training and Education Needs
In Indiana, we have ·found that training and education must provide local
officials with information and data that is pertinent to their way of life.
This requires data from other Indiana experiences, not data from events or
situations from other states.

If this is not possible, then the out-of-state

experiences must be those from a similar type of community.

It is very impor-

tant that, if you go into a small rural community tucked away in the mountains,
your data be those of a similar community in a similar locational setting.
Credibility is very important.

The story of the relocation of $100,000 homes

in Minnesota will not enlighten those situated in $10,000 homes in a mining
camp.
For years we have provided training tools, seminars, etc., on federal
regulations, state laws, and agency responsibility.

However, in many cases the

data have been overly complex (Federal Register, state laws) and not keyed to
the local lifestyle.

It is very hard to discuss the development of grandiose

mitigation plans with a community with no budget for mitigation, particularly
when you are offering no financial assistance yourself.

Through the State

Assistance Program (SAP), Indiana has finally begun to provide the necessary
management tools to help local officials and floodplain managers.
The development of handbooks written in language easy to understand,
highlighting the major issues and regulations that a local official needs, has
been a big plus for our agency.

These handbooks have gone a long way in

assisting the local community to understand the maze of federal and state
regulations on floodplain management and disaster response.

In addition, our

agency has developed a floodproofing slide show illustrating examples of
Indiana experiences in floodproofing.
ing measures is also illustrated.

The cost of undertaking the floodproof-

The depiction of costs is a major element in

achieving credibility with the local community.
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As our agency becomes aware of more examples of Indiana floodproofing
experiences, we are acquiring slides to update our slide show.

This will make

the presentation flexible, thereby allowing us to provide examples that closely
resemble the types of communities where we are providing the training.

In this

way we hope to establish better credibility for our programs, thereby leading
to increased activity at the local level.
Meeting Training and Education Needs
At present, our agency provides funding for staff to attend public meetings and provide technical assistance to meet local community needs.

Through

the SAP we now have an excellent information base (management tools) with which
to assist local communities.

Our agency has no problem with setting up local

workshops and/or seminars and providing staffing to conduct these training and
education programs.

The only problems we encounter are with the scheduling of

our staff, since we do not have staff assigned solely for training and education, and with reproducing handbooks and manuals.

Currently, our budget is not

flexible enough to handle mass reproduction of large manuals.

In the future,

this may not be a problem, but until then, we must conserve our resources.

We

are able to conduct small workshops that require limited amounts of material
reproduction.

As a result, our training efforts have been in response to

requests by local communities versus an organized effort initiated by our
agency.
Funding

Tra~ning

and Education

Additional funds, therefore, are needed for travel and material reproduction.

Once in a while our in-state travel funds become depleted thereby re-

ducing staff's ability to conduct normal business.

Therefore, additional

traveling associated with training exercises would be out of the question.
However, if funds become available to cover these travel costs, it would be no
problem to have our existing staff conduct meetings.

It should be noted that

our staff scheduling problem would not be a problem if normal travel funds were
scarce, since more of our staff would be in the office.
In the case of material reproductions, additional funds would be greatly
appreciated.

Our current budget does not allow for large sums to be applied to

manual/handbook production.

This is one reason why the SAP has been such a

tremendous plus to our program.
costs $1,600 for 500 copies.
Indiana.

(For example, the Handbook for Local planners

This only allows one copy for each community in

This is in no way sufficient for adequate training and education).

Trakimas
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In terms of cooperative arrangements, something could be worked out with
the FEMA Regional Office and the State Civil Defense through their training and
education contracts.

The agreement might be for the FEMA Regional Office to

supply a staff person to work with our agency and have a program like SAP
provide funds for travel and material reproductions.

Another possibility might

be for our agency to use the Civil Defense training and education contract
(Public Officials Conferences) to set up meetings and draw the local participants.

With funding from FEMA for material reproduction, our agency could

conduct training seminars.
Benefits
providing training and education on the NFIP, floodplain management and
disaster preparedness to local officials/communities, along with providing
mitigation, would go a long way towards the establishment of effective local
floodplain management programs in Indiana.

Experience has shown that when

people understand a program, they are willing to abide by the rules.

It is the

complexity and uncertainty of programs that causes confusion at the local level
thereby leading to poor administration.

We hope that, through our efforts to

simplify floodplain management, we will begin to see better administration and
implementation.
The Floodplain Management Handbook for Local planners is a good example of
how we have tried to simplify floodplain management.

This handbook is an

excellent reference tool that locals can use to answer questions as they arise.
Previously, communities were left with a pile of materials, a lot of which were
written in terms foreign to them.
:00

place to go to find the answers.

single source to meet their needs.

As a result, when questions arose, they had
The handbook, we hope, provides that
In addition, the handbook contains a list

of places to contact for assistance, broken down by topic or issue.
Unlike other parts of the country, Indiana does not usually suffer from
floods that cause total destruction. Due to the relatively flat terrain, most
of our flooding is the slow rising type.

Therefore, our losses are not as

great as in some other parts of the country.

Bad floodplain management de-

cisions therefore cause damages, but not of monumental proportion.

Thus, the

reduction in flood damages caused by sound land use decisions will not be as
noticeable in Indiana as other states, but nevertheless it would be
noticeable.
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A real key to what will be accomplished will be the efforts our agency
expends in two areas:
1) providing data/information to locals who already have a detailed FIS, but
lack adequate training to understand the data; and
2) Enforcing our laws against violators, many of whom undertake their activities as a result of a lack of understanding or knowledge of the law.
With better local floodplain managers, we feel we will see a reduction in
our agency's efforts to handle these latter activities.

As a result, our

agency can spend more time in providing data to communities where adequate data
does not exist.

It is in these areas that we can improve our efficiency to

respond to local requests and thereby dramatically reduce future flood losses.
We have found that with timely responses to local requests, we see more
communities willing to seek advice for future construction in flood-prone
areas.

Once the response time drags out, especially in the building season,

communities tend to develop according to their instincts, without regard for
the regulations.

NFIP TRAINING AND EDUCATION IN REGION III

Martin J. Frengs
Federal Emergency Management Agency

The jurisdiction of FEMA Region III includes Delaware, Maryland,
pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia.

The

training and education of local officials and building professionals in the
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) within Region III has historically been
in the form of final meetings, Community Assistance and Program Evaluation
(CAPE) meetings, FEMA/State Coordinating Agency workshops and conferences, and
presentations at meetings sponsored by professional organizations.
Final Meetings
In these meetings--usually the first FEMA contact with a community
official--detailed floodplain data are presented and the NFIP "Regular program"
rules and regulations are discussed.
Costs
The costs of these meetings vary depending on the distance the FEMA staff
person must travel.
below.

Minimum, maximum, and average estimates are presented

Naturally these costs could be higher if they included the travel and

salary for the state coordinator.

Salary estimates include overhead at 100% of

the hourly rate and include the time it takes to set up, travel to, and conduct
the meeting.
Minimum
Travel (rented auto plus gas)
salary (5 hours)

(one day)
say

$

Maximum
Travel (2 days)
Air Fare
Auto Rental
Per Diem
salary (20 hours)

35.00
160.00
200.00

300.00
80.00
100.00
640.00
$ 1120.00
$

Three meetings per trip, say
Average
3/5 x (380-200)

$

110 + 200

$

380.00

$310 per community

STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING HIGH RISK AREAS

278

Advantages
•

Person to person, one on one contact where specific community problems and
situations can be discussed.

Disadvantages
•

Relatively high cost per community.

•

Many, if not most, community officials do not express an interest in the
maps and the ordinance at this early stage of the conversion process.

•

Many times the meeting does not include the best community officials,
e.g., the mayor vs. the code enforcement officer.

•

Many community officials, along with code enforcement officers, leave
office between the final meeting and the effective date of the ordinance
and maps.
CAPE Meetings
While viewed by Region III as primarily a community "audit"

to determine

if new development is compliant with the minimum NFIP regulations, experience
shows that roughly 50% of the these visits result in a refresher course in the
relationship between the maps, the Floodway Data Table, and the flood profiles.
This does not include the (roughly) 5-10% of the cases in which no one knows
where the Flood Insurance Study (FIS) and ordinance are filed.
Costs
Again, a range and an average estimate are provided depending on the time
of travel; the costs would be higher if the state coordinator was included.
While most CAPEs exceed final meetings in length, the minimum CAPE meeting
would compare with a final meeting.
Minimum
Same as a final meeting
Maximum
Travel (3 days)
Air Fare
Auto Rental
Per Diem
Salary (28 hours)

$

200.00

$

300.00
110.00
150.00
900.00
$ 1460.00

Two meetings per trip, say

$

730.00

Average

375-x-T730 -

200)

$320 + 200

$520 per community
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Advantages
•

Person to person, one on one contact where specific community problems and
permits are discussed and evaluated.

•

Meeting is usually held with the proper community official who is now
interested because the maps and ordinance are now effective.

•

By reviewing individual permits, the code enforcement officer's ability
can be evaluated. This is a big advantage over workshops .for which
attendance is voluntary and which this individual may therefore choose not
to attend.

Disadvantages
•

Very time consuming and expensive for the amount of training provided.

•

1,711 communities in Region III (about 55%) are on the Regular Program.
Five staff members doing 20 CAPEs a year would need 17 years to visit each
community once. This is significantly short of FEMA's original goal of
having at least one CAPE meeting per community every five years.
DCA Workshops
These are one-day floodplain management workshops for community code

enforcement officers sponsored by the Pennsylvania Department of Community
Affairs (DCA).

A FEMA staff person participated in these workshops as one of

the presenters.
Cost
The cost estimates presented were provided by DCA and represent the
average cost experienced for all their workshops.
Travel (state employees)
Salaries (state employees)
FEMA (travel and salary)
Conference Room ($50 to $100)
Lunch ($10/person, 20-30 people)
Flyer (printing and mailing)
Subtract Fee ($20/person)
Total Cost

$

say

say

Cost per Community (assuming 20 our of 25
are from different communities)

375.00
1,700.00
300.00
75.00
250.00
200.00
$ 2,900.00
500.00
$ 2,400.00

$

120.00

Advantages
•

TWenty to thirty code enforcement officers, who may represent 20 to 25
communities, can be trained at a relatively low cost.
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•

participants can benefit from problems and solutions experienced in other
communities.

•

Usually the proper community official attends and is interested in
learning.

Disadvantages
•

Much state staff time is spent to set up and organize each workshop.

•

The Code Enforcement Officer who cannot afford (in either time or money)
to attend or is not interested in learning about the NFIP regulations is
eliminated from this process.

•

During the last two years, ten of these workshops have been held averaging
20 communities per workshop. Therefore, only about 200 communities out of
the 2600 communities in pennsylvania have felt the need to send a representative. Experience indicates that many community officials, other than
those volunteering to attend these workshops, need training
Meetings with Professional Organizations
These meetings are arranged with local chapters of professional organiza-

tions involved in the building profession (builders, architects, real estate
agents, engineers, etc.) to discuss a specific NFIP topic.

In this particular

case, coastal construction presentations were held at the normal monthly meetings of local chapters of the national Association of Home Builders.
Costs
Because the time to prepare and conduct one of these presentations is
similar to that of a final meeting, the average cost of one of these meetings
is roughly $300.

The cost per community benefited is difficult to determine.

If the builders at the workshop account for 10% of the construction in the
region, then 10% of the communities in the region are assumed to benefit.
~dvantages

•

Staff time and effort to organize the meeting is minimized. The local
chapter reserves the space and provides the refreshments and invites the
audience.

•

Dealing directly with the people who are most affected by the NFIP regulations eliminates the community officials as the go-between.

•

If the builders comply with the requirements in the design stage, the
community review time is reduced and changes in design are minimized.

•

If the requirements are exceeded, flood insurance premiums decrease,
increasing the structure's marketability.
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Disadvantages
•

The meeting schedule is dictated by the sponsor; dates and times may
conflict with other work.

•

The length of the presentation and, therefore, possibly the content, is
limited by the sponsor. Thirty to 45 minutes seems to be the maximum that
most people care to pay attention.
Conclusion
Given the existing options within the present FEMA/State Coordinator

structure for the training and education of local code enforcement officers, i t
is evident that changes must be made if FEMA's goal of reducing flood damage
susceptibility to new development is to be met.

While the DCA workshop is the

most cost effective option presently underway for training local officials and
should continue to operate, most communities are not voluntarily participating,
and, therefore, most of the code enforcement officers who need this training
are not receiving it.

With the number of staff available to perform CAPE

meetings in Region III being reduced by 50% during the last three years, CAPEs
can no longer be considered a significant training and education option.

Given

the present CAPE return period per Regular Program community of one meeting
every 17 years, and given the high turnover rate of local code enforcement
officers and local elected officials, FEMA would be meeting with every third or
fourth community permit officer at best.

Along with Final Meetings, CAPE

meetings are too expensive for the amount of training and education provided.
This leaves us with the option which makes the most sense, given our
limited resources.

The whole spectrum of the building profession, from the

real estate agent, through the designer, and up to the builder, most be
educated to the benefits of not only complying with the minimum NFIP and state
related requirements, but exceeding these requirements.

This training and

education option, along with complimentary actions such as requiring state
sertification of all code enforcement officers as in New Jersey and amending
National Building Codes to include some of the basic NFIP regulations, should
be a significant, if not the major job element of each FEMA and state employee
involved in floodplain management.

Naturally, the techniques and methods used

to inform these professionals can and should be altered depending on need and
individual preference.
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TRAINING: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T

Janie Douglass
Kentucky Flood Control Advisory Commission

The Perspective From the Bottom of the Totem Pole
One of the keys in determining the training and education needs of the
local practitioner is to take a closer look at exactly who this local practitioner is.
trouble?

Is he the mayor's brother-in-law who needs a job to keep him out of
Perhaps he or she is the underpaid city engineer who is disgruntled

at the additional work load foisted on the office by the National Flood
Insurance Program (NFIP).

Maybe he or she's a highly motivated citizen dedi-

cated to community service.

However, more than likely, you'll recognize the

local practitioners by the many different hats they wear as the city's building
code inspector, fire inspector, plumbing inspector, flood insurance coordinator
--maybe even the dog catcher.
So the "local practitioners," as we are calling them, could be anyone from
those who "just barely made it through high school" to very specialized
professionals--hopefully in a field that meets the needs of the NFIP.
With this in mind, the basic consideration is one of selling the flood
insurance program.

These are some of the more frequently mentioned selling

points:
1)

The community needs to maintain eligibility for flood insurance (which is
often the only game in town) by enacting a flood damage prevention ordinance, implementing a floodplain management program, and enforcing the
permitting requirements.

2)

A community faces certain questions of' liability with regard to its
enforcement or lack of enforcement of such an ordinance.

3)

Current federal disaster policy requires a 75/25% split of recovery costs
for public facilities, which would place additional strain on already
drained local governments to meet the match requirements.

4)

No matter what kind of state and federal assistance is available after a
disaster, there are still other costs associated with flooding, which
further drain the community's resources.
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Most importantly and most frequently overlooked is the fact that in addition to avoiding the costs of recovery, local governments can benefit from
implementing floodplain management techniques by obtaining the optimal use
of the floodplain. The most obvious reason behind the ordinance is the
protection of life and property from the danger of floods.
Once the local practitioners are sold on the NFIP and its requirements,

they will need some tools to do their own selling job to the people who are
going to be most affected--the floodplain residents.

In Kentucky, the Soil

Conservation Service (SCS) provides field personnel with a Dale Carnegie-type
course on selling conservation programs.

Besides the technical aspects of

floodplain management, sessions should be included to address the human/psychological aspects--salesmanship if you will.

The local practitioners need to be

able to maintain an ongoing dialogue with the community and its residents to
promote an informed citizenry that will accept the program based on its merits,
not just because the "Feds say we have to do it this way" if we want flood
insurance and disaster recovery assistance.
Federal agency personnel must be more easily accessible.

Most important-

ly, they need to speak the vernacular and accept the local practitioner as a
valid partner in this venture.
Training Tools
There are only a few tools that translate the technical information into
lay language, though more are becoming available.
essentials needed under one cover.

Still fewer provide all the

A good example of a working tool is the

recently completed manual developed by the Kentucky Flood Control Advisory
Commission designed to serve as a local practitioner's field guidebook.

The

Kentucky Model Flood Damage Prevention Ordinance takes the local practitioners
by the hand, explaining the need for the ordinance and the ordinance itself
with a running commentary which translates legal terms into everyday terms.

It

provides a job description and a diagram showing the permitting process and
includes sample letters covering situations that could develop, public hearing
notices, and a step-by-step permit form.
Public Relations
In turn, the local practitioner needs to have the necessary tools to pass
this information on to the pubic.

Public relations campaign material for all

forms of media dissemination should be available in the vernacular.

These

materials should include, but not be limited to, the regulations and the
reasons behind them, with emphasis on how individual actions impact on others
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and how the program benefits individuals.
The public relations campaign should not be limited to the more traditional media outlets such as radio, TV, and newspaper public service announcements.

Other avenues should be explored to broaden the basic communications

network.

For example, the free classified papers that are so popular now are a

highly visible and easily accessible form for disseminating public service
announcements.
The use of already existing groups at all levels is essential to a pervasive public relations campaign.

Conservation districts, state extension agen-

cies, and public libraries span the nation.

Such groups often need information

themselves and would be interested in disseminating useful information on
floodplain management as well as other integrated emergency management
concepts.
The District is currently working with SCS to sponsor a floodplain tour to
introduce people to flood hazards on a local basis by showing flood-prone areas
that are undeveloped, high water marks on existing developments in the floodplain, areas that are being considered for development and their relationship
to flood hazards.

The occasion can be a successful way to develop an awareness

of flood-conscious development.

Such a program should be geared to the

audience and conducted for several different target audiences, i.e., realtors,
developers, insurers, bankers, consumers, and local units of government.
State extension agents often have daily talk shows and/or newsletters, and
might be willing to develop a series on the basics of floodplain management,
flood insurance, evacuation and warning, floodproofing and other related
issues.
Public libraries are a great place to build up a reference section on
floodplain management as well as to disseminate brochures.
Such professional associations as the home builders, real estate agents,
and insurers may be willing to assist in providing and disseminating information.

They routinely hold national, regional, and state conventions, and

issues of community interest such as the NFIP would be a welcome addition to
their agenda.

Such groups also have a variety of publications that are

valuable vehicles.

A brochure published by a national appraisers' group was

placed in the deed room of a local county clerk's office to highlight what to
look for when buying property, but no mention was made about a determination of
whether the property was hazard-prone.

This was an opportunity lost.
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County fairs, folk festivals and other community events offer excellent
opportunities to distribute information.

Local service groups such as Jaycees,

Kiwanis, and automobile clubs have established credibility within the community
and serve as willing volunteers to help with public information programs.
In Harlan, we worked with a small community group called the Fellowship
Center to establish a landmark program.

From the information gathered by

volunteers at the Center, we not only made the residents aware of procedures to
follow during an emergency situation, but also established high water marks in
the area.

We coordinated this information with the flood insurance study for

the area and, with the aid of SCS, transferred the high water marks to all the
telephone poles in the flood-prone area by simply spray painting the water mark
at the correct height on the pole.

Such activities need continuous maintenance

and follow-up with bulletins showing how water marks coincide with weather
warning announcements for evacuation purposes.

As with any education program

or public relations campaign, to be successful i t has to be an ongoing
process.
Technical Assistance
Some technical assistance programs are simple approaches requiring a
minimum of financial expenditures.

Others require technical assistance from

the various state and federal agencies.

This can take any number of forms:

•

Development of a do-it-yourself book on floodproofing. A specialty
publishing house such as Sunset Books or Time-Life could do a popular
rendition of principles and techniques of all of the IEMS concepts.

•

Development of working scale models for a floodmobile (much like the
various Smithsonian vans) to travel with models to show the impact of fill
in a floodplain, the difference in uncontrolled and controlled development
in a floodplain, how to build a shield for picture windows or sliding
glass doors. The vehicle could also disseminate literature and present
slide shows.

•

Curriculum development for an adult continuing education course or
vocational education courses that include full-semester courses covering a
variety of concepts and techniques for hazard mitigation as well as a
short one-day course on how to anchor a propane tank.
These and other types of technical assistance could have far-reaching

impacts in developing a self-help ethic among residents living in hazard-prone
areas who have become too reliant on the federal dollar to solve their problems.
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Agency Coordination
These kinds of approaches can and should be developed, but the various
state and federal agencies need to talk to each other.

For example, the USDA

Forest Service has a series called Investigate Your Environment, which is
designed to teach teachers how to teach environmental concerns.

The course was

really very good, but in one role-playing activity concerning land use planning
there was no mention in the printed fact situation that the land was floodprone--and no one thought it necessary to add this fact to future printings of
the material.
At the state level, there are frequent problems deciding who has what
authority in dealing with disaster and emergency services groups and the
natural resources groups.

Agencies tend to shy away from cooperating with each

other because of these "turf battles," and thus a valuable resource and frame
of reference has been lost.
Another problem is the failure of federal and state policy decisions to
trickle down to the planners and implementers in the agency.

Staff people are

still following traditional authorities, while the policy makers and theorists
are exploring new possibilities with new implications for old plans still on
the drawing board.

Perhaps miniregional conferences are needed for the middle

levels of bureaucracy and the field personnel.

Do state and federal agencies

really take advantage of Emergency Management Institute courses and if not, why
not?
The final key to implementation is local involvement in the decisionmaking process.

Why don't the states conduct conferences (like the annual NFIP

coordinators' conference) for the local and regional planners to pass on the
knowledge they have acquired?

Why is there no representation from local

government and regional planners at the annual coordinators' conference?
Perhaps agencies could set up working advisory groups with a broad crosssection of individuals to include citizens (the eventual benefactors) and such
professionals as architects, engineers, educators, and planners.
~dvisory

Such an

group could also be set up to examine EMI course needs and content.

The bottom line to training and educating the local practitioner is to
nake sure the local practitioner is involved in the process.
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THE RAPID GROWTH OF COMMUNITY FLOOD WARNING SYSTEMS

Curtis B. Barrett
NOAA/National Weather Service

The NWS is currently experiencing a substantial demand by communities for
technical support for local flood warning systems.

This demand is occurring

because federal, state, county, and local governments are becoming more aware
of the benefits of operating local flood warning systems.

This trend will

probably continue as flood damages continue to increase and as the NWS and
other agencies assist communities to solve their flood problems.

This paper

deals with the present and future role of the NWS in working with communities
in operating local flood warning systems.
Present Approaches to Identify High Risk Areas
In 1975 the NWS contracted with the University of Texas to evaluate the
flash flood potential of the entire nation.

This study used a magnitude of

flash flooding index, flash floou frequency index, and a flash flood warning
time index to evaluate flash flood potential.

However, i t only provided the

NWS with a partial solution in the definition of high risk flash flood areas.
FEMA has identified 20,000 locations in the U.S. that are vulnerable to
the occurrence of floods and flash floods.

This "data base," which contains

useful information for each community, is another source to help identify "high
risk" areas subject to floods.

Other factors that need to be considered are

the population located in the floodplain, present level of warning service,
location of dams in the river basin, and the general level of awareness and
enthusiasm of community officials regarding solving their flood problems.
The NWS does not, in general, market local flood warning systems but
rather responds to requests from communities for technical support.

The NWS

does not have the resources to provide a sustained marketing effort to communities located in high risk areas.
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Classification of Communities for Assistance
Communities are not classified for receiving assistance.

Instead, the NWS

policy (Draft chapter E-OB. WSOM) for supporting communities needs is that:
1)

The NWS will provide technical assistance to requesting communities as
resources permit.

2)

Communities are responsible for the purchase, installation, maintenance,
and cooperation of local flood warning systems.
Other federal agencies such as the Corps of Engineers, the Federal

Emergency Management Agency, and the USDA Soil Conservation Service have provided cost-sharing financial support to high-risk communities.
New Approaches
The design, development, and implementation of local flood warning systems
is an evolutionary process.

As technology advances, so will our capability to

enhance flood warning services.
in particular, the capabilities of automated local flood warning systems
will continue to expand.

In the present versions of ALERT and IFLOWS, the

hydrometeorological analysis and modeling is limited.

Development is now

underway to 1) display and process multimeteorologic sensor data, 2) include
hydrologic routing techniques, 3) model snow melt, and 4) develop a coastal
surge/riverine interface model.

Dam break procedures are planned.

Automated

flood warning systems will eventually evolve into a system of hydrometeorological models and techniques that will meet the many needs of communities.
Future Role of the Systems
The human element will always be the critical one in the warning process.
Local flood warning systems are simply tools to be used by those individuals
responsible for preserving human life and property.

Because of this fact, the

NWS designs forecast and warning systems that are interactive.

Since there are

no perfect hydrologic models, and since data scarcity is the greatest source of
error in river and flood forecasting, manual and automated system performance
can only provide "guidance" to the forecaster.

Of course, the more accurate

and timely the objective guidance, the more warning time and accuracy we can
provide communities to prepare for floods.
In all cases, automated or manual, the key individual (flash flood coordinator) must assimilate data, guidance, and information; interpret the "system"
results; and make decisions about the appropriate actions.
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warning Systems and Floodplain Management
Warning systems are one nonstructural approach to mitigating flood losses.
Basically, a warning system provides lead time for response actions, flood
magnitude, and location of flooding.

In order for a local flood warning system

to be effective, an emergency action plan must be available.

other structural

and nonstructural methods can be linked with a flood warning system to further
reduce flood losses.

For example, floodproofing linked with a manual flood

warning system in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania, is credited with reducing
flood losses by 90%.
In order for warning systems to become more effective, forecasts generated
for river gauges must be related to the area inundated by the flood.

This

translation from a point forecast to an area forecast would greatly enhance
flood response actions.

Also, it is desirable for automated flood warning

systems to include the community emergency action plan as part of the forecast
system.

Thus, forecasts would automatically be translated to actions.

In general, the important point to note here for floodplain managers is
that flood warning systems are usually not the sole solution but rather one
solution among many in an overall floodplain management effort.
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FLOOD FIGHTING IN THE CHICAGO METROPOLITAN AREA

James M. Considine
Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission

Background
The Chicago metropolitan area or Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area is
composed of six counties and 261 municipalities with a population of over seven
million people.

All six counties are in the regular phase of the National

Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).

Two hundred twenty municipalities are in the

regular phase and ten are in the emergency phase of the NFIP.

Chicago is the

largest municipality, with a population of over three and one half million.
Overland flooding problems in Chicago are minimal, although sewer back-up
problems are quite common.

The heavily populated suburbs have severe overland

as well as sewer back-up flooding problems.
Overland flooding in Northeastern Illinois is generally shallow, with low
velocities, and is of a short duration.

Floods at the same location are

usually infrequent, although some areas do have annual flood problems.

The

Chicago SMSA is so large that heavy rainstorms can cause severe flooding in one
area and only minimal problems several miles away.
The damage from floods can be quite extensive because of the large number
of structures located in the floodplains of northeast Illinois.

In 1981, flood

damage in the southern part of the metropolitan area amounted to $84 million,
and in 1982 one northern suburb had over $8 million in damage.

Average annual

overland flood damages in the suburbs of the Chicago area have been estimated
at $12.4 million.
Flood fighting problems in the metropolitan area are compounded because
the flood-prone areas are occupied by numerous small municipalities that lack
the capability and expertise to adequately handle flooding situations.

These

small municipalities lack the proper staff, have a shortage of equipment and
supplies, and have no lead time when it comes to flood warning.
It is difficult to convince the municipalities that a flood response plan
is needed.

Though flooding can affect many structures and cause much damage,

the percentage of structures that are flooded is very small in relation to the
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total number of structures in the metropolitan area.

While many of the munici-

palities have witnessed a 50-year or greater flood within the last 20 years,
there are still many other municipalities that have not.

There is a general

feeling that a severe flood will not occur again, that a structural project
will handle the problem, or that the problem is better left ignored.

For these

reasons, flood fighting is a very low priority item for most municipalities.
Planning for flood fighting is almost nonexistent.

Flood fighting

decisions are normally made "on the spot" by administrators who often have
neither witnessed a flood nor had flood fighting training.

Some municipalities

have Emergency Services and Disaster Agency emergency response plans, but these
"all-emergency" plans normally do not provide the necessary answers for flood
fighting.

While most of the municipalities have capable staffs, the rapid

onset of the flooding, the last-minute decisions, the lack of trained
personnel, and the frantic search for equipment and supplies can cause severe
strains on the municipal staff and leave the public with many questions about
the capabilities of their municipal personnel.
Evaluating the Problem
During December, 1982, floods inundated various locations throughout the
metropolitan area.

Eyewitness accounts by several representatives from the

Illinois Division of water Resources led to a general belief that the flood
fighting capabilities of the municipalities were lacking.
Because of this, the Division of Water Resources conducted a flood fighting conference in March, 1983, attended by over 250 representatives of local
police departments, fire departments, public works departments, building and
zoning departments, ESDA coordinators, and elected officials.

The purpose of

the conference was to explain to municipal officials what flood fighting and
floodplain management services were provided by the various state and federal
government agencies.
At the end of the conference a feedback session was held to determine what
federal and state governments could do to improve local flood fighting capabilities.

Approximately seventy of the conference attendees participated in the

community feedback session.

They were asked, "Based on your experience, what

assistance could be provided by the state and federal governments and neighboring communities to help you before, during, or after a flood?"

Based upon

their decisions, a rank order of the assistance that state and federal govern-
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ments could provide was developed.

The following kinds of assistance were

considered the most important (in order of decreasing importance):
1)

Guidance and assistance in preparing flood response plans;

2)

Aid in establishing local or watershed flood warning systems;

3)

Better coordination and tougher enforcement of regulations on floodplain
development, channel obstructions, and stormwater management;

4)

More information on how to fight floods and what assistance and resources
are available; and

5)

Better coordination to provide mutual aid and share equipment among
communities in the same area or watershed.
After the conference a flood fighting coordination committee was formed to

discuss the outcome of the community feedback session and how i t should be
addressed.

The committee was composed of representatives from the

u.s.

Army

Corps of Engineers Chicago District, the Illinois Division of Water Resources,
the National Weather Service, the Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster
Agency, the regional planning commission, and selected municipal and county
representatives.
Flood Fighting Manual
The main outcome of the flood fighting coordination meeting was to develop
a flood fighting manual that could be used by local municipalities to prepare
flood response plans.

It was felt that such a manual could address many of the

concerns raised by the local government officials at the feedback session.

The

manual was funded mainly by the State of Illinois but also partially by the
State Assistance Program of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The flood

fighting manual is still in the draft stage, and some municipalities have
already expressed an interest in working with the state to develop a flood
response plan, using the manual as a guideline.
The flood fighting manual is a "how-to" guide that provides instructions
on systematically designing a flood fighting program through a planning
process.

The process is similar to the planning process in the Integrated

Emergency Management System (IEMS) developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.

The flood fighting chapters of the manual are:
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•

Chapter 1, "Flood Hazard Analysis"--explains that different types of
floods demand different responses. Flood data must be collected and
analyzed. A flood stage forecast map is needed to determine the flood
hazard impact and to set priorities for emergency response needs.

•

Chapter 2, "capability Assessment"--shows how a municipality should make
an inventory and assessment of the three types of resources--personnel,
equipment, and facilities--that would be needed to fight a flood, and how
to obtain assistance from state and federal agencies.

•

Chapter 3, "Flood warning"--explains different types of warning systems
and how the warnings should be disseminated.

•

Chapter 4, "Flood Fighting Plan"--provides an overview of everything that
should be done immediately after a flood warning is issued.
Practical Application
The manual would have been of little benefit unless i t could be applied to

a practical situation.

About the same time that the flood fighting committee

was formed, a drainage district questioned what they could do to control flooding.

It was suggested that they consider developing a flood warning system.

Flood warning systems on a watershed level have not been developed in the
Chicago metropolitan area.

with the encouragement of the State of Illinois'

Division of water Resources, four communities within the watershed of the west
Fork Branch of the Chicago River have almost completed the preparatory work for
a manually operated flood warning sy,,;tem, with the nec.:e";";dry tec.:hnical expertise being provided by the U.S. National Weather Service.
The precipitation and streams gauges are read by police departments, fire
departments, public works and volunteer ESDA officials from the four municipalities.

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Chicago District, has agreed to

develop a flood stage forecast map.

Once the flood stage mapping is complete,

the Illinois Division of Water Resources and the Emergency Services and
Disaster Agency intend to assemble the municipalities to develop a flood fighting plan based upon the flood fighting manual.
The process has been very slow.

It was initiated almost one year ago and

the flood stage mapping has yet to be prepared.

It was expected that i t would

take time to develop a flood warning system and response plan, since this is
the first time that i t has been done on a watershed basis in the metropolitan
area.

However, a shortage of state and federal personnel who can devote time

to the project has greatly hindered its completion.

Those personnel assigned

to work on the project have other responsibilities that take priority.

Because
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of this, the flood response plan for the North Branch of the Chicago River
watershed remains undone, and many other watersheds need assistance on flood
warning systems and response plans.
Conclusion
The capability and the willingness of municipalities to prepare flood
warning systems and flood response plans is evident.
more pronounced after flood events.

Their desires are even

Intergovernmental cooperation is a diffi-

cult task that has to be worked out, but is not a major obstacle.' The big
challenge lies in making the proper people available to the local municipalities, and this includes for planning as well as technical assistance.
The lack of assistance is not a result of the capabilities of the people
in the state and federal agencies, but rather of the lack of time that can be
devoted to such efforts.

More emphasis needs to be placed on assistance by

those agencies with the staff to provide it to the local municipalities.

This

includes the u.s. National Weather Service, the u.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
the Illinois Department of Transportation Division of water Resources, the
Illinois Emergency Services and Disaster Agency, and the Illinois State Water
Survey.
The Division of Water Resources has made great strides in showing municipalities how they can develop a flood response plan with the flood fighting
manual.

Many municipalities that had not thought about developing such pro-

cedures now have something to help them visualize how it can be done.
technical and planning assistance is still needed.

However,

None of the suburban

municipalities or the counties have a hydrologist who can develop flood
forecasting procedures.

Of the municipalities with an engineering staff, many

do not have the time, or for that matter, the expertise to properly prepare
flood forecast maps.

These are the kinds of things that can be done by the

U,S. National Weather service, the u.s. Army Corps of Engineers, and the state
of Illinois.

The expertise is there, but time must be allocated.
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UTAH FLOODS--1983-84
James D. Harvey
Utah Division of Comprehensive Emergency Management
Department of Public safety

The settlement of Utah and the West dates back to 1776 with the expedition
of Father Escalante, followed by exploration by early mountaineers, fur
trappers, and the John C. Freemont expedition.
Mormon pioneers entered the Salt Lake Valley.

In 1847, the first of many
These people were the first to

maintain records of the fluctuations of the Great Salt Lake.

The lake's fre-

quent flooding of vast areas of land caused the early settlers many problems.
According to historical records, the Great Salt Lake reached its highest
elevation of 4,212 feet during the years 1872-1874.

For a period of ten years

(1868-1878) the lake was above the 4,209-foot level.

In 1963, the lake

declined to its lower elevation of 4,191.5 feet. During this time, the utah
Legislature passed a resolution that set forth the idea that the lake should be
maintained at the 4,200-foot level.

In spite of the efforts of the utah

Legislature, the lake today is at an elevation of 4,209 feet.

Drawing from

past as well as from present facts, we can reasonably expect more flooding from
the lake.
Today, industry, developers, engineers, and others have a difficult time
trying to determine the fluctuations of the lake.

This scenario holds true for

much of the state as we attempt to deal with the lakes and rivers of Utah.
This is because Utah is a land of contrasts.

For example, the Great Salt Lake

Basin receives an average of 5.3 inches of rain annually whereas the ski resort
at Alta receives an average of 100 inches per year.
197 inches of rain.)
drier.

(This year, Alta received

Normally, Utah is a desert state, with only Nevada being

However, past and present records indicate that flooding is a common

problem.
Utah experiences three types of flooding:
ing, and

two types of snow melt flood-

short-lived summer torrential downpours associated with cloudbursts

and thunderstorms.

The first snow melt floods take place during the months of

January and February while the ground is frozen.

These floods are difficult to

control because corrective measures are hampered by winter weather.

The second
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snow melt occurs during the last week of April and continues through May.
runoff is often increased by rain.

The

The salt Lake area was affected by such

floods in 1922, 1952, and again in 1983-84.

(It is of interest to note that

the floods of 1922 and of 1952 did not have the highest volume of total runoff,
but that the floods resulted because of above average spring temperatures.)
The flooding of 1983-84 is, we believe, a repeat of the high water that
was experienced by the Mormon pioneers of 95 years ago.
100-year event?

We believe that it is.

Could this be a true

As a result of rising waters, the

following events have occurred:
1)

Interstate 80 from Salt Lake City west to Nevada was damaged and required
reconstructive work.

2)

The Great Salt Lake Mineral company went out of business, resulting in the
loss of 240 jobs.

3)

Saltair Entertainment Park also went out of business, resulting in 20 to
50 lost jobs.

4)

Many agricultural operations were flooded, resulting in the loss of
millions of agricultural dollars.

5)

Additional diking of Rose Park (northwest of Salt Lake City)
required.

was

It must be noted that the jobs lost because of the lake's flooding are to
some extent offset by the new jobs generated in the fighting of the flood.
Loss of income has also been experienced by all of the major hotels of the
state as a direct result of the news coverage of the floods of 1983 and 1984.
Based upon our experiences during the flood fight of 1983-84, our most
serious problems were those dealing with unknown factors such as mud/landslides
and dam failures, coupled with the fact that homeowners and small business
people were unwilling to accept even minimal losses from flooding.

As a result

some dwellings were saved only at great public expense.
Another thing that caused some confusion was the practice of county officials contacting the Governor's and the U.S. Senators' offices directly instead
of working through the proper channels.
ment was misappropriated.

Because of this, some emergency equip-

We are taking measures to better inform local offi-

cials on the procedures to follow in the case of an emergency.
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As a result of the extensive damages Utah experienced in the last few
years, we are taking preventive measures.
being constructed.
erosion.

For example, many debris basins are

River banks are being riprapped to prevent excess bank

To counter mudslides, landslides, and extensive hillside erosion, we

are installing electronic instrumentation for early warnings.
provide up to 30 minutes of lead time.

These stations

One worry that we do have concerning

these stations is that too many false alerts may condition property owners not
to heed the warnings.

Also, a new area for lawsuits could arise if people seek

recourse for disasters that may have been avoided if adequate warning had been
given.

Would predisaster plans be practical for a state such as Utah?
believe any planning to be practical.

Yes, we

In many instances, county/city crews

were able to predict the extent of a flood enabling them to fortify stream
banks and reduce possible losses.

However, it must be noted that all of the

mud/landslides that have occurred in Utah these past two years were in areas
thought not to be subject to land movement.

Areas of greatest concern did not

move.

Agencies that were a part of the flood fight of 1984 were:
Federal Agencies
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Highway Administration
National Weather Service
Small Business Administration
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USDA Soil Conservation Services
USDA Agriculture Stabilization Services
USDA Forest Service
U.S. Geological Survey
State Agencies
Department of
Department of
Department of
Department of
Department of
Department of
Utah National

Agriculture
community and Economic Development
Health
Insurance
Natural Resources and Energy
Transportation
Guard

The following recommendations are offered for future flood mitigation:
1)

Have the Army Corps of Engineers combine mudflow and flood-zone data onto
one FEMA map. This is being done for Davis county.
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2)
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Propose legislation requiring that owners of dams have liability
insurance.

3)

Where possible, swap lands between federal agencies and local communities
in areas in which debris basins and flood control measures are to be
constructed.

4)

Further define the role of the state engineer to include regulating
storage reservoirs.

5)

During disasters, arrange fro property owners to receive their flood
insurance payments from their individual insurance agents.

6)

Provide for the payment of flood insurance for structures rendered unusable as well as for those destroyed.
Utah has and will continue to experience floods.

We hope that our present

mitigation efforts (both regulatory and structural), coupled with past experience will reduce the severity of that flooding.
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